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ABSTRACT 
 
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL-HERMENEUTIC ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTAL 
INFANT RESEARCH 
  
 
 
By 
James L. Yu 
December 2009 
 
Dissertation supervised by Eva Simms, Ph.D. 
  This project challenges the dualistic conceptions in infant research literature by 
reexamining a collection of infant research records from a phenomenological, non-
dualistic perspective.  Grounded in the recent convergences between phenomenology and 
cognitive sciences, this project utilizes a combined phenomenological-hermeneutic 
method.  This model of analysis is applied to three major areas in infant research: 
physical knowledge, memory-based learning, and social behaviors.  The primary pool of 
data is drawn from written research records from both primary and secondary sources.  
To reinterpret empirical findings the analysis includes a systematic reexamination of the 
ontological presuppositions of infant researchers/scholars, and a reflective, experience-
near approach.  The author attempts to deconstruct reified concepts and concretize 
theoretical abstractions that have been used to describe and interpret experimental 
 v 
 
observations reported in the literature.  Accordingly, the conceptual framework of this 
project is founded on several phenomenological notions that seek to transcend dualism: 
phenomenal world, lived-body, and intersubjectivity.  
  The first part of investigation demonstrated that subject-object dualism has had a 
major impact on contemporary conceptions of infants’ object/physical knowledge.  In 
turn, it was shown that a unified subject-object view of perception can allow for a non-
conceptual perspective on the infant’s understanding of the physical world; specifically, 
the permanence of objects and other physical principles are abstract descriptions of what 
are already implicit in the infant’s lived-world.  Second, the lasting influence of mind-
body dualism was revealed through a critical re-reading of the research studies 
concerning memory-based learning behaviors.  Based on the idea of intelligent action 
without representation, several experimental studies were reinterpreted in order to capture 
the immediacy of infants’ coping behaviors.  Lastly, the prevalence of the self-other 
ontological separation in the research literature was shown through a systematic 
reexamination of the research on infants’ facial perception, imitation, and social 
intentionality.  In addition, it was demonstrated that the rationale underlying the thesis of 
a “discriminatory consciousness” and self-and/or-other representations can be effectively 
deconstructed through a phenomenological re-reading of some of this supporting 
empirical evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 I would like to thank Dr. Eva Simms, my dissertation director, for her excellent 
guidance and support.  Eva’s thoughtful input and active curiosity for my project helped 
me to expand the scope of several sections.  I truly appreciate her willingness to devote 
the time and energy needed as a dissertation director.  My own thought has resonated 
with Eva’s work since my very first semester at Duquesne, and this dissertation is 
founded on my final paper for a class with her.  Therefore, many of the 
phenomenological ideas expressed in this project grew out of our intellectual exchanges 
throughout the past five years, both inside and outside of the classroom.   
  I would like to thank my readers, Dr. Connie Fischer and Dr. Paul Richer.  Connie 
has been a major mentor throughout my graduate training at Duquesne, supporting 
wholeheartedly both my clinical and academic work.  Connie’s emphasis on expressing 
phenomenological thought descriptively and succinctly has had a lasting influence on my 
approach to academic writing.  Paul’s interest in experimental research and his 
introduction of Merleau-Ponty’s Structure of Behavior in a class laid the foundation of 
my own interest in similar lines of work.  His systematic presentation of some 
complicated concepts in phenomenology helped me to digest these materials despite the 
language barrier during my early training.  I especially appreciate both Connie and Paul’s 
efforts in supporting my applications for a teaching position in Hong Kong.   
  A final thanks to Nate Okpych, who has helped me with proofreading some parts 
of this project; and Andri Yennari, who has provided me with emotional support 
throughout the writing process. 
 vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
                Page 
Abstract…………………………………………………………….………………......…iv 
Acknowledgements………...……………………………………………………………..vi 
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………1 
   1.1 Background..…………………………………………………………………..1 
  1.2 Conceptual Framework………………………………………………………..3 
      An Ontological Emphasis…………………………………………………3 
    A Review of Relevant Literature………………………………………….4 
     Conceptual Foundations…………………………………………………..6 
    1.3 Research Questions…………………………………………………………..11 
  1.4 Methods……………………………………………………………………....13 
    Phenomenology...………………………………………………………..14 
 Hermeneutics………………………………………………………….....16 
 Primary Data for Analysis……….………………………………………17 
     Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Analysis……………………………….18 
  1.5 Validity………………………………………………………………………19 
2. Infant’s Physical Knowledge: Overcoming Subject-Object Dualism…………….21  
 2.1 Introduction…………………………………………………..…….………21  
    2.2 How do infants perceive object permanence?.................................................28 
   A Phenomenological Re-reading of a Research Summary………………32 
   2.3 How do infants perceive objects-in-motion?...................................................41   
 viii 
 
     A Phenomenological Approach to the Original Drawbridge Study……..42 
   A Re-reading of Other Drawbridge Studies………………...……………48 
    Partially-Occluded Object Movements…..………………………………57 
  2.4 How do infants perceive object categorizations?.............................................64 
   Mental Categorical Schemas vs. A Categorical World………………….64 
     Reflecting on the Habituation Process in the Study…….…...…………..67 
     Reflecting on the Infants’ Experience in the Study…………………...…69 
   Categorizing in the Natural Habitat…………………...…………………71 
3. Infant’s Bodily Intelligence: Learning without Representations…………...…….74 
3.1 Introduction………...…….………………………………………………….74 
  3.2 Bodily Intentionality………………….……………………………………...77 
     A “Coupled” Body-World Perspective…………………………………..78 
     Affordances and Embodied Coping………………………...……………81 
      Corporeal Schema and Vitality Affects………………………………….83 
    The Embodied Agent and Practical Space……………………………….84 
    3.3 Intelligent/Learned Behavior I: Infant’s Reaching in the Dark……………...87 
Visual Disappearance and World-Disappearance..……………………….88 
   Differential Reaching in the Light………….……………………………90 
    Differential Reaching in the Dark………………………………………..92 
   3.4 Intelligent/Learned Behavior II: Anticipatory and “Memorized” Actions......95 
     Reexamining the “Mobile Kicking Experiment”……………….……......95 
       Reexamining the “Puppet Experiment”……..…………..……………….99 
 ix 
 
4. Infant’s Social World: Intersubjectivity/Intercorporeality…………….………..104 
  4.1 Introduction………………….……………………………………………..104 
   4.2 Perceiving the Human Face…….…………………………………………..106 
    4.3 Neonatal Imitations: facial and emotional dimensions…………….……….111 
     Facial Imitations in Newborns………………………………………….112 
   Is Facial Imitation also Emotional Imitation?..........................................116 
      Implications for Infants’ Sociality and Selfhood……………………….118 
  4.4 Perceiving Intentionality……………………………………….…………...121 
     Perceiving Intentions/Social Causality…………...…………………….122  
      Perceiving Subject-Object Roles…………………………………….....126 
   4.5 Infant’s Ability to Distinguish between Self and Others…….……………..129 
     A Nondualistic Reinterpretation of Experimental Outcomes…………..132   
   4.6 Research on Representations of Self and Others………….………………..139 
    Presymbolic Representations……………...……………………………143 
     Nonrepresentational Interpretations…………………………………….145 
5. Dissertation Conclusions and Discussion………………………………..………...151 
 5.1 Infant Research and the Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Method….….….151 
  5.2 The “Story” about the Infants in this Project…………………..……….…..153 
   5.3 Concluding Thoughts………………….…………………………………....163 
References…………………………………………………………………………….. .169 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Backgrounds 
  The development of experimental infant research over the past century has given 
rise to a handful of scholarly investigations about the nature of the infant’s world.  Stern 
(1985) called these “inferential leaps,” which are often considered to be a prohibited 
intellectual activity in the mainstream of academic psychology.  Nevertheless, 
psychology is fundamentally a meaning-making profession—collecting data and reading 
into their broader meanings are inseparable.  Thus, we continue to witness psychological 
investigations that go beyond brute quantitative data or raw experimental observations.   
    In particular, some of these efforts have been praised for achieving a high level of 
theoretical sophistication and structural coherence (e.g. Beebe & Lachman, 2002; Jacoby, 
2001; Maurer & Maurer, 1988; Rochat, 2001; Sander, 1977; Stern, 1985).  These 
interpretive inquiries are founded on an attempt to merge psychological theories with 
empirical evidence in infant research.  These scholars all consider their work as a catalyst 
in a never-ending dialogue about the fascinating world of infants.  Psychological research 
at this level is essentially interpretive and discursive—a hermeneutic and dialogical 
“human science” (Dilthey, 1883/1989) grounded in empirical evidence.   
  The current project is also situated in this ongoing, historical dialogue.  Unlike 
most of the former studies, however, it focuses on the level of ontology or the dimension 
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of being and existence.  Accordingly, this project is concerned with the structures and 
meaning of human existence, and takes issue with the basic terms and constructs in infant 
literature that carry controversial ontological implications (e.g. mind, self, body, others, 
and objects).  In the philosophy of psychology, Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964, 1965, & 
1968) is an emblematic pioneer in this line of research.  Most of his works can be 
characterized as a rigorous reexamination of empirical findings from a variety of 
scientific disciplines.  Over his very productive career, he successfully laid out the 
foundation of a post-Cartesian, nondualistic ontology.  In psychoanalysis, too, some 
contemporary scholars are beginning to recognize the importance of ontology in 
psychological interpretations—particularly, the inaccuracy of Cartesian dualistic 
conceptions (e.g. Aron, 1996; Stolorow et al., 2002).   
  Through a systematic reexamination and review of selected literatures based on a 
hermeneutic-phenomenological interpretive method, this project seeks to provide a 
nondualistic perspective on several major topic areas in infant psychological research: 
physical knowledge or understanding, learning and intelligent behaviors, social and 
interpersonal functioning.  The primary pool of data comes from the written descriptions 
and the conceptual interpretations of infant behaviors available in research experiments.  
For this dissertation, research excerpts were collected from both primary and secondary 
sources.  The latter is limited to a small number of seminal works, each of which includes 
an extensive review of the most significant studies in infant psychology.   
  The Cartesian bifurcations of human existence inevitably lead to a vision of the 
self that is bounded, masterful, interiorized, and autonomous—which, at its core, is 
inhabited by Western ideologies (Cushman, 1991).  How exactly does Cartesian dualism 
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influence the literature of infant research?  In order to address this question, the current 
project pays special attention to three particular dichotomous ontological themes: subject-
object bifurcation, mind-body split, and self-other separation.  Alternatively, the 
reexamination is guided by the core nondualistic ontological propositions in Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy: the phenomenal world or “lived-world,” embodiment or “lived-body,” 
and intersubjectivity or intercorporeality.   
1.2 Conceptual Framework 
An Ontological Emphasis 
  Technically speaking, psychology regularly steps into a branch of metaphysics 
known as ontology, because it involves theoretical and conceptual explorations that 
provide implications about the following questions: What is there? What is a subject? 
What is an object? What is existence and how is it defined?  What are the relations 
between the subject and the object, the mind and the body, the self and others?  Evidently, 
academic psychology has always participated in conceptualizing human realities, explicit 
or implicit, and its intricate relationship with ontology cannot be overlooked.  
 Ontological studies concern the nature and relations of being, and thus, the 
question of how reality is experienced by humans.  It is not difficult to see the ontological 
underpinnings in psychological literature—from how a phenomenon is broken down into 
separate but interacting objects, to how these objects are related to the observer studying 
them.  Nevertheless, it takes a disciplined scholarly effort to systematically explicate 
these ontological claims, which is a major goal in the current dissertation; no 
standardized experimental methods and statistical analysis can do this trick! 
  Every theoretical account of infancy is an anthropological portrayal of human 
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beings in the earliest developmental stage, and every conceptual interpretation of infant 
behaviors in experimental settings is founded on an implicit ontology.  It is impossible to 
describe or interpret human behaviors without an ontological framework.  In some cases, 
a whole discipline of knowledge is built upon a specific ontology.  Thus, ontology is the 
ultimate ground for the so-called theoretical presuppositions, preconceptions, and 
assumptions.   
  In infant literature, the “inferential leaps” (Stern, 1985) occur at both theoretical 
and ontological levels.  Theoretical conceptualizations not only construct a vision of 
human being (anthropology), but also reveal an array of ontological commitments. To a 
certain extent, some critical infant scholars (e.g., Rochat, 2001; Stern, 1985) have 
attempted to make ontology somewhat more explicit in their work.  However, these 
issues have not been properly treated in the history of psychology 
A Review of Relevant Literature 
  Theorizing about the infant’s world might be an intellectually-stimulating activity 
for many psychologists.  Nevertheless, in order to create a coherent account of infancy, 
some scholars engage in an extensive and painstaking analysis of research records.  
Maurer and Maurer (1988) and Rochat (2001) are two successful examples, as their 
respective works on infancy have been recognized for achieving a high level of internal 
coherence in their arguments.  In the broad and diverse field of contemporary 
psychoanalysis, a number of notable scholars/researchers have also made remarkable 
contributions to infant psychology through bridging psychodynamic theories with 
empirical findings (i.e., Sander, 1980; Lichtenberg, 1983; Stern, 2000; Beebe & Lachman, 
2002).  Jacoby (1999) has also attempted to bridge infant research with Jungian analytic 
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theories.    
  In the past few decades, contemporary psychoanalysis has experienced an abrupt 
awakening about the inaccuracy of an intrapsychic model of the mind, which, needless to 
say, is Cartesian by default (Stolorow et al., 2002).  Beebe and Lachman (2002) propose 
a “system view” of infant’s consciousness where the newborn and the mother continually 
and mutually regulate the psycho-affective states of each other.  Similarly, Stolorow et al. 
(2002) puts forth the idea of an “intersubjective field,” suggesting that infants from the 
very beginning participate in a nondualistic world with their mothers.  These ideas 
resonate with Donald Winnicott’s famous saying that the infant does not exist as an 
isolated being, and her existence can only be understood as a mother-infant unit.  
  On the border between psychology and philosophy, Knowles (1986) demonstrates 
how developmental psychology could be understood from a human-science framework, 
through a careful reexamination of Erikson’s stages of development from the perspective 
of Heidegger’s existential-phenomenology. Gallagher (2002) suggests that 
phenomenology has a very strong appeal to the interpretation of scientific findings.  
In light of the groundbreaking research in infant psychology, many scholars with both 
philosophical and psychological backgrounds have also attempted to investigate different 
aspects of the infant’s world from a phenomenological-hermeneutic perspective (e.g., 
Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1966; Simms, 1993, 1994, & 1999; O’Connor, 1986; Wiggins, 
1979).   
  Furthermore, the psychological relevance of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is well-
documented.  For instance, Dreyfus (1972, 1986) and Gallagher (2005) have attempted to 
bring Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the “lived-body” into a refreshing dialogue with 
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cognitive sciences and neurosciences, providing a new understanding of complex 
phenomenon such as phantom limbs, unilateral neglect, and the construction of artificial 
intelligence.  In 1996, Shaun Gallagher collaborated with the world-renowned infant 
researcher, A.N. Meltzoff, in a combined effort to reexamine Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on 
the infant’s sense of self and others.  Evidently, Merleau-Ponty’s revolutionary 
contributions to infant psychology are uncontestable (Hoeller, 1993).  
Conceptual Foundations 
  As previously discussed, there are several ontological notions proposed by 
Merleau-Ponty that serve as the conceptual foundation in this dissertation: the 
phenomenal world/lived-world, intersubjectivity/intercorporeality, and 
embodiment/lived-body.  It is absolutely imperative that these notions are viewed as 
fundamentally ontological rather than theoretical concepts, given that all theories are 
grounded in ontology.   
  Nevertheless, these notions are not completely foreign to the tradition of 
developmental psychology.  For instance, emphasis on the fundamental relatedness 
between the organism and its surroundings can be traced back to Heinz Werner’s 
“organismic approach” to human development.  According to this approach, development 
refers to changes of structure, proceeding from “a state of relative lack of differentiation 
and to a state of increasing differentiation and hierarchic integration” (Werner & Kaplan, 
1956, p.866).  Differentiation is the process through which a global whole, or an 
undifferentiated unit, progressively branches out into assorted units with specific 
functions.  These units are not isolated from one another, but “hierarchically integrated” 
as a whole: all units function as a complex system, in which the higher regulating units 
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always take control over the lower ones.  This model of human development is known as 
the “orthogenic principle,” which operates in many developmental domains.  In the 
psychological domains, the implication of the orthogenic principle is remarkably 
profound.  For instance, it would challenge the idea of a unified self because our self-
consciousness might also begin in a state of relative undifferentiation between self and 
others.   
  Some of Werner’s developmental notions carry tremendous implications for our 
understanding of the infant’s world.  For instance, the notion of microgenesis suggests 
that perception unfolds in the exact same sequence of human development from relative 
undifferentiation to more differentiation.   Physiognomic perception characterizes the 
most fundamental level in which the human organism perceives the world: perception is 
fused with sensations, feelings and actions, and thus, things originally appear as full of 
life and emotions.  Next, we will further elucidate the notions of the phenomenal world, 
the lived-body, and intersubjectivity, in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy.  
The Phenomenal World 
   The phenomenal world refers to the primordial relatedness between human beings  
and the world; it is a notion that radically challenges the Cartesian subject-object and 
inner-outer distinctions.  The world is simultaneously immanent and transcendent—
everything we perceive is “in-itself-for-us.”  Every presence trails a past and portends a 
future; thus, there is a thickness in each passing moment.  Through a phenomenological 
reflection on the crisscrossing/reversibility between the subject and the object, Merleau-
Ponty (1962) attempts to deconstruct the subject-object dichotomy: 
  This subject-object dialogue, this drawing together, by the subject of the  
  meaning diffused through the object, and by the object, of the subject’s  
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  intentions—a process which is physiognomic perception—ranges round the  
  subject a world speaks to him of himself, and gives his own thoughts their place  
     in their world” (p.152-153). 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is also characterized by a return of the body into 
philosophical and psychological discourses.  Not long before him, Edmund Husserl 
considered consciousness in terms of intentionality which is always directed to the world.  
For Merleau-Ponty, however, intentionality is not understood in terms of a transcendental 
ego as Husserl suggested, but of a total bodily engagement and anchorage in the world.  
The body is the primary medium through which the subject knows the world, but they are 
never separated ontologically.  The embodied subject simultaneously inhabits a world 
and is inhabited by it.  This conception of an intermingled, double inhabitation is a 
paradox that has no place in Cartesian dualism.  At the end of his career, Merleau-Ponty 
(1968) invented the metaphoric notion of the “flesh,” which refers to an “element” that 
highlights the intertwining between the self and others, as well as the subject and the 
objects.  
      The Lived-Body 
  Embodiment has a variety of definitions across different fields of study.  Here, the 
term is founded on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the “lived-body,” which is a counterclaim 
to the radical split between the Cartesian disembodied mind and the purely materialistic, 
mindless body.  In his ontological elucidation of human embodiment, Merleau-Ponty 
took on a few empirical phenomena—namely, infant’s pointing and grasping, double-
sensation, and the phantom-limb, and revealed their ontological implications for the 
human body.   
  From a phenomenological perspective, the body and the mind are not separate 
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entities, but different orders of a singular structural unity.  Merleau-Ponty (1964) argues 
that terms such as perception, phenomenon, or experience, already presuppose a body.  
The body is the ultimate ground of reference for perceptual experience.  Having a body is 
equivalent to having a world: to be embodied is to be in the world and of the world.  
Hence, the body is a part of the domain it surveys.  The relation between the body and 
space is captured by the notion of “lived-space.”  According to this idea, space is already 
pregnant with both potentials and limitations of motor projects, which is the foundation 
of a primordial sense of “I can” or bodily intentionality already operative during early 
infancy.  In addition, through a painstaking analysis of a patient’s disability resulting 
from a severe brain injury, Merleau-Ponty (1962) shows that the structural re-
configuration of the body would bring about corresponding change in the lived-world.   
  In the same vein, Werner (1948) posits that infants hardly experience an outside 
world differentiated from their own immediate actions, sensations and feelings/emotions.  
Infants and young children experience the world at the “sensori-motor-affective” level of 
perception, which is characterized by two perceptual mechanisms: physiognomic 
perception and intersensory experience.  Physiognomic perception implies a syncretic 
unity between the embodied subject and the world of objects, which is present already at 
birth.  Intersensory experience points to the syncretic unity of senses, suggesting that 
human perceptual modalities begin altogether as a relatively global unit.  Accordingly to 
Werner, too, the infant’s body is understood as an embodied subject inherently 
intertwined with the world.   
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Intersubjectivity/Intercorporeality 
  In both philosophical and psychological literatures, intersubjectivity also has a 
variety of definitions.  In psychotherapy, intersubjectivity is often defined as the 
“interplay between two subjectivities,” a field theory that conceives therapeutic 
phenomenon in terms of the co-construction between the therapist and the patient 
(Stolorow et al., 2002).  It is also commonly known as a “two-person” model of 
psychology.  In psychological research, intersubjectivity is treated somewhat as a 
measurable variable.  In developmental psychology, it is often referred as the earliest 
form of pre-linguistic communication—a developmental achievement divided into 
“primary” and “secondary” stages (Trevarthen, 1978, 1979). 
  In philosophy, the history of the term intersubjectivity can be traced back to 
Edmund Husserl, who proposes that “the meaning of the term 'man' implies a reciprocal 
existence of one to the other, hence a community of men, a society" (1970,  p.104, 
original italics).  This notion of “transcendental intersubjectivity” refers to the primordial, 
pre-verbal, and pre-reflected sense of others.  Ortega y Gasset (1957), following Husserl, 
introduces the idea of "compresence,” which describes an intrinsic awareness of others 
regardless of whether they are present in our immediate perception. 
  Intersubjectivity is the ontological counterclaim to the Cartesian isolated mind, or 
the radical self-other split.  Most fundamentally, intersubjectivity suggests that the 
primordial context of human existence is a communal world.  Others are experienced 
originally as animate organisms like oneself.  The intersubjective context of the infant’s 
existence is characterized by what Merleau-Ponty (1964) called the “syncretic sociability,” 
which points to an anonymous communal world prior to the distinction of perspectives—
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what is mine and what is the other.  This particular theme has evoked some interesting 
debates in psychology (e.g., Stern, 1986; Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996).  Nevertheless, the 
point taken is that there is no demarcation between the world an infant owns and 
privately experiences, and the world she exists as an object of others’ intention.  Instead, 
infants are born into an “anonymous collectivity” or an “undifferentiated group life” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p.119).  Intersubjectivity speaks to the ontology of human 
conscious existence: we are at the same time the subject and the object, and the social 
world and us inhabit each other.  As Merleau-Ponty suggests, “the subject is his body, his 
world, and his situation by a sort of exchange” (p.72).  Diamond (1996) also speaks to 
this double inhabitance: “The individual lives in a multipersonal field and conversely this 
inhabits the individual” (p.305).   
  All of these ideas suggest that the infant’s body is not only a biological entity, but 
is also fundamentally intertwined with the social environment.  The infant’s existence is 
interwoven with the existence of others in a multi-personal field.  The notion of 
intersubjectivity, however, is not based on the interaction of isolated minds.  According 
to Merleau-Ponty (1964), the infant’s intersubjective existence must be understood in her 
embodied situation, based on the transfer of corporeal schemas.  Hence, the foundation of 
intersubjectivity is “transitivism” or the “immediate assimilation of others’ experience 
and the infant’s own” (p.135).  
1.3 Research Questions  
  There is no doubt that infant research has tremendous practical implications for 
child-rearing, daycare, education, nursing, medicine, business, and even public policies.  
However, Bruner (1999) has documented some misuses and misinterpretations of 
 12 
 
experimental findings in developmental psychology, showing that empirical evidence 
without careful interpretations could be very counterproductive1.  Thus, an unreflective 
and uncritical attitude is contradictory to the core ethical principle in psychology—that is, 
taking the well-being of people as its best interest.  
  Given that theoretical propositions and models are built upon an implicit ontology, 
it is not difficult to imagine how an underlying ontological framework could give rise to a 
whole discipline of knowledge and professional practices.  For example, it has been noted 
that Cartesian dualism had a major influence in traditional Western medicines (Duncan, 
2000) as well as atomic physics.  Even though Cartesian dualism has been characterized 
as “the cancer of all psychology” (Binswanger, 1963), its remnants continue to prevail in 
highly disguised forms in the literature today.   
  Accordingly, most contemporary psychologists do not identify themselves as 
followers of Cartesian dualism.  Nevertheless, ontological reflection is not a major part of 
the regular routine for psychologists.  Hence, dualistic thoughts are more or less invisible 
even to the critical eyes of a well-trained psychologist.  Whereas contemporary 
psychologists have generally been well-trained in critical thinking, it does not necessarily 
translate into an awareness of how their understanding/knowledge of psychological 
phenomena, in both written and verbal forms, might have been colored by Cartesian 
thoughts.  
  This project is founded on a strong interest in conceptualizing the tightly-webbed 
relationship between the infant and her world.  Based on a critical and reflective approach 
to the subject-object, the mind-body, and the self-other bifurcations in Cartesian dualism, 
                                                 
1
 Bruner (1999) mentions multi-million dollar businesses under the name of science, such as baby-training 
institutes, as an example.  
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the focus is on the infant’s relationship to her own body, physical objects, and other 
animate beings.  Correspondingly, the following questions are being asked:  
1. How do infants understand the ways in which physical objects behave and 
interact with each other in space? 
 
2. How do infants engage in bodily actions or motor projects that indicate 
learning and intelligence? 
 
3.  How do infants perceive the social features in their surroundings, and what 
can be learned from their social behaviors? 
   
1.4 Methods 
  Merleau-Ponty (1965) argues that traditional scientific psychology is “in no 
position, with its more restricted methods, to examine carefully and critically” (Preface, 
Xiii) the ontological assumptions in infant research literature.  The current dissertation, 
with its ontological emphasis, calls for a methodological corollary in the “human-science” 
psychology (Dilthey, 1883/1989)—that is, a phenomenological-hermeneutic interpretive 
approach to experimental research records.  
  Human-science research respectfully approaches the uniqueness of human 
subjects (Fischer, 1998).  Psychological matters are understood in a holistic, integrative 
manner: the interweaving of symbolic, interpersonal, bodily dimensions of human 
experience (Barton, 2000).  Today, human-science psychological research involves 
existentialism, phenomenology, and a variety of hermeneutic frameworks, such as post-
structuralism and constructivism.  It seeks to explore the meaning of—rather than 
taxonomize—psychological phenomena; it also attempts to reveal the structures of lived-
experience, rather than to explain isolated behaviors and thoughts in casual and 
probabilistic terms (van Manen, 1990, p.4).   
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  Infant research opens up a new avenue for phenomenology, because it provides 
invaluable qualitative data for interpretive work.  The simplicity of newborns’ behaviors 
often presents a challenging and uncomfortable task for research scientists to categorize 
them into more complicated theoretical constructs.  As a result, compared to the 
psychologists who study older age groups, infant researchers demonstrate a stronger 
commitment to provide detailed contextual descriptions of behavior.  These written 
records also involve the researchers’ own theoretical commitments and the associated 
ontological implications.  Thus, infant research offers a vast pool of data that is extremely 
appealing to the phenomenological-hermeneutic approach to psychology. 
  The phenomenological-hermeneutic method seeks to enrich scientific 
observations of human behavior.  Findings from such an investigation are not scientific in 
the traditional sense.  The investigator holds the epistemological stance that he or she is 
never neutral; facts are never separated from human observations and interpretations, and 
understanding is a dialogic process involving multiple perspectives.  Let us take a closer 
look at both methodological counterparts in the current project.  
Phenomenology 
  Merleau-Ponty (1962) describes phenomenology as a return to the world prior to 
any scientific/theoretical abstraction, the primordial lived-world of which science always 
speaks.  Accordingly, one major step in phenomenological research is to “bracket” or 
“deconstruct” these abstractions and constructs.  Phenomenological research always 
begins with the “first-order” lived-world prior to any scientific abstractions.  The 
conception of knowing or researching something is not based on “the myth of a neutral 
observer” (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992), which suggests a detached researcher gathering 
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and analyzing objective data in the outer, real world.   
  There are many variations of phenomenological research, and their focus ranges 
from “lived-experience,” “structures of consciousness,” “Husserlian essences,” meaning-
units, to “unconscious organizing principles” (Stolorow, 1992).  Regardless of the 
emphasis, most phenomenological researchers share a fundamental sensitivity toward 
their own presuppositions, and adopt a wholistic, part-whole model of epistemology 
(Giorgi, 1986, p.7).  Thus, phenomenology is inseparable from “human attitudes” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1965, p.9).  However, it is not based on wild guesses or theorizing 
because it “has never given up its [close] contact with facts” (p.10). 
  According to Merleau-Ponty (1962), the ultimate goal of phenomenology is to 
create or rediscover a new ontology that properly describes the primordial experiential 
world, without reducing the vicissitudes of human experience into theoretical abstractions 
and reified constructs.  Knowledge is acquired through an ongoing cross-examination 
between new ideas or insights and a forever-growing pool of empirical evidence.  Thus, 
phenomenology can be viewed as the resurrection of a closed ending and the initiation of 
a new beginning.  It does not seek to provide an all-encompassing answer that puts an 
end to future inquiries.  Rather, the mission of phenomenology is to offer a different 
perspective in which both new answers and further questions can emerge.  Merleau-Ponty 
has always been an advocate for a tight connection between phenomenology and 
developmental research, and his work has been described as the “ontogenetic 
investigation that is the phenomenological counterpart of developmental psychology” 
(Dillon, 1997, p.119).  Simms (1993) also suggests that a phenomenological reflection on 
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developmental research makes a clarifying contribution to the understanding of the 
experiential world of young children.  
Hermeneutics 
  Hermeneutics is often considered as the counterpart of phenomenology.  
Historically, hermeneutics is usually referred to the art of interpretation of religious texts, 
but its scope in human-science research extends far beyond the religious and classic 
meanings of texts.  Today, hermeneutics is viewed as an approach to anything that is 
subjected to interpretations.  Woolfolk et al. (1988) discuss three kinds of hermeneutics: 
methodological, ontological, and critical.  The nature of the current dissertation is closest 
to “ontological hermeneutics” (p.4), which emphasizes understanding and seeks truth that 
is foundational to all theories and interpretations.  
  In Merleau-Ponty’s work, hermeneutics is definitely the methodological corollary 
of phenomenology.  He calls this kind of research an exploration of the “lived world,” 
which requires both empirical evidence (e.g., research records) and intellectual-logical 
endeavors (e.g., reflections, interpretations, “bracketing”, etc.).  Furthermore, 
hermeneutics can be conceived as an epistemological model as well: the acquisition of 
knowledge is a never-ending circular process, and is never based on the accumulation of 
facts (Gadamer, 1994).  This process involves an ongoing dialogue between different 
perspectives; hence, knowledge is neither subjective nor objective but “inter-subjective.”   
  As discussed before, the current project is situated in a historical dialogue in 
infant psychology, and is open to feedback in any form (e.g., criticism, commentaries) 
and fundamentally responsible to answer them.  The goal is to come up with new ways of 
thinking about the infant’s world that are observable and comprehensible by the readers.  
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Gallagher (2002) offers an excellent characterization of the role of an inquirer/researcher 
in such phenomenological-hermeneutic research: “We need to appeal to empirical 
verifications and clarifications that will confirm phenomenological insight, and then use 
that insight to interpret the empirical data—a hermeneutic circle, to be sure, but not a 
methodologically vicious one” (p.13).  
Primary Data for Analysis 
  The expansion of infant-related research in the last several decades has produced 
an enormous pool of empirical data.  It is impossible to incorporate its entirety into the 
current investigation.  In the context of this project, however, it might be more beneficial 
to select the experimental studies that really “matter” to our ontological emphasis.  Thus, 
a collection of studies has been selected based on an extensive literature review that 
involves some of the seminal works on infancy (i.e., Beebe and Lachman, 2002; Jacoby, 
2001; Lichtenberg, 1983, Maurer & Maurer, 1988; Rochat, 2001; Stern, 1985).  Most of 
these scholars have attempted to shed light on the infant’s sense of self, body, and social 
reality—hence, their descriptions provide important ontological implications for the 
current investigation.  Interestingly, the empirical studies cited in these books overlap a 
great deal, showing that they are perhaps the most significant research experiments in the 
field.   
  Simms (1999) suggests that “the scientific descriptions of [infant’s] behavior are 
incomplete documents” or “second-order texts” (p. 322), which should be critically and 
reflectively reexamined for their first-order experiential relevance.  Written records of 
infant research not only provide “incomplete” behavioral descriptions, but also linguistic 
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traces of the researchers’ own ontological convictions.  Both are invaluable data for the 
current investigation. 
Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Analysis 
  How does a phenomenological-hermeneutic interpretive approach to 
psychological studies different from other typical, logically-sound interpretations? And, 
why is it better?  These questions might not have been directly and explicitly addressed 
before, but the answer is encrypted in the writing of Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964, 1965, & 
1968) who is well-known for his inclusion of experimental research in philosophical 
reasoning.  In order to better explain the sophistication of the phenomenological-
hermeneutic interpretive method, it might be helpful to offer a description of the major 
methodological procedures that Merleau-Ponty undertook in his work.  In the following, 
these procedures are discussed in reference to the current project:  
1. Examine and reflect on the nature of “research data”  
Written records of infant research provide two kinds of data:  
 a) Descriptions of original experimental observations    
 b) Theoretical interpretations offered by scholars/researchers  
 
  Although both kinds of data are often presented together in a coherent paragraph, 
it is important to distinguish the pure behavioral descriptions (for reinterpretation), from 
the theoretical or conceptual interpretations (for reexamination).  
 
 2. Data Analysis based on the phenomenological-hermeneutic method 
 
a) Every interpretation or conceptualization has an internal logic, which might be  
explicit or implicit.  Such logic can be made explicit by spelling out how researchers go 
from experimental observations to the making of an argument or statement.   
 
b) Scan for theoretical abstractions or constructs, which will then be “bracketed” for 
reflection and/or “deconstruction.”  The phenomenological reflection makes explicit the 
experiential world prior to scientific abstractions or conceptions, whereas “deconstruction” 
takes apart reified constructs and disempowers their status of representing the real.  
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c) This project has an ontological emphasis, so the next step is to reveal the ontological 
assumptions or convictions residing in selected literatures—making the implicit explicit, 
so to speak.  Even if the investigator is in agreement with a particular research 
interpretation, it is important to spell out its ontological implications.  
 
d) In reexamining infant research records, the investigator articulates an alternative 
perspective and makes explicit its underlying ontological framework.   
 
e) The investigator engages in a circular, hermeneutic re-reading of all selected written 
records.  Rather than strictly reporting one’s conclusions, an effort is made to spell out 
the progression of his/her reasoning or thinking.  
  
3. Pending practical feasibility, the investigator makes an effort to address input from 
others (in this case, my director and readers). This step might not take place until toward 
the end of the project. 
 
1.5. Validity 
  The phenomenological-hermeneutic method is not a form of subjective 
introspection.  Its “search for validity goes beyond a mere return to subjectivity and 
personal explorations of one’s private experience” (Simms, 1999, p.304).  What does 
validity mean in this dissertation then?  Given that it is situated in a historical dialogue 
about the world of infants, it might be helpful to find out how some of the former 
participants understand validity in their works.  
   Stern (1985) attempts to form a bridge between psychoanalytic clinical theories 
and infant research, in order to resolve “the contradiction between theory and reality [or 
empirical findings]” (Preface, ix).  This contradiction explains why there is such a rigid 
division between empirical researchers and theoretical psychologists.  According to Stern 
(1986), such tension can only be resolved by someone who is “bilingual”—both well-
versed in theories and knowledgeable of infant research.  Accordingly, validity can be 
evaluated by the structural coherence of a theoretical-empirical account.  Rochat (2001) 
conceives his account of the infant’s world as a kind of “story,” and its success is 
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measured by the extent to which it stimulates curiosity and a sense of wonderment in the 
readers.  Validity can be examined by the coherence of such a story, and the reactions it 
receives from the audience.  In addition, validity can also be evaluated by means of the 
goals of a project.  For Stern (1985), the clinical relevance and utility of his 
developmental account of the infant’s sense of self is among his top goals in his work.  
Thus, its validity can be examined by the extent to which the goal is accomplished.   
  To sum up, validity in the current project can be evaluated in several ways.  First, 
given that this dissertation will provide a narrative of infancy, the structural coherence of 
this “story” represents one dimension of validity.  Second, the extent to which this project 
can capture the attention and stimulate the wonderment of readers is viewed as another 
dimension of validity.  Finally, the validity of this project can also be judged by whether 
or not the goals have been successfully attained.   
  It is important to note that the current project itself is dedicated to examine the 
validity of the Cartesian dualistic ontology—and alternatively, it seeks to provide a post-
Cartesian, nondualistic framework for understanding the experimental observations in 
infant research.  Its own validity, then, can be evaluated by the extent to which it can 
efficiently account for the empirical findings; provide a ground for new theories, 
explanations, and descriptions of psychological phenomenon; and, resonate with the 
readers’ own personal experiences and observations.  Such validity has been 
demonstrated in similar efforts undertaken by some of the most prominent 
phenomenological researchers (e.g. Dreyfus, 1972; Gallagher, 1996).  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Infant’s Physical Knowledge:  
Overcoming Subject-Object Dualism 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
  Infant researchers begin their work by creating research questions and forming 
testable hypotheses.  Nonetheless, these preliminary procedures already reveal an implicit 
ontological and theoretical framework prior to the actual execution of an experiment.  For 
example, Rochat (2001) argues that “current infancy research is part of a tradition that is 
deeply rooted in Western philosophy, in particular the tradition of dividing mental life 
into separate arenas such as cognition, perception, motivation, attention, social behavior, 
emotions, or personality” (p.24).   
  Although it is rather difficult for a neutral observer to identify such “separateness” 
in infant’s behaviors, such ontological presuppositions in infant psychology inevitably 
determine the ways in which infant’s behaviors in experimental setting are conceived and 
interpreted.  Cartesian subject-object dualism has a lasting influence in the infant 
psychological literature.  The subject-object split is the foundation of the popular 
portrayal of a “rational infant physicist” in contemporary research literature (Rochat, 
2001, p.24).  The infant is viewed as a biologically premature scientist with an emerging 
mind, constantly attempting to decipher and identify the physical laws and patterns in the 
external world.  
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  This cognitive camp in infant research often views the infant as “a patchwork of 
discrete abilities” (Simms, 1998, p.321).  The infant’s inability to perceive and decipher 
the objects in the exact manner adults do is considered as somewhat of a flaw.  This 
vision of infancy reveals a deeply-entrenched commitment to a notion of consciousness 
that is ontologically detached and independent from the object world.  In turn, this idea of 
self-consciousness or an isolated mind has led many psychologists to bifurcate infant’s 
existence into dualistic and binary conceptions—namely, internal versus external, 
subjective versus objective, mental versus real, and so forth.  How does this subject-
object dualism influence our understanding of the infant’s physical/object knowledge in 
psychology?  
  In this chapter, our reflection on this question will be based on a 
phenomenological-hermeneutic analysis on three major research areas regarding the 
infant’s understanding of the object world: object permanence, object movement, and 
object categorization.  To begin, we will re-read an extensive research excerpt of infant’s 
acquisition of object permanence provided by Maurer and Maurer (1988), which 
represents the general view of this developmental achievement in infant research.  The 
concept of object permanence, nonetheless, will be revisited in the next chapter as well, 
when infant’s embodiment is taken into consideration.  Then, we will engage in a 
thorough phenomenological analysis of the original drawbridge experiment and some of 
its follow-up studies, as well as another research experiment concerning the infant’s 
ability to perceive occluded object movements.  Lastly, we will critically reexamine an 
experimental study on the infant’s ability to categorize objects.  
  To sum up, we will identify the remnants of subject-object dualism in the 
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researchers’ explanations, examine the logic of their arguments, and unveil their 
associated ontological problems.  In turn, we will seek to provide an alternative account 
that goes beyond the subject-object bifurcations in the literature, taking into consideration 
the aspects of an experiment that might have been overlooked and misunderstood by 
infant researchers.  In other words, the comparison between dualistic and nondualistic 
understandings of infant’s physical knowledge will be directly demonstrated through our 
systematic analyses of the selected research studies.  
 Whereas dualistic conceptions are the shared language for most infant researchers 
today, the nondualistic framework proposed in this project is somewhat foreign to many 
psychologists.  Hence, it is important to elucidate on the fundamentals of a nondualistic 
perspective that attempts to transcend subject-object dualism in the literature.  According 
to Merleau-Ponty (1962), the notion of the phenomenal world is central to this endeavor.  
Rooted in Cartesian dualism, the subjective world and the objective world are historically 
considered as mutually exclusive.  The tension between the two terms has given rise to 
many psychological theories about the mind, because psychologists have been 
preoccupied with inventing some sophisticated mechanisms that would bridge these two 
ontologically-divided worlds.  As a result, the majority of psychological theories are 
founded on the ontological bifurcation between the inner mind and outer world, or the 
constituting consciousness and external physical objects. The following description is a 
classical example of subject-object dualism in infant psychology: “infants are born 
perceiving and discriminating an ‘objectified’ world…furnished with physical objects 
and events that can be differentiated and specified” (Rochat, 2001, p.88). 
  The subjective world is associated with the sphere of interiority and immanence.  
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Physical knowledge is based on the immediate conscious experience of worldly objects—
we come to understand objects as they are given to us in perception.  Hence, objects in 
the subjective world are thus partial because they only exist “for us.”  Furthermore, 
subjects and objects are considered as “internally related,” which means the 
characterization of the latter necessarily requires reference to the first.  In contrast, the 
objective world is associated with exteriority and transcendental reality, the sphere of 
objects existing as they really are.  An object is thus defined as something that exists “in-
itself,” fundamentally independent of human consciousness.  Hence, subjects and objects 
are conceived as “externally related,” which means worldly objects are transcendent, 
completely independent of the subject’s consciousness that is searching for them.  
  Alternatively, the phenomenal world, also known as the perceptual world or 
“lived world”2, refers to our fundamental grip of the world at the level of perception.  It is 
“ontologically and epistemologically prior to the worlds of subjectivity and objectivity 
which dualistic thought posits as primary reality” (Dillon, 1997, p.88).  From this 
perspective, the subjective and objective worlds are “ideal variants” of the phenomenal 
world—they are theoretical descriptions becoming reifications, so to speak. The 
phenomenal world calls for a return to the level of perception, or of phenomenon.  There 
is no bifurcation between interiority and exteriority, but a tightly-webbed relatedness 
between the subject and the objects in the world. 
  The phenomenal world is simultaneously immanent and transcendent: worldly 
objects are in a crisscrossing relationship with the intentional, embodied subjects.  The 
                                                 
2
 Dillon (1988) advises that Merleau-Ponty’s lived-world (le monde vecu) should not be considered as 
terminologically equivalent to Husserl’s notion of the life-world (die Lebenswelt).  The lived-world and the 
phenomenal world are used interchangeably throughout the current project.  
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object is thus “in-itself-for-us.”  Every presence trials a past and portends a future:  there 
is a thickness in every passing moment.  The world is a “primordial presence,” not an 
objective space inhabited by determinate objects.  From a phenomenological perspective, 
the world is indeterminate and ambiguous in perception, although the embodied subjects 
are always trying to refine their perceptual clarity.  Furthermore, intentionality or 
consciousness is not located within or inside a mental entity.  Rather, it is radically 
redefined in terms of a self-world relationship, as an “intentional arc” between the subject 
and the world. 
  The notion of a self-enclosed mind or consciousness is also the inevitable 
consequence of subject-object dualism, because of the associated distinctions between 
inner and outer regions, and between mental and real realities.  The history of 
phenomenological philosophy has witnessed numerous endeavors in challenging the 
traditional concept of a transcendental consciousness.  For Merleau-Ponty, there is one 
theme that truly highlights his refutation against the Cartesian consciousness: the tacit 
cogito vs. the Cartesian cogito.   The Cartesian cogito is the transcendental consciousness 
or ego—an absolute identity that exists on its own term, independent of the world of 
objects, and is not bounded within the sphere of immanence.  In contrast, the tacit cogito 
refers to the pre-reflective perceptual consciousness, the primordial awareness of oneself 
to oneself and to a world.  As Dillon (1997) points out, the major distinction between the 
tacit cogito and the Cartesian cogito lies in “the difference between anonymity or 
generality of the former and the personal or individual nature of the latter” (p.108).   
 The Cartesian cogito is the genesis of thematic self-awareness, the soul or psyche; 
it is characterized by self-reflexivity, a sort of cognitive act that personalizes and 
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thematizes perceptual experience.  Nonetheless, thematic awareness is founded upon the 
tacit cogito, which is the more fundamental perceptual ground—a person can see an 
object without constituting an identity of himself as the seer or labeling the object as the 
seen thing.  The identities of the subject and the object are not given at the level of 
perceptual experience. Such “anonymous” perceptual experience is immediately given to 
us as a meaningful totality, which already presupposes a relationship between the subject 
and the object.  Merleau-Ponty suggests that whereas the term consciousness might serve 
as the starting point for philosophical reflections3, it cannot serve as the “basic term in an 
ontology that succeeds in overcoming dualism” (Dillon, 1997, p.102). 
  According to Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenal world is fundamentally syncretic in 
nature.  Nevertheless, a clarification needs to be made on the difference between 
syncreticism and undifferentiation.  Most contemporary psychologists challenge the 
classical notion of a self-world undifferentiation, which suggests that newborns are 
incapable of distinguishing themselves from the environment.  According to Merleau-
Ponty (1968), this is also known as the hypothesis of “coincidence”—the self and the 
object completely “coincide” with each other, thus becoming indistinguishable from one 
another.  In our view, syncreticism does not carry the same assumption as the hypothesis 
of coincidence.  For instance, Werner (1948) suggests that syncreticism is a fitting 
description insofar as two differently-organized processes or structures are fused together 
in actual functioning.  Thus, from the perspective of the phenomenal world, the subject 
and the objects do not become one physical thing, but are inseparable and tightly webbed 
together in perception.  
                                                 
3
 According to Dillon (1997), Merleau-Ponty believed that “consciousness in phenomenology is a term 
seeking its own dissolution” (p.102).  
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  Werner (1948) denotes that there are two well-documented perceptual 
mechanisms underlying the syncretic mode of perceptual functioning.  First, this level of 
perception is based on an immediate experience of the physiognomies of an object.  
Physiognomy refers to the dynamic and expressive features of a face, a person, and very 
broadly, a form of life—which also applies to nonhuman forms and objects.  It has been 
documented that very young children perceive inanimate objects in terms of the same 
emotional and expressive qualities they feel within themselves (p.167).  Physiognomic 
perception is in contrast to the geometric-technical perception.  The latter focuses on 
objective, measurable properties such as shape, length, width, brightness, hue, and so 
forth.  This kind of perception describes how adult scientists and technicians construct the 
world, but there is no direct evidence that it serves as the foundation of infant’s 
perception.   
   There is also no direct evidence that physiognomic perception dominates the 
infant’s world.  However, as mentioned before, there are observational and qualitative 
data such as children’s drawings and verbal reports, suggesting that young children pick 
up the physiognomies of the objects in the world.  Also, there are indirect empirical 
findings that suggest infants might actually perceive the inanimate as the animate, so to 
speak, which will be discussed in the chapter of infant’s social world.  Furthermore, the 
notion of physiognomic perception can incorporate the measurable objective properties of 
the world, which is not the case the other way around.  For instance, whereas newborns 
might function primarily at the level physiognomic perception, they nonetheless are able 
to perceive when one object is taller, bigger, brighter, and making a louder sound than the 
other.  More specifically, they can directly perceive the taller and bigger object in terms 
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of its physiognomic qualities, for example, as the more powerful, impending presence.  
  The second mechanism is known as synesthesia, or the syncretic unity of senses 
in perception, which is interrelated with physiognomic perception.4  For instance, a 
cheerful tone might strike us as light and colorful, and a dark inkblot might strike us as 
heavy and dull.  Synesthesia involving vision, in particular, has drawn much interest from 
color theorists and perceptual scientists.  Intersensory experience has also been 
documented in comparative studies, mostly in reference to what might be considered as 
nontechnological cultures and their languages (e.g., Werner, 1948, p.259).  Infant 
researchers, too, take the concept of synesthesia very seriously as well.  Nevertheless, 
they generally conceive it as the basis of intermodal functioning and cross-modal 
matching, without further consideration of its relevance to the infant’s existence.  From a 
phenomenological perspective, we believe that synestheisa provides a new understanding 
of the nature of a perceived object.  Put simply, when an object is understood as the 
temporal-spatial unfolding of a phenomenon, the sensory experiences associated with this 
object are integral to its identity.  This particular concept is central to the following 
sections in which we will investigate a series of research observations and experiments 
regarding the infant’s understanding of the physical world. 
2.2 How Do Infants Perceive Object Permanence?   
  Subject-object dualism leads to the view that the object is external, objective 
(real), and ontologically independent of the subject.  This dualistic ontology brings about 
a major epistemological consequence: human knowledge of the world is based on the 
subject’s endeavor to capture the “object-in-itself” and develop conceptual understanding 
                                                 
4
 Synesthesia is often mistaken as an argument of complete indifferentiation of senses. 
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of the physical laws and principles that govern all objects.  This is the rationale 
underlying the infant-as-scientist metaphor in contemporary infant psychology.  
  According to Merleau-Ponty (1962), the perception of the object-in-itself is an 
impossible one, because it assumes “a perception of the thing from all sides and 
throughout the history of its being” (Dillon, 1997, p.89).  Subject-object bifurcation 
implies that in order to fully perceive objects-as-they-really-are, it would require an 
infinite perception that transforms the spatio-temporal unfolding of objects into atemporal 
entities.  Such perception, accordingly, must necessarily encompass moments that are no 
longer and moments that have yet to be.  From a phenomenological perspective, this idea 
of infinite perception is nothing but an ideal, presumptive synthesis.  
  In the phenomenal world, in contrast, we grasp and understand the objects as they 
unfold in perception.  As a phenomenon unfolding in time and space, a perceived object 
is already in a meaningful contextual relationship with other proximal objects as well as 
the perceiving person.  Thus, a perceptual phenomenon is already “circumscribed by such 
basic aspects of finitude as spatiality, temporality, sexuality, cultural sedimentation, and 
so on” (Dillon, 1997, p.89).  This view brings the subject and the object into an integrated 
view of perception, in which both are “internally related” ontologically; the description of 
either one necessarily makes reference to the other.  A phenomenological view of object 
perception rests on the radical notion of “primordial presence,” which draws together the 
perception of what is immediately present and the apperception of what is immediately 
absent (i.e. the past and the present, and the visible and invisible parts of an object).  
Accordingly, the presence of an object always “entails a possible absence” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, p.90). 
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  A phenomenological ontology challenges the traditional view on infant’s object 
perception, which is based on the progression of cognitive development—the little 
scientist who gradually “gets” it.  This portrayal is evident in the topic of object 
permanence in infant literature.  According to Piaget (1928; 1952; 1955), infants do not 
possess the concept of object permanence until approximately nine months of age.  In a 
series of experiments, he carefully observed the reactions of infants witnessing an 
interesting object or toy being hidden or disappearing.  He discovered that the younger 
infants appeared confused or distressed, which indicates the belief that the object no 
longer exist in space.  The infants of an older age showed a surprised reaction when the 
same thing happened, revealing a preliminary understanding of the permanent object 
which should not simply disappear into thin air.  The infants of an even older age group 
demonstrated searching behaviors, showing their expectation that the object should 
continue to exist even when out of sight.  Taken together, these observations led Piaget to 
conclude that object permanence is a cognitive achievement that has a developmental 
timeline.  
  From a cognitive perspective, young infants cannot reason objects that are 
perceptually absent. In other words, they lack “object concepts.”  Unlike “object percept” 
or the immediate sensory experience of an object, “the concept of an object is the result 
of a mental operation that is inseparable from sensory experience. It is the product of 
thought: it is an idea or system of ideas” (Rochat, 2001, p.96).  Apparently, an object 
concept is essentially a representational idea.  It follows that object permanence as a 
concept literally refers to the cognitive ability to represent objects in their perceptual 
absence.   
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  Merleau-Ponty (1962) identifies two opposing perspectives of object perception 
that are rooted in Cartesian subject-object dualism.  Empiricism puts forth the primacy of 
the object; object perception is conceived in terms of a progression that begins from 
relatively partial and imperfect to complete and accurate perception of objects-as-they-
really-are.  Accordingly, object permanence is an inevitable cognitive achievement 
because the objective world is inhabited by determinate spatial objects; it is only a matter 
of time until this external reality impinges itself on the infants.   
  In contrast, intellectualism supports the primacy of the subject; the perceived 
object is reduced to the immanent structures of the subject’s consciousness.  Accordingly, 
mental and cognitive structures inevitably determine perception of reality, and thus, 
conceptual understanding precedes and constitutes perception.  Put simply, object 
permanence is an inevitable outcome of the infant’s cognitive development associated 
with neurological maturation.  As infants begin to mature biologically and cognitively, 
they would naturally acquire the “concept” of object permanence.   
  These dualistic thoughts permeate the research literature on object permanence.  If 
one thinks of the infant in terms of an internal mind against an external world of objects, 
it is inevitable to ask these following questions: How do infants come to understand 
object permanence?  Is this understanding or knowledge based on a gradual development 
of conceptual schemas, which constitutes the world as inhabited by determinate and 
permanent objects?  Or, is it founded on a gradual recognition of the fact that the objects 
are real entities in the external world that do not simply vanish?  As demonstrated in the 
following section, a phenomenological analysis would show that these questions are the 
wrong starting point to approach the infant’s behaviors observed in experimental 
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conditions.  In this section, we will reinterpret an extensive developmental description of 
the infant’s acquisition of object permanence provided by Maurer and Maurer (1988).  
The following excerpts represent the general view of object permanence shared by most 
contemporary infant researchers and psychologists.5  
A Phenomenological Re-reading of an Extensive Research Summary  
  An extensive summary of object permanence research (Maurer and Maurer, 1988) 
is divided into four excerpts for further examination.  These excerpts describe the 
developmental progression of the infant’s “cognitive achievement” of object permanence.  
Our primary goal here is to deconstruct the rationale of interpreting the following 
observations as indicating the existence of conceptual knowledge, and set up the 
foundation of a nondualistic framework for conceiving infant’s understanding of worldly 
objects.  
Excerpt 1 
 From birth to one month of age the baby shows no sign whatsoever that he  
  understands the permanence of objects. Out of sight seems to be literally out of  
  mind (Maurer & Maurer, 1988, p.91) 
 
This excerpt makes reference to the general observation that newborns tend to 
immediately lose interest when an object disappears from the visual field.  The 
characterization that “out of sight seems to be literally out of mind” reveals a typical 
logic of reasoning in the traditions of cognitive psychology.  Nonetheless, a critical 
investigator is led to ask if what researchers observed in the newborns necessarily 
supports a distinction between perceptual and mental territories.  From a dualistic 
                                                 
5
 There have been many research experiments that claimed to explain the infant’s acquisition of object 
permanence.  Their focuses and experimental procedures often vary a great deal.  Maurer & Maurer (1988) 
provide an excellent summary involving most of the important findings in this area of research.  
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perspective, the newborns only have an immediate visual grip of the object, with no 
concept of its permanence as a fact of the external world.  As the object becomes visually 
inaccessible, they automatically disengage and stop looking.  Accordingly, the newborn’s 
object perception is portrayed as somewhat incomplete or inaccurate, because it is 
measured against the objective physical world that preoccupies physicists.  
  From a nondualistic perspective, however, there is nothing incomplete or 
inaccurate about the newborn’s object perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).  The perceived 
object is a complete spatio-temporal phenomenon, fully meaningful in its own terms.  For 
the newborn, object perception is coextensive with the act of looking.6  When an object is 
out of sight, there is nothing for the eyes to fixate on.  Through a phenomenological 
analysis of Piaget’s observations on his infant daughter, Simms (2008) suggests that the 
attention flow of young infants moves in a different pattern than that of older children 
and adults.  The newborn’s visual attention is continuously redirected toward the next 
interesting thing or event based on her bodily desires and motor capacities.  In other 
words, the newborn is almost completely caught up in the immediacy of sensory 
experiences.  This is a description of what Merleau-Ponty called the operative 
intentionality: “the natural and prethematic unity of the world and of our life” (p.91).  
When an object of interest disappears, the newborn simply moves on.  Nonetheless, as 
the newborn develops more advanced motor flexibility and visual-tracking ability, her 
“anchorage” in space and time will be expanded accordingly, and the nature of her grasp 
of the objects will be transformed as well. 
                                                 
6
 It is important to consider infant’s repertoire of visual tracking as well.  In the first month of life, 
newborns have very limited visual tracking ability.  The emergence of more advanced visual tracking 
ability as well as motor capacities literally transforms the infant’s phenomenal world.  This is a major 
theme in one of Merleau-Ponty’s earliest work, The Structure of Behavior (1963).  
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Excerpt 2 
  Between one and four months the baby stares for a moment at the point where  
  an object disappears from his sight, as though he is intrigued by its  
  disappearance. This is the earliest evidence of his thinking about an object while  
  it is out of sight. But he thinks about it only for a moment: the object disappears  
  from his mind almost immediately (Maurer & Maurer, 1988, p.191). 
 
This excerpt contains one simple behavioral observation: the infant’s staring, and the rest 
is the authors’ own interpretations.  There is no objective method to examine whether or 
not the baby is “intrigued” or “thinking” about the object when it is out of sight.  Hence, 
it is important to call these assumptions into question, and reexamine the validity of these 
arguments. Whereas the infant’s staring is quite a revolutionary phenomenon from a 
developmental point of view, it is premature to consider it as an “evidence” of thinking or 
cognition, or the existence of a mind that thinks about an object.  This is an example of 
what might be called an ontological leap.   
  There is only one certain conclusion here: the infant shows a reaction when an 
object that appeared moments ago disappears.   Why?  The infant might be surprised, 
intrigued, frustrated, or shocked—there is no way to find out with certainty.  This could 
very well be a reaction of “violated expectancy.”7  Nevertheless, does the notion of 
expectation necessarily suggest the existence of an isolated mind that gradually acquires 
more and more object concepts of the world?  This is an ontological issue that will 
continue to be examined throughout this chapter.  
Excerpt 3 
  Between four to eight months the baby appears to begin to understand. He will  
  pull a toy from your pocket when it is only partly visible. He will look toward the  
  floor after he drops a toy. If a toy train runs into a tunnel, he will watch the   
                                                 
7
 The “violation of expectancy” is a popular rationale for explaining the behaviors that might indicate 
object concepts or principles.  
 35 
 
   tunnel’s exit for the train to reappear. He enjoys playing peek-a-boo. But this  
  understanding is very limited. If you draped a handkerchief over a toy that he is  
  holding, thereby hiding it entirely from his eyes, he will not remove the   
  handkerchief, even if the toy is making a noise. If the handkerchief falls off, he  
           appears surprised to find himself holding the toy (Maurer & Maurer, 1988, p.191). 
 
This excerpt presents a series of interesting observations that provide clues to the infant’s 
understanding of partiality, motion, and temporality.  Apparently, the infant is now living 
in a markedly different world.  This transformation is not based on the acquisition of the 
“correct” view of the external world, however.  With increased motor flexibility and 
enhanced visual tracking, the infant’s conscious existence has been expanded in both 
spatial and temporal dimensions.  Hence, some expectations about how the world should 
unfold are beginning to develop.  
   The infants can now perceive both the appearance and disappearance of a moving 
object as moments of a single perceptual episode (temporality), but only insofar as there 
are visual traces of its existence.  For instance, they can track a single object (i.e. the train) 
as it moves across space, and anticipate its movement as it goes through a penetrable 
object (i.e. the tunnel).  Also, they can now perceive presence and absence as two 
integrated aspects of how an object shows up in their world (partiality).  In particular, the 
perception of a partially visible toy in a pocket can motivate them to engage in a motor 
project of retrieving it.  Furthermore, they can also perceive that a moving object passing 
through another penetrable object, despite a brief disappearance from sight (motion in 
space).  Nonetheless, a complete disappearance of an object from the visual field, such as 
being completely hidden behind an occluder without visual traces of its existence, is still 
an incomprehensible phenomenon for the infants at this age. 
  From a critical standpoint, it remains unclear as to how these observations would 
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support the notion of an isolated mind.  From a phenomenological perspective, the 
behaviors described in the excerpt can be explained without resorting to a neutral, 
observing mental entity that constantly attempts to “get” the permanence of objects in the 
external world.  According to the idea of an objective world, things do not “appear” and 
“disappear” because physical objects are by definition complete, determinate, and total.  
Hence, when we speak of the infant’s perception of appearance, partial appearance, and 
disappearance—all of which presuppose a point of view of the perceiver, a meaningful 
subject-object unified relationship has already been implied. 
  From a dualistic perspective, an object carries certain qualities or features that 
contribute to a variety of sensory experience.  For example, a toy in the infant’s hand 
makes noise and gives a unique visual appearance; these are considered as the qualities of 
the toy, secondary to the existence of the object itself.  From a phenomenological 
perspective, however, the sound and the visual appearance are integrated and inseparable 
aspects of the perceived object.  Thus, what was previously perceived as an integrated 
whole is no longer the same object because a major perceptual element has been removed.  
Accordingly, when the toy is covered up by a handkerchief, the infant simply hears 
noises. 
  What about the case when the infant is actually holding the hidden toy in her hand?  
Whereas the infant still has a grip on the toy’s touchable aspect, it is no longer the same 
visible and sound-making object that was in her hand moments ago.  For the same reason 
why an infant might not extend her reach to touch an object out of range, the tactile 
sensation or the noise alone is insufficient to motivate the infant to seek for the toy. 
According to Simms (2008), the infant’s bodily actions at this age are still closely tied to 
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the “landscape of things” (p.92).  Thus, the infant cannot understand the pointing hand-
gesture as a sign pointing to a world beyond immediate experience; instead, she would 
merely stare at the pointing hand as noted by Stern (1985).  In the same vein, the infant 
cannot follow the auditory experience (the noise) or the tactile sensation (the toy’s in her 
hand) to rediscover the visual existence of the toy.  
Excerpt 4 
  Between eight and twelve months the baby appears to understand the objects are  
  permanent. If you hide a toy beneath a handkerchief, he will retrieve the toy. If  
  you play a conjuring trick by replacing the hidden toy with another, or making it  
  vanished, he acts surprised (Maurer & Maurer, 1988, p.192). 
 
This last excerpt is supposed to describe the stage in which infants finally achieve object 
permanence as a concept.  There are two concrete behavioral observations here: the 
infant’s retrieval of the hidden toy and her surprised reaction toward the “wrong” toy.  
These behaviors describe the infant’s responses to partially or completely occluded 
objects.  In infant research, these behaviors are interpreted as the evidence of the infant’s 
conceptual acquisition of object permanence.8  Is there a different way to interpret these 
behaviors without resorting to the idea of conceptual knowledge?  
  Let us recall the notion of synesthesia and reflect on the unity of vision and touch.  
According to Merleau-Ponty (1962), vision and touch are not considered as “coincidental” 
or “superposable”: they never reach coincidence and become one thing.  Rather, vision 
and touch are united in one body and thus open to a unitary world.  Vision and tactility 
are united in such a way that they are “reversible”; what can be seen has a carnal 
reference to its tactility, and what can be touched has a carnal reference to its visual 
                                                 
8
 This internal view of physical knowledge has not been effectively challenged in psychology; ,it always 
seems  to be the only explanation for such behaviors  
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existence.   
  What does visual-tactile synesthesia have to do with the behaviors described in 
this excerpt?  When infants come into visual contact with an object, they simultaneously 
perceive (or apperceive) its potential to be touched.9  Visual perception of an object 
implies (not cognitively) its existence as a potentially touchable thing.  Although the seen 
object might not actually be touchable in reality, it nonetheless provides a sense of 
tactility and texture.10  This is demonstrated by newborns’ pre-reaching behavior while 
tracking an object visually (Von Hofsten, 1982).  Neonates show frequent forward arm 
movements, as if their bodies are plunged into reach-like actions, when their eyes are 
locked into a proximal object.   
  The opposite is also true: touching an object implies its potential to be located and 
captured by vision as well, thus, affirming its existence as a visible thing.  However, if an 
object is placed in the infant’s hand, the tactile sensation itself would not make her bring 
the object into the center of the visual field for better clarity and further exploration.  
Research shows that infants do not engage in this action until two months of age (Rochat, 
1989).  Hence, it seems that visual-tactile synesthesia also follows a developmental 
trajectory.  Nonetheless, even though the mere sensation of touch might not propel the 
infant to bring an object into her visual field for further exploration, the object as a visible 
thing is already implicated in the perception of touch and its confirmation is inevitable at 
a later age.  
  Object permanence literally refers to the awareness that objects continue to exist 
                                                 
9This is sometimes captured by other terms such as “apperception” or “co-perception” (Rochat, 2001).   
10
 After all, we all know what it “feels” like to touch the clouds in the sky. 
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even when they are no longer visible.  It seems that infants have finally developed this 
awareness toward the end of her first year.   However, our explication of the visual-tactile 
synestheisa has demonstrated that this awareness is not based on a conceptual acquisition 
of object permanence as a fact of the external world.  Because an object’s visibility and 
touchability are reversible and mutually implicated, the infant in a way always “knows” 
or understands that objects are permanent—it is already implicit in her earliest experience 
with objects.   
  Simms (2008, p.93) suggests that the achievement of object permanence 
corresponds to the infant’s emerging capacity for referential and symbolic actions.  
According to this idea, when the infant at this age witnesses an interesting toy being 
hidden under a handkerchief, she can now perceive the handkerchief as a sign that opens 
up a future-oriented action space, which has been extended beyond her immediate visual 
world.  In addition, the infant’s ability to remove the handkerchief and retrieve the hidden 
toy is also connected to her increasingly advanced motor ability—to reach with her hands, 
to extend her limb, to crawl on the floor, and so forth.  The infant can now actualize the 
implicit touchability of the hidden toy, because she has developed a pre-reflective 
understanding of the handkerchief as an occluder, and of her bodily capacities to 
rearrange objects in her action-space (i.e., to remove the handkerchief).  
  Also, given that the sensory experiences associated with a perceived object is 
integral to its identity as discussed before, the infant acts surprised toward the wrong toy 
after the handkerchief has been removed.  In other words, the infant knows the toy she is 
searching for.  This understanding is based on the infant’s bodily engagement in the 
world, rather than a mental encyclopedia on object permanence within her mind.  By 
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logic, the object as a visual “occluder” presupposes both a vantage point (of the infant) as 
well as another object that is partially or completely blocked.  In other words, the notion 
of a visual occlude implies the presence of an object of interest, and thus, the 
intentionality of the infant.  Thus, the perception of a visual occluder actually reveals the 
infant’s embodied situation in which one object is blocking her direct visual access to an 
interesting object.  Hence, an object’s presence, absence, or partiality always presuppose 
the inseparability of the subject’s intentionality/situation (i.e. his interest and vantage 
point) and the object’s spatial existence.  Visual occlusion as a phenomenon has no place 
in either the subjective mind or the objective world, because it can only be defined in 
terms of the infant’s relation-to-the-world.  This is a great example of why objects are 
best understood as “in-itself-for-us.”  
  In conclusion, from a phenomenological perspective, the perceived object is 
viewed as a phenomenon unfolding in space and time, and the associated visual and 
tactile experiences are integral to the identify of this object.  Visual perception of an 
object provides the infants with a tactile grip of it, and the reverse is also true to some 
extent.  Furthermore, the mere visual perception of an object does not reduce its existence 
as being entirely visual without reference to its touchability, which seems to be an 
implicit assumption for some researchers.11  A seen object understood synesthetically has 
a built-in experiential reference to its tactility—in that, the object has also registered a 
place in the tactile dimension of infant’s lived-world.  Thus, the infants “know” in an 
implicit, embodied manner that visible objects exist in space as touchable objects.  This 
understanding is the foundation of the infant’s behaviors (e.g. retrieval of hidden toy; 
                                                 
11
 Otherwise, why would researchers be intrigued by the fact that infants eventually look for something no 
longer visible?  
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looking surprised at wrong toy) that have been taken as the evidence of object 
permanence as a cognitive achievement.  
2.3 How Do Infants Perceive Objects-in-motion? 
  Objects-in-motion are another intriguing phenomenon that captures the attention 
of many infant researchers.  The general empirical observation is that infants seem to 
“expect” an object moving on a connected path unless it comes into contract with another 
object.  When two objects are about cross paths with each other, infants seem to 
anticipate a collision.  In infant psychology, these observations have been taken as an 
indication of the infant’s conceptual knowledge about the physical principles of the world.   
  First, the principle of solidity refers to the understanding that an object occupies 
space in exclusivity, and thus two objects cannot coexist in the same space 
simultaneously.  Second, the principle of spatio-temporal continuity means that the same 
object exists continuously in space and move on connected paths.  Third, spatial objects 
always move independently if they do not come into contact with one another, which is 
also known as the principle of no-action-at-a-distance. 
  Many research studies have been done in order to further investigate the infant’s 
understanding of these physical principles.  The “violation-of-expectancy paradigm” is a 
major experimental method in these studies.  In these experiments, researchers often 
presented the infant subjects with physically impossible/improbable events and looked 
for their behavioral signs for violated expectations. Such behavioral evidence is generally 
measured by the duration of visual attention: if the infants have knowledge of certain 
physical principles that govern the objects-in-motion, they should expectedly look longer 
at the improbable outcomes.  Accordingly, the longer visual attention to the improbable 
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event is viewed as the indisputable proof of conceptual object knowledge inside of the 
young infant’s mind.  In this section, we will closely examine a couple of major studies 
that have been frequently cited as the supporting evidence of infant’s physical knowledge 
about these principles.    
A Phenomenological Approach to the Original “Drawbridge” Study  
(Baillargeon et.al., 1985) 
  The “drawbridge” experiment is one of the most frequently-cited infant research 
studies, because it has been widely taken as the empirical evidence of object concepts in 
early infancy.  The experiment was designed to study the infant’s ability to distinguish 
between probable and improbable physical events.  During the familiarization trials, a 
group of five-month-old infants were exposed to a screen (the “drawbridge”) rotating 
180-degree backward on a table.  During the experimental trials, a solid object (a box) 
was placed behind the drawbridge, which would prevent it from making a complete 
rotation.  In one experimental condition, the infants witnessed the rotating drawbridge 
being stopped by the obstructing box, which was the probable outcome.  In the other 
condition, they saw the drawbridge rotating “through” the box, which was the improbable 
outcome.  The researchers hypothesized that if the infants can notice the difference 
between two events, they should look significantly longer at the improbable outcome 
because their expectations are “violated.”  As a matter of fact, this is precisely what the 
researchers discovered in this study.   
The Conceptual Hypothesis vs. The Perceptual Hypothesis 
  According to this “conceptual” hypothesis, the infants looked longer at the 
improbable outcome because it “violated” the physical principles of the world.  Thus, it 
follows that the infants must possess some forms of conceptual knowledge about spatial 
 43 
 
objects.  Before we directly address the ontological issues associated with this conceptual 
explanation, it is important to discuss an alternative “perceptual processing account” 
provided by other infant scholars (Haith & Benson, 1997).  According to the perceptual-
processing explanation, infants are born with some perceptual preferences and 
inclinations, as their gaze is always directed at the salient and appealing features of the 
world.  In particular, Rivera et al. (1999) found that infants have a natural preference for 
180° rotations as a visual stimulus.  In the original drawbridge study, the screen actually 
rotated farther in the impossible event than in the possible event.  Thus, the infants were 
not paying more attention at the “impossible event” per se, but the complete rotations 
they naturally preferred.   
   Scholl and Leslie (1999) suggest that this ongoing debate between the two rival 
explanations demonstrates a clear dichotomy between perceptual and cognitive processes 
in the infant literature. The disjunction between perception and cognition is a direct 
consequence of Cartesian dualistic ontology.  Perception is bounded within immanence 
and associated with mechanical bodily processes, whereas cognition is related to higher-
order mental operations that render perception meaningful.  At the level of theory, the 
conceptual account and the perceptual-processing explanation are both tenable 
explanations.  Scholars from both sides witness the same behavior, and their explanations 
share the same ontological foundation.  From the original study alone, it is difficult to 
judge which line of reasoning is better.   
  In our view, the real problem lies in the dualistic framework that constitutes 
perceptual and cognitive processes as mutually-exclusive in explaining the drawbridge 
phenomenon.  The perceptual-conceptual dichotomy underlying both theoretical 
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explanations renders a unified view of perception impossible.  The conceptual account 
suggests the primacy of an impossible physical event, and the perceptual account implies 
the primacy of an internal cognitive operation.  Is it possible that infants might possess 
some perceptual preferences and inclinations, as well as some understanding about how 
physical objects behave in space?  If both mechanisms are active, it is important then to 
examine how they interact in actual functioning.  In fact, taking into account both 
mechanisms might provide a more thorough interpretation of the variability of all the 
follow-up drawbridge studies, as will be discussed later.  
A nonconceptual revision of physical understanding 
  At this point, we have found that it is difficult to decide whether the perceptual or 
the cognitive mechanisms played the exclusive role in the original study, and the debate 
is rooted in the perception-cognition dichotomy in Cartesian dualism.  Perhaps it is time 
to take a deeper look at the ontological issues underlying both accounts.  In Cartesian 
dualism, the subject is viewed as an atemporal self, isolated as a point in space from the 
objects in the world.  The presence is bounded within immanence, or our immediate 
perception of things—one cannot know or perceive anything beyond immediate sensory 
experience.  An object is conceived as fully determinate, and its identity and attributes do 
not change in every passing moment.  Thus, if the past must influence the subject’s 
perception in the present, it must be stored inside the subject and served as a conceptual 
template for immediate perception.  This is the ontological foundation of representational 
thoughts.   
  Under this dualistic ontology, there is no knowledge or understanding at the level 
of perception; if infants demonstrate behaviors that imply knowledge and learning, there 
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must be some form of cognitive mediation that took place.  The perceptual hypothesis of 
the drawbridge study is very straightforward: it suggests that the infants simply preferred 
looking at an object making a full rotation. There is no question that infants are born with 
perceptual preferences.  However, there is a question about whether or not perception is 
limited to mechanical bodily processes.  In other words, the perceptual-processing 
explanation leaves no room for the possibility that the infants might have possessed some 
understanding of the physical world.  
  The conceptual account, in contrast, provides an extensive explanation of the 
habituation process and the visual occlusion involved in the study.  In order for the 
infants to discriminate the difference between the probable outcome and the improbable 
outcome, they must have possessed the proper object-concepts that interpret perceptual 
data.   This is precisely the logic underlying the portrayal of the little scientist, according 
to which the infants actively “reason” about objects, “make predictions” about their 
interaction in space, and “anticipate” certain possible physical outcomes (Rochat, 2002, 
p.101).  However, if every instance of differential visual attention is taken as an evidence 
of conceptual understanding, and every sign of preferential looking is considered an 
indication of the conceptual distinction between two events, the young infant’s mind 
would be inhabited by an astronomical number of cognitive schemas or representations.  
Following this line of reasoning, every so-called just-noticeable-difference (JND) would 
be taken as a conceptual category in its own terms.   
  In order to transcend the dualism underlying both explanations, the key is to offer 
an alternate view of perception that does not exclude physical understanding, and that of 
physical knowledge that is not fundamentally conceptual.  To begin, we need to employ 
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two phenomenological ideas: spatial affordances and embodied understanding.  Spatial 
affordance is a unified view of perception in which the subject and objects are 
inseparable.  From a phenomenological perspective, infants do not need to know the 
physical principles in the form of concept, because they are directly perceived and 
experienced as the background of possibilities.  Gibson (1977) proposes a theory of 
affordance that highlights the intricate relationship between the subject’s intentionality 
(& motility) and the “action-possibilities” of objects.  An object is not perceived as 
something in-itself, and the subject does not hold absolute power to constitute an object.  
The notion of affordance testifies to the subject-object unity in perception—the context in 
which meaningful perception occurs.  
    Affordances can be perceived as both positive and negative, because perception 
both affords and denies certain action-possibilities. For instance, for a young child, a 
closed door affords possible actions such as knocking and turning the doorknob, partly 
because it does not afford being pushed open with brute physical force.  In other words, 
spatial perception accentuates the probable and successful bodily projects (positive), and 
suppresses the improbably and unlikely bodily projects (negative).   
   Thus, spatial perception is inseparable with human embodiment: the structure of 
space is intertwined with the structure of our body.  When there are multiple objects in 
the proximal field, the perception of affordances is understood in a more global sense.  
For example, when a young toddler sees an object with a wide flat surface (e.g. a small 
table) and a figurine, there is immediately for her an internal relationship between these 
two separate objects.  Putting the figurine on a small table is directly perceived as an 
“action-possibility” for the young toddler, rather than an external connection between two 
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objects in the objective space, independent of her intentions and motor capacities.  The 
table and the small figurine together form an action-possibility.  The phenomenological 
view of spatial perception seeks to transcends the subject-object bifurcation, and radically 
challenge traditional concept of cognitive mediation.  Accordingly, there is no need to 
presuppose conceptual knowledge in meaningful, spatial perception.  Our embodied 
understanding of space is through a direct perception of affordances—making certain 
action- possibilities more likely and certain others less likely.   
  According to the conceptual hypothesis, the drawbridge study describes a 
phenomenon regarding the interaction between two objects in space (the screen and the 
blocker).  How do infants understand objects are solid, occupy space in exclusivity, exist 
continuously in space, move on connected paths, and do not interact at a distance?   The 
experimental findings seem to show that the infants could identify the probable event that 
was consistent with these physical principles, which explains why they looked surprised 
when witnessing the “improbable” event.  
  Nevertheless, according to the notion of spatial affordances, the infants did not 
need to project the conceptual principles into their immediate perception because the 
objects in space were never given to them as unrelated to each other.  Instead, the infants 
directly perceived (and looked longer at) the less probable outcome as the more attention-
worthy event, which does not require any secondary, higher-order cognitive operations. 
  These conceptual physical principles are the abstract descriptions of a first-order 
primordial world.  It is an existential fact that infants are always in contact with visible 
and touchable things in the world.  Touchable things occupy space and are not readily 
penetrated by other solid touchable objects.  Infants know this through direct experience, 
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and do not need discover the principle of solidity as a concept.  To sum up, conceptual 
understanding is not the prerequisite for infants to experience meaningful perceptions; 
rather, the physical principles are simply scientific abstractions/descriptions of the 
infant’s embodied understanding in a primordial lived-world. 
A Re-reading of Other Drawbridge Studies 
  Conceived in terms of an intertwined subject-object relationship, the 
phenomenological notion of perception is fully embodied, temporal, and contextual.  
Given that infants have both an embodied understanding of the physical world, as well as 
a natural preference for certain movements, it is no longer necessary to choose between 
the perceptual and conceptual accounts—the “either-or” framework might not be the best 
approach in this case.  
  The original drawbridge study (Baillargeon et al, 1985) has been subjected to 
many critical speculations.  First, some researchers failed to replicate some of its findings 
(e.g., Bogartz et al., 2000).  Second, minor variations in experimental designs and 
procedures played a major role in the disparity of findings across other follow-up and 
replication studies (e.g. Bogartz et al., 1997; Schilling, 2000).  Third, Turke-Browne et al. 
(2008) identified the “enhancement vs. attenuation/habituation” controversy regarding 
the familiarization procedure—whether it enhances or attenuates preference for familiar 
stimulus.  In order to explain the variable outcomes in these “drawbridge” studies, it is 
important to pay attention to the experimental procedures, and more globally, the 
experiential progression of the infants in these settings.  Thus, our investigation is guided 
by three major experiential factors involved in these experiments: the 
habituation/familiarization process, perception of movements, and spatial reference/cues.   
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The Habituation Process: Some Considerations 
  Infant researchers often view habituation as the process by which the infants 
gradually decrease visual attention to repeated presentations of a stimulus.  Given that the 
infants suddenly regain visual attention in response to a slightly different stimulus, it is 
taken as a sign that they “notice” something different.  The rest of the story is a matter of 
interpretation—in short, whether they notice something “novel” or “unexpected.”   
  From a phenomenological perceptive, it is important to reflect on the experience 
of the infants during the habituation/familiarization trials.  The concept of habituation has 
always been haunted by some theoretical controversies in experimental psychology.  For 
instance, it is incredibly difficult to decide whether longer visual attention found in these 
studies suggests the infants’ preference for novel stimulus or avoidance of repeated 
stimulus.  Turk-Browne et al. (2008) proposes a few important questions for 
consideration. What level of habituation is just enough? What is too little habituation? 
What is too much habituation?  From an experimental standpoint, the ideal level of 
habituation can be described as follows: just-enough exposure to a stimulus such that a 
similar stimulus generates neither interest nor aversion.  There is nonetheless no proven 
way to achieve this ideal level of habituation.  Hence, it is crucial to examine the 
habituation process in the whole context of a particular experiment itself. 
  What is “too much” habituation? It is difficult to draw the line that separates the 
habituation and extinction processes, so to speak.  Furthermore, according to classical 
behaviorism, the extinction process can lead to stimulus-generalization, leading to a 
global unresponsiveness toward similar stimuli.  In addition, it is even more challenging 
to figure out the basis of such aversive generalization (e.g. what constitutes “similarity”). 
 50 
 
 What is too little habituation?  “Too little” habituation is not a negative term when 
understood as a learning process.  Research shows that a brief exposure to the same 
stimulus would in fact enhance the infants’ preference for the familiarity, and to some 
extent, refine their reaction to similar stimuli.  Nevertheless, it is equally challenging to 
identify the exact point where the repeated exposure to a stimulus ceases to be a process 
of perceptual enhancement or refinement.   
  Another important question concerns the nature of the stimulus involved in both 
the familiarization and the experimental trials.  In other words, what exactly was being 
habituated—the rotating screen (i.e. 180° movement), the physical events (both probable 
and improbable), or both simultaneously?  In the original drawbridge study, researchers 
used the rotating screen during initial familiarization trials, and provided the infants with 
a brief visual exposure to the box before the screen began to rotate in the experimental 
trials (Baillargeon et al., 1985).  This exposure is extremely important because it provided 
the infant subjects with a spatial cue/reference that would change the spatial affordances 
in the field.  The infant subjects first saw a screen making 180° rotations to which they 
were habituated.  In one following experimental condition, they immediately witnessed 
an impossible event in which the screen seemingly rotated through the box and 
completed a 180° rotation.   
  According to the perceptual-processing hypothesis, it was believed that the infant 
subjects had just witnessed two events of 180° rotations.  From a phenomenological point 
of view, this belief is a huge mistake because the introduction of a box significantly 
changed the spatial affordance in the field.  Hence, the infants were no longer witnessing 
pure rotations in the experimental trials.  In other words, the addition of the box was very 
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significant; what the infants saw was a physical event involving two objects, the screen 
and the box.  Is it important to make such a distinction between the pure rotation 
movements and the physical event involving two objects, as two different kinds of stimuli?  
The answer should reveal itself in the following analysis of the “order effect” in the 
original study, as well as the variable outcomes found in other replication/follow-up 
studies.  
The “Order Effect” 
   
Table 1.1 The “Order Effect” (Baillargeon et al., 1985) 
 
 
*Note: The experiential aspects that called for the most attention are highlighted in bold . 
 
  There was an interesting “order effect” in the original study (Baillargeon et al., 
1985).  The infant subjects were habituated/familiarized with a screen moving back and 
forth in full 180° rotations, followed by two experimental trials preceded by a brief visual 
exposure to a box.  In one experimental condition, they proceeded to witness the possible 
event (rotating screen blocked) followed by the impossible event.  In the other 
experimental condition, the order was reversed as the infants saw the impossible event 
first and then the possible event.  Interestingly, it was found that infants looked longer at 
the impossible event only when it was presented immediately after the familiarization 
trials.  The researchers failed to find the same result if the infants witnessed the possible 
Experiment 1 Familiarization 
Trials 
Box Experimental Trial 1 Experimental Trial 2 
Physical Event possible  possible Impossible 
Movement 180°  120° 180° 
Spatial Affordance single object Yes two objects two objects 
     
Experiment 2     
Physical Event possible 
 impossible Possible 
Movement 180°  180° 120° 
Spatial Affordance single object Yes two objects two objects 
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event prior to the impossible event.  In order to explore this so-called order effect, each of 
the experimental conditions must be viewed as a complete spatio-temporal phenomenon.  
Through a phenomenological reflection of the drawbridge experiment, we have come up 
with a series of tentative experiential hypotheses that might contribute to a thorough 
explanation of the infants’ differential responses in the study.  
• There is a natural preference for 180° rotations 
• In the familiarization trials, the habituation stimulus is the movement 
• The habituation to one movement immediately enhances the preference for a 
different movement 
• The introduction of the box changes the spatial affordance in the field, and the 
change itself demands attention 
• If the new spatial affordance is immediately violated by a physical event 
(incongruence), the reaction is much stronger 
• If the new spatial affordance is immediately confirmed by a physical event 
(congruence) but violated by another event later, the reaction is not as strong. 
• Incongruence between spatial affordance and the physical event preoccupies 
attention 
• Habituation to a probable physical event is doubtful 
• Habituation to an impossible physical event is even more unlikely, because there 
is no evidence that repeated exposure to something physically impossible would 
enhance sensitivity toward something physically possible.  
In this first case, the infants were habituated to the 180° rotations, immediately followed 
by the 120° rotations in the first experimental trial.  In addition, the novel 120° rotations 
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took place in a novel field of spatial affordance with the new addition of the box.  Hence, 
even though the infants generally preferred 180° rotations, this experimental trial was still 
interesting enough to receive their attention.  The second experimental trial presented an 
impossible physical event, which was incongruent with the spatial affordance.  However, 
whereas this was also an interesting and somewhat shocking event for the infants, the fact 
that the field of spatial affordance has been confirmed before significantly lessened its 
impact.   As a result, the infant subjects found both experimental trials equally interesting 
to some extent, and no difference was found in their visual attention toward them.  
  In the second case, the infants were habituated to the 180° rotations as well.  In 
the first experimental trial, they immediately witnessed the impossible physical event, 
which was incongruent with the novel spatial affordance caused by the newly-added box.  
This event not only drew a great deal of attention from the infants, but it also directed 
their focus to the violated expectations.  Thus, even though it was another trial with 180° 
rotations, the movement was faded into the background and there was no habituation 
taking place here. As a result, there was nothing particularly appealing about the 120° 
rotations (i.e. dishabituation effect) in the next experimental trial. Furthermore, because it 
is highly unlikely that one can be habituated by an improbable physical event, there was 
also nothing particularly appealing about the probable physical event in the last trial.  
Putting these considerations together, the first experimental trial was more interesting 
than the last one for the infants—thus, they paid significantly more attention to it, and an 
“effect” was found.  As demonstrated here, if we can go beyond the perceptual-
conceptual debate and reexamine the experiment from a phenomenological perspective, 
the “order effect” is not longer a myth and becomes an understandable phenomenon.  
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Reexamining Some Follow-up Experiments 
  Our investigation so far has led to some hypotheses or factors that might have 
contributed to the experimental outcomes.  Do these factors apply to other drawbridge 
studies as well?  Let us take a look at some of these studies. 
Table 1.2 The drawbridge study without habituation (Rivera et al., 1999) 
 
  Rivera et al. (1999) carried out two experiments without habituation, which was 
believed to be unnecessary.  In one experiment, they simply compared the difference in 
the infants’ visual attention between the possible and impossible events.  As expected, the 
infants looked longer at the impossible event. In a different experiment, the infants were 
simply exposed to two physically-possible events, but they looked longer at the screen 
rotating in 180° rather than the screen making 120° rotations.  The fact that the infants 
looked longer at the 180° rotations in both experiments was taken as a support for the 
perceptual-processing explanation. 
 However, this line of reasoning overlooked the significance of the box.  
According to our earlier hypotheses, the new box transformed the spatial affordance in 
the field.  Hence, the infants in the first experiment looked longer at the physical event 
that violated their affordance perception.  In the second experiment, however, there was 
no introduction of the box into the field.  As a result, the infants looked at the movement 
Experiment 1 Familiarization 
Trials 
Box Experimental Trial 1 Experimental Trial 2 
Physical Event None  impossible possible 
Movement 
  
180° 120° 
Spatial Affordance  Yes Two objects Two objects 
     
Experiment 2     
Physical Event None 
  
 
Movement 
 
 180° 120° 
Spatial Affordance  No Single object Single object 
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that they naturally preferred, which was the 180° movement.  Without the potential 
complication caused by the familiarization/habituation process, it seems that these studies 
suggest that infants possess a natural perceptual preference for some movements, as well 
as the ability to directly respond to the more improbable physical event based on 
affordance perception.   
Table 1.3 The control experiment by Baillargeon et al. (1985) 
 
 Familiarization 
Trials 
Box Experimental Trial Experimental 
Trial 
Physical Event Possible  Possible Possible 
Movement 180°  180° 120° 
Spatial 
Affordance 
Single object “out of 
the way” 
Two objects Two objects 
 
  Baillargeon et al. (1985) carried out an additional control experiment in which the 
infants were also habituated to a screen moving in full 180° rotations.  However, there 
was a little twist prior to the experimental trials: the box was introduced into the field, but 
it was “out of the way” such that the screen could still freely move in complete rotation.  
Hence, both events in the experimental trials were equally possible.  If the infants did not 
perceive a change in spatial affordance, how come there was no difference found between 
the two events? Why didn’t the infants look longer at the 180° rotations?  The answer lies 
in the familiarization trials.  Because the infants were habituated to 180° rotations, their 
natural preference for it was partially cancelled out when they were exposed to the same 
movement again in the next experimental trial.  This control study shows that the 
habituation process can potentially undermine a natural preference, and that infants can 
perceive spatial affordances in a very precisely and refined manner.  
  There are a couple other drawbridge studies that might shed light on whether or 
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not the level of habituation matters.  For instance, what is too little or too much 
habituation, and how might it be relevant to the outcomes?  Bogartz et al. (2000) 
designed an experiment that provides some clues about the impact of insufficient 
habituation.  In general, seven is the mean number of habituation trials established by 
researchers (Bailllargeon et al., 1985).  However, the infants in this study were habituated 
to 180° display for only three trials, and as expected, they looked longer at the impossible 
event.  Coming from the perceptual-processing camp, the researchers suggested that 
insufficient habituation actually enhanced the infants’ perceptual preference for 
familiarity.   
  Ironically, as demonstrated in one previous study (Rivera et al., 1999), infants are 
generally more sensitive to the impossible physical event given no habituation trials took 
place.  A few habituation trials to 180° rotation might enhance familiarity-seeking in 
general, but the experimental trials did not simply contain movement.  As discussed 
before, the introduction of a box during experimental trials would significantly transform 
spatial affordances—at the moment, the field does not “afford” the screen making full 
rotations anymore.  Thus, there is no difference between a few habituation trials and no 
habituation at all; in either case, the infants paid significant attention toward the 
impossible physical event.  
  What about too much habituation?  Schilling et al. (2000) carried out a study in 
which the infants went through twelve habituation trials looking at the 180° display.  It 
was found that they looked longer at the 112° display (a possible event) than the 180° 
display (an impossible event).  Researchers argued that the infants were simply 
responding to perceptual novelty, as suggested by the perceptual-processing explanation.  
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However, there might be an alternate explanation.  When habituation goes overboard, so 
to speak, considerations need to be made concerning the extinction process and stimulus-
generalization.   
  Too much habituation can lead to three consequences: no reactivity toward the 
same/similar stimulus, avoidance of the same/similar stimulus and seeking out for novel 
stimulus, and aversive stimulus-generalization.   Taken together, the infants in this study 
might have developed an aversion to 180° rotation, actively avoiding any display that 
resembles this type of movement.  In addition, over-habituation could not only cancel out 
their natural preference for 180° rotation, but it could also take away their attention 
toward the probable-improbable dimension of these physical events.  During post-
habituation, the infants might have been more preoccupied with avoiding anything 
similar, as opposed to paying attention to how the box might have changed the spatial 
affordances in the field.  Thus, it can be said that over-habituation can dampen the infants’ 
natural perceptual preference, as well as their attunement to spatial affordances. 
Partially-Occluded Object Movement  
  The conceptual account of infant’s physical understanding also attempts to draw 
support from the research studies involving occluded object movements.  Rochat (2002) 
suggests that the notion of object-concepts is not simply limited to “a static representation 
of the perceptually absent object,” but it also includes “movements and spatial 
transformation when out of sight” (p.103).   
  Rochat and Hespos (1996, 1997) designed an interesting experiment in order to 
further examine the nature of infant’s object-concept.  The researchers placed several 
groups of infants (four and six month olds) in front of a puppet stage.  In the “translation 
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condition,” the infants witnessed a Y-shaped object falling vertically from the top of the 
stage and landing right behind an occluder.  When the experimenter removed the 
occluder, the infants saw either a probable (Vertical Y) or an improbable outcome 
(Inverted Y).  In the “rotation condition,” the same object fell in a 180° clockwise 
rotation and disappeared behind the occluder at four o’clock.  The infants then witnessed 
either a probable (Inverted Y) or improbable outcome (Vertical Y).  
  The results demonstrate that four-month-old or older infants tend to look 
significantly longer at the improbable outcome in both experimental conditions.  The 
infants appeared to “know” what happened behind the occluder, anticipating the manner 
in which of the Y-shape object was rotating.  
 In infant research, perceptual representations are considered to operate only on 
visible objects, whereas conceptual representations can persist and transcend the 
immediacy of the visual experience.  Thus, it is believed that only conceptual 
representations can survive occlusions.  If research can demonstrate the infant’s ability to 
represent object’s movement and spatial transformation when out of sight, the conceptual 
account would appear to be validated.  This is precisely the rationale of the researchers’ 
interpretation in this study: “Infants saw the object disappeared behind the occluder and 
managed to predict, using conceptual representation alone, the final orientation of the 
object” (Rochat, 2001, p.106).  
  The researchers carried out an additional experiment to control for confounding 
perceptual factors.  In this control study, an object simply rest at the top of the stage with 
no movement involved, and the infants looked equally at this object in either orientation 
at the bottom of the stage when the occluder was removed during experimental trials. 
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The “Translation” and “Rotation” Conditions 
  In the translation condition, the infants first went through six familiarization trials 
in which the Y-shaped object fell vertically until it landed behind an occluder.  They 
proceeded to witness the same movement in both experimental trials, except that the 
occluder was lowered to reveal the final orientation(s) of the object.  In the probable 
outcome trials, the Y-shaped object was revealed in the vertical orientation. In the 
improbable outcome trials, it reappeared in the 180° inverted orientation.  
  As mentioned before, the infants in this condition looked longer at the 180° 
inverted orientation.  Like all the drawbridge studies discussed previously, this particular 
finding is subjected to the perceptual-conceptual debate.  It can be explained by violated-
expectancy or perceptual novelty, both equally valid according to their own theoretical 
rationales.  Nonetheless, it was the following experimental condition that presents a 
significant challenge to the thesis of perceptual novelty.   
  In the rotation condition, the infants were familiarized with six trials of a Y-
shaped object rotating in 180° as it disappeared behind an occluder at four o’clock.  Then, 
they witnessed the same movement in both experimental trials, and the occluder was 
lowered to show the final orientation(s) of the object.  In the probable outcome trials, the 
Y-shaped object was in the 180° inverted orientation.  In the improbable outcome trials, it 
reappeared in the vertical position.   
  The infants in this condition looked longer at the vertical orientation, which was 
identical as the Y-shaped object’s starting orientation.  In addition, Rochat (2001) 
discussed a control group in which infants witnessed the object resting motionless at the 
top of the stage, and looked equally at either orientation at the bottom of the stage.  
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Together, these findings seem to eliminate the possibility that the infants were simply 
comparing two static appearances. 
  The infants did not perceive and compare two isolated appearances of the same 
object.  Instead, they perceived “the motion and the trajectory” of the object (p.106).  In 
fact, there were no isolated appearances of the object in either experimental condition.  
Thus, the thesis of perceptual novelty should neither be validated nor invalidated based 
on this study.  Not only did the researchers discredit the assumption that infants might 
look longer because the ending orientation was different from the starting orientation, but 
also hinted that the precondition to validate it was absent.  
  In order to make sense of the infants’ differential looking time of two ending 
orientations, it is important to reexamine the outcomes in terms of movement perception.  
Why did one trial demand more visual attention from the infants than the other trial?  The 
researchers resorted to the conceptual explanation, because it seems that the violated-
expectancy hypothesis might be the only tenable explanation for this part of the 
experiment.  The issue that remains debatable, however, is whether or not expectancy 
necessarily requires the mediation of a representational mind.  
The Mental Tracking Explanation 
  According to the researchers, this study testifies to the infant’s ability to generate 
“dynamic mental imagery” that “prolongs the information given by perception” and 
“allows infants to predict both visible and invisible transformations” (Rochat, 2001, 
p.105).  From this perspective, the infant possesses some understanding of physical 
principles that would render conceptual representations possible.  Accordingly, 
conceptual representation is the only explanation for why the infants’ perception of the 
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rotating Y-shape object did not stop as soon as it disappeared behind the occluder.  
Finally, it was only conceptual representations within the mind (independent of the actual 
moving object) that could support the infants’ mental tracking that survived temporary 
occlusion in the experiment.  This account, apparently, is thoroughly dualistic, and its 
argument is contingent on whether or not infant’s visual-spatial expectancy necessarily 
suggests the existence of conceptual representations.  Is there a nondualistic concept of 
expectations that can survive occlusion as well?   
  The “mental tracking” explanation rests on the assumption that eye movements 
are simply reacting to the object moving in successive points in space.  Because the eyes 
are “following” the moving object, their access to it is completely “cut off” as soon as it 
moves behind an occluder.  If that is the case, the eyes will always trail behind the 
moving object, rendering something like catching a fast moving object in mid-air 
impossible.  Stern (1977) carried out a microanalysis of a classic boxing match, and 
discovered that a substantial percentage of boxers’ jabs were faster than visual reaction 
time (~180 millisecond).  Beebe & Lachman (2002) further elaborates that human bodily 
actions, such as a punch or a block, indicate a “hypothesis-generating” component in the 
perception of movement.  
  With familiarizations, the eyes track an object not by following the moving object 
at each successive point in space it occupies in transit, but actually by outrunning some 
instants of its movement.  Nonetheless, it would be equally untenable to suggest that the 
moving object is trailing behind the act of looking, because our vision cannot constitute 
object movements that do not exist; such a relationship renders our body neglectful of the 
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changes in space.  Instead, a genuinely unified subject-object view of perception would 
suggest that the act of looking is simultaneously with object movement.  
  If effortful movements such as a punch can surpass the speed of visual perception, 
eye movements are certainly capable of the same feat.  Thus, the representational 
explanation would yield a dwarfed portrayal of human intelligence.  We must then 
conceive the body as thoroughly intelligent as a unified system, responding directly to the 
constant changes in the world; the presence is past-loaded and future-implicated, always 
in the process of becoming.   
  With regard to the phenomenon of an object-in-motion, Merleau-Ponty (1962) 
argues that “if we want to take the phenomenon of movement seriously, we shall need to 
conceive a world which is not made up only of things, but which has in it pure transitions” 
(p.320).  The idea of “pure transitions” refers to the fact that the phenomenal world is not 
made up of determinate and static objects, but movements of the objects (animate or 
inanimate) are an integral part of our everyday experience.  From a phenomenological 
perspective, object movements are not secondary to the objects themselves.  In fact, 
Merleau-Ponty would suggest that the human body is not designed to respond to a world 
of static objects.   
  In conclusion, it appears that expectations and anticipations were involved in this 
experiment.  However, if we conceive the infant’s body as inherently coupled with the 
world, which is neither determinate nor made up of static objects, the perception of object 
movement becomes an anticipatory act in which expectations of its trajectory and visual 
transformations are already implicated.  There is a kind of perceptual momentum that 
builds on itself as the movement progresses.  The occluder in the current study was 
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placed to block only the ending orientation of the Y-shaped object’s movement.  One can 
easily imagine a different outcome if the occlusion took place at a much earlier time 
before the object showed cues of rotation and falling.  Hence, the general claim that only 
representations can survive visual occlusion is inaccurate.  From a phenomenological 
point of view, it is crucial to consider the relationship between what was visually 
accessible and what was occluded.   
  In this sense, Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of movement perception is 
strikingly insightful: “the something in transit which we have recognized as necessary to 
the constitution of a change is to be defined only in terms of the particular manner of its 
‘passing’”(1962, p.320), or, in other words, by means of its “behavior”.  Regarding the 
current experiment, the infants had plenty of visual access to the trajectory and rotating 
“behavior” or “manner” of the passing object.  The ending orientation, though visually 
inaccessible, was built into the infants’ perception of the object’s rotating movement.    
  Thus, it can be argued that movement perception is fundamentally anticipatory or 
“hypothesis-generating,” requiring no internal mental representation to survive occlusion.   
The infants in this study might have noticed a physical outcome that violated their 
expectation.  Nonetheless, this recognition does not require the infants to possess some 
conceptual understanding of the physical world, nor to reactivate an internal schema of 
the object movement (which they learned during the familiarization trials).  From a 
phenomenological perspective, perceiving movements of an object is to decipher its 
behaviors or its manner of passing, which can survive some forms of temporary occlusion. 
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2.4 How Do Infants Perceive Object-Categorizations?12 
  In this section, we will reexamine a central ontological issue based on a major 
research study, and reflect on the infants’ experience during the habituation process in 
order provide an alternative explanation for the outcomes.  Using the 
habituation/dishabituation paradigm (Eimas & Quinn, 1994), the researchers examined a 
group of three-month-old infants’ ability to discriminate animal categories such as horses 
and cats.  The infants were visually habituated to repeated presentations of different 
exemplars of either horses or cats.  During the test trials, they witnessed the presentation 
of either a new horse or a new cat (novel exemplar/same category), or a zebra or giraffe 
(novel exemplar/different category).  It was found that these three-month-olds regained 
visual attention when presented with novel exemplars from a different category.   
  The topic of object categorization is another example of cognitive 
representationalism in the infant literature.  Many researchers believe that infants actively 
group external objects into mental categories, which are then stored in memory and 
organize future perceptions.   
Mental Categorical Schemas vs. A Categorical World 
  Do infants divide the world up into distinct categories based on similar physical 
properties, such as shape, color, and sound?  Are there some real, objective physical 
attributes that render some objects more likely to fall under a category?  Is object 
categorization based on a mental entity making copies of the world as it really is?  More 
importantly, does the ability to categorize, under certain situations (e.g., in an 
                                                 
12
 This is another topic area posed in infant psychology regarding the nature of the infant’s knowledge of 
objects. 
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experiment), equate to a categorical world in direct experience?   
  Alternatively, do infants actively constitute a categorical world through their 
cognitive abilities, such as the development of object concepts or conceptual prototypes?  
Is object categorization based on a constituting mind that continually develops more 
refined conceptual schemas through the process of assimilation and accommodation as 
Piaget suggested, which would break the world down into discrete categories?  More 
importantly, does the ability to form conceptual categories, under certain situations, 
reflect a categorical world in immediate experience?  
  Evidently, these questions bring back the problem of the subject-object split in 
Cartesian ontology.  With regard to the idea of object-categorization, researchers 
nowadays seem to have a hard time choosing a side.  For instance, Rochat (2002) argues 
that whereas an object-in-itself should possess some kinds of “categorical attributes,” 
object-categorization is essentially a mental constitution based on the infant’s ability to 
“perceive the invariant commonalities of things in the physical world” (p.117).  The 
infant’s perceptual experiences are stored as basic-level representational units (Eimas and 
Quinn, 1994), which then become the foundation of more advanced and abstract level of 
categorical representations.  Some researchers, however, do not consider these 
representations as “conceptual” in nature—infants do not necessarily understand the 
meaning and boundary of a category.  Although a distinction has been made between 
perceptual and conceptual categorizations, the ontological presuppositions remain 
unequivocally dualistic. 
  What made two exemplars similar to the infants is the key question in this 
experiment.  Dualistic thoughts offer two competing explanations for the perception of 
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similarities.  The empiricist’s explanation views similarities/resemblance in terms of a 
natural tie between two objects with similar physical attributes: a de facto relation 
between similar things in the objective world that thrusts into our mind.  The 
intellectualist’s account conceives similarities/resemblance as an exclusively mental or 
cognitive constitution.  Physical objects are meaningless in themselves, and it is the mind 
that draws some of them together as a group or category.  
  In addition, there is also a temporal aspect of the experiment to be addressed.  
Grouping a former exemplar and a current exemplar on the screen brings memory into 
question.  Dualistic thoughts resort to representationalism for an answer. The 
representational perspective views that a copy of each exemplar is made and stored 
within the mind.  In the experiment, the infants either somehow “figured out” there was a 
factual similarity between them, or actively “constituted” them as such based on some 
preexisting categorical schemas/concepts.  Hence, for the infants who had been grouping 
the horses into a category during the initial trials, they were able to identify the new zebra 
exemplar as a violation of this category, be it conceptual or perceptual in nature.  
  From a nondualistic perspective, it is important to examine both the empiricist 
and intellectualist’s accounts.  The subject-object dualistic framework suggests that either 
the subject determines the perception of resemblance (intellectualism) or the objective 
resemblance between two objects produces such perception in the mind (empiricism).  
For a deeper understanding of the experiment, it is necessary to have a closer look at 
what might have taken place during the experiment. 
  Ironically, the central experimental paradigm in this study, the process of 
habituation, is a testimony against both accounts.  On the one hand, habituation would 
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not have occurred if the infants were exposed to a series of random exemplars.  In other 
words, there seems to be things in the world that are more likely to be grouped together 
for the infants, otherwise habituation would not have been possible at all in this 
experiment.  Nevertheless, it is clear that infants do not simply have the power to 
constitute any two things as similar (i.e., the “subject” does not determine categorical 
perception).  On the other hand, habituation would have been an unnecessary 
experimental procedure if the resemblance between two exemplars was already an 
objective fact in the world, independent of human intentionality.  The underlying 
category should have been thrust into the infants’ minds immediately, and habituation 
would have occurred instantaneously (i.e. the “object” does not determine categorical 
perception).  To sum up, whereas we cannot deny the possibility that some objects in the 
world might be more likely to be grouped together by human infants, it seems that these 
“categorical attributes” are not independent of human intentionality. 
Reflecting on the Habituation Process in the Study 
  In order to provide a more thorough contextual reinterpretation of this study, the 
right place to begin is a reflection of the phenomenon of habituation.  Habituation is an 
experimental process by which the participants gradually lose visual attention toward 
repeated presentation of the same thing or similar things.  From a phenomenological 
perspective, the research studies using the habituation-paradigm would in fact actively 
structure the infant’s phenomenal world—in a somewhat unnatural way.  Why?   In 
nonexperimental situations, infants are generally not physically positioned in such a way 
that their eyes would fixate on the same area where a variety of objects occur in order.  
Also, in the experiment, the screen that was placed in front of the infants, as the primary 
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light source in their visual field, was irresistible to the natural inclination of their visual 
system.  
  In their natural habitat, infants do not get coerced into witnessing repeated 
presentations of the same/similar objects, to the extent that their lived-world gradually 
becomes uninteresting and dull (e.g., it was indicated by their gaze diversion as noted in 
the experiment).  Infants generally have more physical freedom to fixate their gaze on a 
variety of objects, which was significantly limited by the experimental situation.  Having 
said all these, the main point is that the process of experimental habituation brings about 
a transformation of the infant’s lived-world.   
  The habituation-dishabituation paradigm has a unique feature that often goes 
unnoticed.  Unlike other experimental paradigms, in which the primary feature is the 
participant’s direct behaviors toward an object or a presentation, the habituation 
procedure actually manufactures the behaviors that are supposed to be observed from a 
removed, scientific vantage point.  One cannot help but to wonder if research studies 
based on this paradigm are actually revealing the phenomenon of habituation and 
dishabituation, rather than the hypothetical underlying cognitive or perceptual capacities.  
Reflecting on the Infants’ Experience in the Study 
From a phenomenological perspective, this experiment describes how infants 
organize their sensory experience according to their particular situations—in fact, this is a 
unified subject-object view of perception.  More specifically, it demonstrates how the 
infants organized their perception of a series of animal exemplars in the context of the 
experiment.  These exemplars were presented one after another, but the infants clearly 
did not experience them as isolated instances of visual experience.   
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  What was the basis of this perceptual organization?  It was believed that the 
infants were being habituated to the category of an animal, whether the process was 
based on perceptual characteristics or conceptual boundaries of the animal.  However, 
there was little consideration on the role of habituation in the gradual formation of this 
category, so to speak.  
  As discussed in our reflection of the habituation process in this experiment, 
habituation is only possible if the “stimuli” (e.g. different exemplars of horses) were 
somewhat “generalizable,” that is, there must be some potential “commonalities” shared 
by these exemplars.  On the one hand, if each exemplar was “different-enough” than the 
former one, habituation would have never occurred.  On the other hand, habituation 
would not have been possible if the exemplars were not generalizable, which means that 
some exemplars must share some “commonalities” that can be potentially generalized.  It 
follows that the infants must have been somewhat “motivated” to pull these shared 
commonalities together. 
  This motivation, as discussed before, was based on the displeasure associated 
with watching some similar objects over and over again.  In response to this situation, the 
infants pre-reflectively drew on the generalizable features of these exemplars13, so as to 
enhance their attunement to the next “different-enough” exemplar.  This pattern of 
perceptual organization is explainable by their basic inclinations to generalize and 
“average” their experience (e.g., Stern, 1985, p.195).  Thus, at the most basic level, 
perceiving two things as similar provides a simultaneous apperception of their “averaged” 
version, which does not necessarily indicate an overarching category.  Furthermore, the 
                                                 
13
  These “generalizable” features could very well be the foundation of later development of these animal 
categories.  
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infants’ continuing effort to generalize the horse exemplars eventually stopped as they 
were no longer paying attention to the introduction of new horses, indicating that the 
habituation criterion had been met.   
  The “horse-habituated” infants were not actively putting all of the horse 
exemplars into a group, inasmuch as they were becoming progressively inactive (this is 
what habituation means after all) because the new horses no longer had attention-worthy 
features.  Furthermore, this process also heightened the infants’ sensitivity to novel 
sensory experience; hence, they regained their visual attention immediately when a zebra 
exemplar was presented.  They saw in the zebra not an object that violates the category of 
horses, but its “different-enough” perceptual features or forms that immediately summons 
their attention.  In other words, the infants demonstrated not an act of categorizing objects 
into a group, but a reactive manner of perceptual organization in a very unique but 
somewhat unrealistic experimental situation. 
  This phenomenon speaks to how infants cope with their situation by reorganizing 
their perceptual patterns.  Hence, from a unified subject-object perspective, their 
perceptual organizations are closely tied to their bodily inclinations and interest.  As 
embodied beings always situated in a world, their bodies are always in the process of 
coping with different situations.  This experimental situation altered the infants’ bodily 
inclinations and interest, and the infants pre-reflectively coped with this by reconfiguring 
their perceptual organization—avoiding exemplars with similar features and seeking for 
the next attention-worthy exemplar.  
  This experiment might have proven that infants “can” categorize by dampening 
their level of visual reactivity.  Metaphorically speaking, they were “categorizing” in 
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order to lessen the torture of boredom, while enhancing the potential excitement upon 
seeing the next “different-enough” exemplar.  From a phenomenological point of view, 
habituation propels a person into seeking for something new and different.  The 
habituation process decreases one’s inclination to seek for similarities, and heightens our 
reactivity to novelties.  Thus, to a certain extent, the infants in this experiment were 
“trained” to categorize, and the sign of dishabituation only revealed a successful training.  
In this sense, the experimental outcomes do not suggest that infants are either living in a 
categorical world, or carrying some internal conceptual schemas that constantly divide 
the world into discrete categories.   
Categorizing in the Natural Habitat?  
  From a phenomenological perspective, it would be important to ask if 
experimental situations reflect infants’ natural habitat, because empirical observations in 
these contexts might not be ecologically-valid enough to substantiate ontological claims.  
Again, the experiment cited in this section does not support the idea that infants perceive 
discrete categories in their natural settings, whether it is based on internal conceptual 
schemas or factual properties of the external world.   
  In our effort to reinterpret the experiment from an experience-near point of view, 
we have found no evidence indicating that infants are preoccupied with a mental project 
of grouping the objects into discrete categories—whether it is based on external 
“categorical attributes” of the objects, or internal “conceptual schemas” inside the mind.  
Thus, we do not believe that this ability to “perceive the invariant commonalities of 
things in the physical world” represents the focal point of infant’s conscious existence in 
their natural habitat.  The question remains whether or not infants would perceive discrete 
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categories in their naturally habitats.  Hypothetically, as an infant crawls into a room with 
an array of objects everywhere, does she naturally and immediately perceive groupings or 
categories in the room?  Currently, we cannot address this question strictly based on 
experimental studies such as the current one in discussion.   
  Nevertheless, our analysis in this section brings up a major principle that would 
guide further explorations about infants’ perception of similarity or resemblance, as well 
as the formation of conceptual categorizes.14  Simply put, if infants have the ability to 
draw together the commonalities of the things in the world, this ability is not independent 
of their bodily inclinations, capacities, interests, and desires in a particular situation.  As 
discussed before, the young infants’ attention is characterized by a continuous flow that 
constantly redirects their focus.  Accordingly, there must be some “motivations” for them 
to group and categorize things in natural settings.  This “motivation” was discussed in the 
particular context of the current experiment.  From a unified subject-object view, the 
infants were only grouping or categorizing the animal exemplars as a manner of coping 
or dealing with a particular situation.  In their natural habitat, infants only identify a 
current object as similar to/different from a former object insofar as it calls for a certain 
manner of acting toward it (see the next two chapters for more examples).  
  Certainly, it would be counterintuitive to suggest that infants are not born with 
some innate inclinations to perceive similarities and/or differences; otherwise, the well-
documented familiarity-and-novelty-seeking behaviors would be inconceivable.  
Nevertheless, this inclination cannot be understood as independent of the broader 
                                                 
14
 From a phenomenological point of view, the perception of two similar things does not necessarily 
presuppose the existence of a conceptual category; and, the grouping of things based on a conceptual 
category does not necessarily require the perception of similarities.  
 
 73 
 
contexts of their situation, as demonstrated in our discussion of the habituation process. 
 In addition, perceiving two objects as similar to each other does not necessarily 
indicate an overarching category with firm boundaries.  In general, we agree with the 
consensus that the young infants’ perception of similarities/differences is more likely to 
be based on basic perceptual features, such as form, size, shape, color, and so forth.  For 
example, at the sensory level, two blue circles of slightly different size might produce a 
very similar pattern of neuronal firing in the visual cortex.  Nevertheless, for an infant 
who crawls into a room with an array of objects, there is no evidence that seeing a blue 
circle would propel her to look for another blue circle in order to arrive at a perception of 
similarities, or to continue building up a category of “blue circles” whether it is based on 
sense impressions or the concept of blue circles.  There is no doubt that the topic of 
object-categorization involves many theoretical, conceptual, and developmental issues 
that cannot be thoroughly addressed here.  Our major goal is to deconstruct the rationale 
of taking this frequently-cited experiment as the supporting evidence for both its dualistic 
explanation (with representations) and ontological portrayals (of a mind that categorizes, 
and of a categorical world). 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Infant’s Bodily Intelligence: Learning 
without Representations 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
  Although subject-object dualism is the major theme in the previous chapter, it is 
evident that the “body” has repeatedly found its way into our exploration of the infant’s 
grip of the objects in the physical world.  In fact, it is difficult to articulate the infant’s 
intertwined relationship with the world without making reference to the body.  In this 
sense, Merleau-Ponty (1962) is correct that a genuine phenomenological project is 
incomplete without making reference to the primordial embodied situation of human 
beings.   
  Cartesian dualism not only suggests a subject-object split, but also an ontological 
bifurcation between a mental entity (i.e. mind, psyche, or consciousness) and a purely 
mechanical body.  This mind-body dualism is traditionally considered as an issue of the 
“self”: an isolated individual being is further split into two separated units.  According to 
Descartes, the mind and the body are two separate entities with distinct features or 
substances.  The mind is mental and somewhat disembodied, whereas the body is purely 
materialistic.  The mind and the body interact in the “pineal gland” as Descartes 
originally suggested.   
   It seems that Descartes was attempting to locate mind-body interactions within 
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the body itself.  Nonetheless, the body he envisioned was a mindless physical entity.  In 
contemporary psychology, we can continue to see the prevalence of the idea that the 
mind and the body are of two different substances: mental and physical.  Many 
psychologists today would reject the idea of a disembodied mind.  Their sentiment, 
however, is often based on an appreciation of modern brain-scanning technologies, which 
provide an “inside view” of neurological processes in the brain that are considered as the 
same as mental activities.  As a result, some new versions of the mind-body dualism have 
emerged in recent decades.  
  On the one hand, some psychologists often argue that the mind is not real; it is 
nothing but an epiphenomenon produced by the neurological processes within the body.  
This version of biological reductionism has purposefully disregarded the seemingly 
elusive notion of the mind, consciousness, or subjectivity.  As a result, human existence 
is reduced to “the exclusive terms of pure physicality” (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992, p.9).  
This is often known as physicalism in philosophy. Psychologists without a strong 
position on this issue might continue to speak of the mind and the brain interchangeably.  
  On the other hand, in contrast, some psychologists often retain some versions of a 
constituting mind or self-consciousness. The mind, or the psyche, despite its biological 
basis, actively gathers and organizes information received from the external world.  
Because the mind seems to organize the world in such complex ways that cannot be 
readily decoded and interpreted from the brain scans, the cognitive camp in psychology 
has assumed the responsibility of discovering the mental secrets.  Nonetheless, the 
cognitive mind is still Cartesian at its core for it continues to rest on the ontology of a 
self-world bifurcation, and the split between inner subjectivity and external objectivity.  
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  There are two major versions of the mind based on this self-world split.  First, the 
mind represents the world as it really is, and the objective world basically impinges its 
“facts” onto the mind.  Second, in contrast, the mind is the constituting agent that 
constructs the world based on some innate programs or perceptual patterns, and the world 
is not fundamentally meaningful by itself.  In either case, the mind is considered as 
“embodied” insofar as there is a brain inside the body.  Likewise, the body is only 
“minded” as long as a brain resides within it.  In both cases, the location of intentionality 
remains in the interior, as an internal entity, whether we call it the brain, the mind, or the 
psyche.  This creates an ontological sub-bifurcation between the body-as-subject 
(constituting mind) and the body-as-object (physical body), the latter of which is 
subjected to be surveyed and manipulated by the first.  This seems to be the 
contemporary version of mind-body dualism implicit in the psychological literature. 
  To recapitulate, the contemporary model of the mind is believed to have a 
neurological (brain) basis, surveying and exploring the world of objects including its own 
body and other animate beings.  Although the mind is no longer disembodied in the 
classical sense of Cartesian dualism, the body-as-subject and the body-as-object remain 
to be fundamentally separated.  The mind, or the-body-as-subject, still possesses 
everything associated with the interior of a Cartesian mind, such as internal schemas to 
organize and categorize the external world of objects and other human beings.  In 
addition, there remains a mindless body that is purely physical, which is independent of a 
neurologically-based mind that possesses the cognitive power to survey the body as an 
object.  Under this contemporary version of mind-body dualism, the infant is portrayed as 
a premature scientist, with an internal mental entity that makes copies of the objects in 
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the world, and forms representations that give rise to some expectations and predictions 
about the world.   
  In this chapter, we contend that this ontological split between a disembodied mind 
and a materialistic body renders learning and intelligent behaviors inconceivable, without 
some forms of internal mental representation.  Thus, the major goal here is to develop an 
understanding of intelligent and learned behaviors without representational concepts.  
Accordingly, we will discuss a variety of experimental observations on infant behaviors 
that indicate learning, memory, and intelligence.  Unlike the previous chapter in which 
our reflection is mostly grounded on infants’ visual attention and eye movements, the 
behaviors cited in this section involve more active and deliberate actions such as reaching 
with hands. 
3.2 Bodily Intentionality 
  Developmental psychologists generally conceive infants’ bodily engagement in 
the world in terms of some kinds of action-theory: oral, manual, and visual object-
exploratory behaviors imply a process of knowing the world through immediate actions.  
However, infants not only demonstrate immediate practical knowledge of the world, but 
also memory-based intelligent actions and learned behaviors.  Hence, infant 
psychologists seek to look beyond action-theory for an explanation for these higher-order 
behaviors. 
  Piaget’s resolution was essentially a representational explanation, which has 
undergone many theoretical modifications over the years.  However, the core notion of a 
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representational mind is still widely shared by contemporary developmentalists.15  As 
discussed before, the dominance of a Cartesian mind—inhabited by its mental furniture—
in the mainstream of psychology, makes it nearly impossible to conceive a 
nonrepresentational explanation for the transition from the immediacy of perceptual 
experience into the territory of more advanced intelligent behaviors.   
  Furthermore, the age-old constructivist versus nativist debate is also built upon 
the Cartesian model of mind: whether mental representations or cognitive schemas are 
developed entirely on the basis of accumulative experience or some innate conceptual 
forms?  In either case, a “middle” entity (i.e. the mind) is required to bridge the gap 
between the body and the external objects.  This is because the body is considered as 
secondary to the mind, in which intelligent and learning behaviors must originate.  If the 
body is acting toward objects in a meaningful and intelligent way, it is only because some 
innate object-concepts or newly developed mental schemas are guiding its actions.   
A “Coupled” Body-World Perspective 
  In order to establish an account for learning and intelligent behaviors without 
representations, it is crucial to first elucidate the notion of intentionality in terms of the 
body.  Bodily intentionality suggests that the body is never simply a biological machine 
governed by either innate programs or cognitive schemas.  There are several ways to 
discuss the idea of a primordial bodily intentionality. 
  From a phenomenological point of view, the body and the world are one 
intertwined system from the beginning of life.  The body is fully intentional and 
purposive because it is “coupled” with the world.  This is not to say that, however, all 
                                                 
15
 Arguments against Piaget are often directed to the constructivist aspect in his theory of knowledge 
acquisition, most vigorously by the opposing nativist view (e.g. Spelke, 1991).   
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individuals necessarily experience the world as unified with their bodies.  As adults in 
contemporary societies, we gradually develop a more removed attitude to observe the 
world.  For example, Wapner and Werner (1965) discuss a series of experiments 
concerning the relation between our body and perception.  One of these experiments 
deserves special mention because it shows that what is often conceived as the fully-
determinate objective reality is not isolated from our “body attitudes.”   
  In this intriguing study, two “body attitudes” were introduced to two groups of 
adult participants.  In one group, the participants were asked to adopt the normal attitude 
of looking at an object as “out there,” unrelated to the body.  In the other group, the 
participants were asked to “feel” themselves as fused with the object.  It was shown that 
the participants were fixating their eyes on different parts of the same object according to 
the “bodily attitude” they were asked to adopt.  The researchers suggested that these two 
opposing body attitudes brought about to two differently-organized visual perceptions, 
although the visual presentation was “objectively” the same. Which one of these 
“attitudes” is a better reflection of the infants’ lived-world as demonstrated in 
experimental research and observations?  Infant research seems to suggest that the human 
body is innately coupled with the world, because it shows that the infants’ body always 
corresponds to a changing world.  For instance, Lewcowicz and Turkewitz (1980) 
showed that the heart rate of three-week-old infants would change according to the 
temporal correspondence between the levels of sound intensity and light intensity.  It was 
suggested that infants seem to naturally expect certain levels of sound intensity to 
correspond with certain levels of light intensity.  
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 Regarding the body’s relationship with space, the dualistic approach cannot get 
past the tension between the space of causes and the space of reasons (McDowell, 1993); 
that is, whether the world is causing the body to react, or the mind is constituting space 
based on some cognitive frameworks.  Both perspectives are derived from the mind-body 
problem rooted in Cartesianism.  Alternatively, Merleau-Ponty (1962) offers a 
nondualistic notion known as the space of motivation:  “[I]n perception we do not think 
the object and we do not think ourselves thinking it, we are given over to the object and 
we merge into this body which is better informed than we are about the world, and about 
the motives we have and the means at our disposal” (p.250).    
  This phenomenological view of space presents a unified idea of the relationship 
between the body and the world.  On the one hand, the infant’s increasingly advanced 
motor capacities, visual tracking abilities, and bodily desires continue to actively 
structure the practical space, as discussed before.  On the other hand, the infant’s body 
also directly responds to any changes or reconfigurations in space.  For instance, the 
infant’s ability to locate an object in space is generally guided by what researchers called 
the auditory-visual correspondence.  In one research study, it was shown that infants were 
sprung into defensive reaction/reflex in response to a looming object on a collision course 
with his face (Bower et al., 1970).  In a different experiment, a group of two-month-old 
infants sat in a room where the walls gradually approached or receded, and it was 
observed that they were constantly reorienting themselves with head and postural 
movements in response to the constant changes of space (Gibson, 1966). 
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Affordances and Embodied Coping 
  The notion of affordance has been discussed previously in order to reveal the 
primordial subject-object intertwined relationship that precedes both the subject’s 
intentions and the object’s fixed features, drawing them together as a meaningful form of 
human behavior in context.  For instance, a ball can afford many motor possibilities: 
rolling, squeezing, dribbling, or throwing.  Nonetheless, we do not perceive these 
possibilities upon seeing a ball, and then consciously pick the one that best fits our 
interest.  Nor does the ball carry in itself some objective features that solicit the same 
reaction in every one of us.  If we end up throwing the ball at the wall, it is this throwing 
action that clarifies and specifies the subject-object relationship, because we clearly do 
not possess the omnipotence to transform every ball-like object in the world to be a 
“throwing-friendly” thing, nor does every such object in the world have an irresistible 
enigma that drives us to throw it.   
  Precisely because newborns directly perceive affordances, which are inseparable 
from their innate exploratory dispositions and motor capacities, they demonstrate what is 
known as “pre-reaching” behavior.  Prior to the development of advanced hand-eye 
coordination and the motor ability to grab objects, newborns show frequent forward arm 
movements while tracking a near object moving in front of them, as discussed before 
(von Hofsten, 1982).  From a phenomenological point of view, the infants’ body is 
sprung into action the moment an object falls within reachable distance, showing that the 
human body is a thoroughly intentional system inherently connected to the world.   
  Taken into consideration of the historicity of the “subject” who perceives 
affordances, it is important to rethink the connection between learning/memory and 
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affordance perception.  Dreyfus (2002) offers a nonrepresentational account for learning 
and intelligent behaviors, based on the ideas of skillful perception and embodied coping.  
What is the relevance of affordance to the notion of embodied coping skills?  As 
embodied coping agents already engaged in the world, we do not respond to things as 
things but directly and skillfully as affordances.  Hence, we do not perceive affordances 
as the objective background that gives rise or delimits possibilities of bodily actions—in 
other words, affordances are not “in” the objects or “out there” in the world.  Rather, it is 
crucial to situate the notion of affordances in a nondualistic ontology. 
  Merleau-Ponty (1962) also suggests that the lived-body is drawn to get a maximal 
grip on its environment: “[The] body is geared into the world when my perception 
presents me with a spectacle as varied and as clearly articulated as possible, and when my 
motor intentions, as they unfold, receive the responses they expect from the world” 
(p.250).  In this sense, everyday human coping cannot be understood in terms of 
symbolic representations, and of responses caused by fixed features of the environment:  
  We need to consider the possibility that embodied beings like us take as input  
  energy from the physical universe and process it in such a way as to open them to  
  a world organized in terms of their needs, interests, and bodily capacities without  
  their minds needing to impose a meaning, nor their brains converting the stimulus  
  input into reflex responses (Dreyfus, 2007, p.251). 
 
According to Dreyfus (2002), the embodied agent acquires skills through successful and 
adaptive coping experience.  These skills are both perceptual and action-oriented—they 
are “stored” not as representations, but as solicitations of situations in the world.  In other 
words, what we acquire through experience is not “represented” but directly presented to 
us as more refined and discriminated situations.  Embodied coping skills are acquired 
through a process of increasingly discriminate perceptions and refined bodily responses.  
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In this sense, the clarity of affordances, which defines the level of refinement in our 
skillful perception and action, is a result of successful embodied coping or learning.  In 
addition, it is worthwhile to mention that this nonrepresentational perspective on learning 
has received some empirical support from neuroscience—in particular, as Dreyfus (2007) 
notes, the work of Walter Freeman on the nonlinear dynamic system based on circular 
causality of the human brain. 
Corporeal Schema and Vitality Affects 
  As an embodied agent, the infant is fundamentally aware of herself in both 
motoric and emotional/affective dimensions.  First, proprioception refers to the awareness 
of one’s own bodily movements.  Rochat (2001) offers a more scientific definition, 
according to which proprioception is “the act of perceiving based on information carried 
by receptors in contact with muscles and at the joints, which provide on-line tracking of 
the variations in tensions and torque”(p.35).  
  Infants are not only aware of proprioceptive information, but also of their motor 
capabilities/limitations in specific contexts.  Rochat et al. (1999) designed two research 
experiments to demonstrate this awareness  In the first experiment, they showed that 
infants have a precise awareness of their motor limitations in relation to the objects that 
are either out of reach or too dangerous to try.  In the second experiment, they found 
evidence of the same motor awareness when additional physical constraints were put on 
the infants.  A group of five to sixth-month-old infants wore either light (2g) or heavy 
(200g) bracelets on their wrists.  According to the researchers, whereas the heavy bracelet 
was not enough to suspend the infants’ arm movements altogether, it should have limited 
how far forward they could lean without losing balance.  As expected, the infants were 
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perfectly aware of their motor limitations in relation to distal objects, as evidenced by the 
fact that they did not attempt to reach for the far-away object as frequently as they did for 
the closer object.   
  Stern (1985) brings up a second dimension of embodied awareness, by 
distinguishing between categorical and vitality affects.  Categorical affects are the 
experience of more discrete forms of emotions such as depression, sadness, anger, and so 
forth.  Vitality affects, in contrast, describes the ways and contours of emotional 
activation, including our own visceral feelings and the basic bodily awareness of vitality.  
In addition, according to Tomkins (1962, 1963), emotions are the private experience of 
nine different innate affects.  These affects are physiologically-based but inextricably 
linked to perceptual elements such as images and sound.  Together, they form a 
meaningful experience (or, a script) that signals to us that something is significant.  
Hence, one of the major functions of affects is making us care about what is happening.  
In this sense, affects can be considered as the heightening of embodied awareness.  
The Embodied agent and Practical Space 
  The notion of space in psychology reflects a classical confusion between its own 
subject matter with that of physical sciences in which space is objectified.   This mix-up 
has inevitably led to a view of the body as a point in objective space.  Accordingly, 
spatial structures are fundamentally independent of and separated from bodily structures.  
The notion of bodily intentionality brings about a major challenge to the concept of 
objective space.  According to Merleau-Ponty (1962), having a body is equivalent to 
having a world, and the lived-body is synonymous to the lived space: “to be incarnate is 
to be in the world and of the world; it is to be part of the domain it surveys” (Dillon, 1997, 
 85 
 
p.139).   
 The infant’s lived-space is oriented around both the physical capacities and 
limitations of her body, as well as her inherent motivation to undertake motor projects to 
fulfill her needs.  Hence, the body is very much “minded,” so to speak.  The body has a 
primordial intentionality precisely because it is inherently coupled with space.  The space 
of motivation transcends the duality between objective space and mental/subjective space, 
and allows for a nondualistic framework of embodied learning: “our environment and 
body work together to dispose us to particular ways of acting and experiencing.  The 
world works by drawing on our skillful bodily dispositions” (Wrathall, 2005 p.118).  To 
sum up, the body is originally and thoroughly intentional.  It has its own intentionality 
prior to any cognitive or mental operations.16  All bodily actions can be conceived as 
“consisting movements that are both immediate and, at the same time, purposive (hence 
intentional)” (Dillon, 1997, p.135). 
  At this point, it has been established that the body is primordially intentional, 
coupled with the world, responds directly to spatial changes, and actively structures the 
practical space.  Nevertheless, the notion of embodiment breeds a common 
misconception in the mainstream of psychology: the intertwined body-world perspective 
is considered valid insofar as the embodied agent has direct perceptual access to the 
immediate world, here and now.  Otherwise, some might wonder how the body can be 
intentional, coupled with the world, and structure space, without an immediate contact 
with this world.  
   In other words, the “coupling” is assumed to be suspended temporarily when 
                                                 
16
 The fact that bodily actions are always purposive and directed to objects indicates the inseparability 
between “intentionality”/consciousness and the human flesh, as Dillon (1997) suggests.  
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objects are out-of-sight, so to speak. This is exactly why overcoming subject-object 
dualism is insufficient for a thorough revision of the ontological misconceptions in the 
literature.  A superficial recognition of bodily intentionality does not necessarily rescue 
the body from being trapped within immediacy.  As a result, empirical evidence of 
memory and learning has often been attributed to the working of cognitive or mental 
processes.   
  For example, what if infants have no visual access to the world as in darkness, but 
they seem to remember the precise manners in which they have reached for some objects 
in the light?  Does it not indicate the existence of some visual representations that have 
been “stored” and “reactivated”?  What if infants are able to learn how to use their bodily 
actions to “control” some aspects of the world?  Does it not imply that there is an 
overseeing mind using the body as a physical tool in order to control the external world?  
In addition, what if infants are able to “remember” from a past experience what they need 
to do in order make something happen in the world even after a long delay?   
  In order to overcome mind-body dualism in the literature, it is very important to 
deconstruct the belief that memory and learning, traditionally conceived as mental 
functions, are beyond the capacity of an intentional body.  Some of these questions have 
been discussed in the previous chapter.  Nonetheless, with the mind-body problem as the 
current focus, our approach here takes on a new theme.  We will discuss several 
experimental studies that indicate infants indeed behave intelligently beyond immediacy, 
which means that some kinds of learning, adaptation, or memorization do occur at the 
level of embodiment.  The major challenge is to show how the “lived-body” can offer an 
account of learning or intelligence without representations.   
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3.3 Intelligent/Learned behavior I: Reaching in the Dark 
 “Reaching in the Dark” Study (Clifton et al., 1991) 
We presented six-month-olds either a large (thirty centimeters in diameter) or a  
small (six centimeters in diameter) donut shaped object for reaching and grasping. 
In alternated trials, each object was presented first out of reach and slowly moved 
closer to within reach in front of the infant.  During the trial, each object was 
shaken by the experimenter to make a particular sound: either a jingle bell or a 
rattle.  Following six presentations of the objects in the light, we then turned the 
lights off and presented again each object that the infant could only hear, not see.  
We videotaped infants in pitch darkness using an infrared camera and coded their 
reaching activity toward the object (Rochat, 2002, p.98).  
 
There are a few popular assumptions associated with this experiment.  The researchers 
suggest that infants are able to reach in the dark because they are guided by some specific 
object-concepts or representations of the visually-absent object.  Otherwise, the infants’ 
persistent reaching in the dark would not make sense, for there is no visual information 
guiding their manual search.  Furthermore, it has been suggested that using an occluder to 
block infants’ direct visual contact with an object and turning a room into complete 
darkness are comparable experimental conditions, because there is no visual feedback in 
both scenarios.  
  Such a generalization ignores some major contextual and experiential differences 
between two unique phenomena.  From a phenomenological perspective, we are 
interested in the ways in which infants engage in space without visual feedback from the 
world.    For most researchers, internal representations jump out as an appealing answer.  
They believe that infants can mentally “represent” objects in their visual absence, 
because they possess a cognitive mind which is the only thing capable of making 
permanent copies of the objects.   
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Visual Absence and World-Disappearance  
  Let us first reflect on the infant’s experience in both cases. In the condition in 
which there is an occluder blocking the infant’s visual access to a toy, the “visible 
inaccessibility” is only specific to the toy itself.  The infant continues to be firmly 
anchored in a visible world, and her actions are guided by the visible space.  In the 
condition where the disappearance of an interesting object is due to darkness, the cut-off 
of visual access is not specific to the original object of interest.  When the light is turned 
off, the infant experiences a sense of global darkness.  She no longer exists in a visible 
world, so to speak, which presents to her a relatively handicapped situation in 
undertaking any potential motor projects.  Thus, research has shown that infants are 
generally more active in the light than in darkness, as they always tend to reach more 
frequently in the light in terms of mere numbers of attempt (e.g., Clifton et al., 1999). 
   Does it mean the infant’s world has temporarily disappeared in the dark?  Does 
immediate visual perception matter to the extent that darkness would completely take 
away the infant’s sense of space?  In other words, does visual absence mean world-
disappearance?  According to Merleau-Ponty (1962), the notion of lived-body suggests 
that our body is always engaged in space: we have a fundamental sense of spatiality even 
if we cannot “see” our body and the surrounding objects.  Eyes open or not, the infant’s 
access to the world is not eradicated by darkness.  When the light is suddenly turned off, 
the darkness simply reconfigures the infant’s relationship with space.   
  In order to substantiate this claim, let us first look at the more detailed 
descriptions of the study.  The infants in the experiment were firmly anchored in space, 
with an experimenter or a parent supporting their back.  They could reach with forward 
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arm movements freely and safely.  Before the light was turned off, these objects provided 
visual appearances, moved in and out of reach, shook and made sound, and were 
touchable.  From a phenomenological standpoint, when the perceived object is viewed as 
a phenomenon unfolding through space and time in-relation-to-the-subject, its carnal 
existence should no longer be reduced into mere visual appearances.  During initial trials 
of the experiment, the infants already established an integrated grip of these objects as 
visual, dynamic, sound-making, and touchable—all inseparable aspects of their 
phenomenal existence.  When the light was turned off, the invisibility of these objects did 
not completely eradicate their carnal existence for the infants.  
  Some empirical evidence also seems to support this idea.  Rochat (2001) notes 
that there are two general factors that make infants more likely to reach in the dark: 
witnessing the object/toy before darkness is introduced, and hearing the sound produced 
by the object/toy in darkness.  The first condition nullifies the hypothesis that visual 
absence would bring about world disappearance. Although many infants do not attempt 
to reach at all in the dark, for a combination of factors such as visual disorientation and 
fussiness, it has been shown that fixating on an object of interest (e.g., a toy) immediately 
before darkness would significantly increase reaching behaviors, in comparison to 
conditions where no toys are presented.  From a phenomenological perspective, this is the 
evidence of the infant’s unequivocal conviction that the object is “still there” and their 
spatial relationship remains intact.  The second condition testifies to the primacy of 
auditory space in darkness.  When an object makes sound in the dark, it provides the 
infant with an auditory confirmation of its carnal existence, as well as an auditory sense 
of distance.  Thus, even without seeing the object before it disappears in darkness, the 
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infant perceives in the sound that “the object is there.” As some researchers have 
suggested, sound-making objects does provide a sense of distance—within or beyond 
reach, that guides the infants’ reaching attempts (e.g. Clifton et al., 1991). 
Differential Reaching in the Light 
  Many infant researchers are intrigued by the fact that the same two factors do not 
increase infants’ likelihood to reach in the light condition.  In one study (Shinskey & 
Munakata, 2003), the infants were exposed to two different experimental trials: “cloth-no 
toy” and “cloth-toy” conditions.17  The researchers found that the infants actually reached 
more during the “cloth-no toy” trial than in the “cloth-toy” trial (Shinskey & Munakata, 
2003).  In general, it is suggested that when exposed to either a cloth on the floor or the 
same cloth-as-occluder covering a toy, most infants tend to reach more toward the no-toy 
cloth.  When a cloth is placed on an empty surface, it is the only object of interest 
available to the infants.  Hence, the infants directly perceive the cloth’s affordance as a 
touchable object within a reachable distance.   
  In contrast, when a toy is presented first as the original object of interest, the 
infants are immediately caught up in its affordance as the touchable object within a 
reachable distance and in the motor projects it summons.  In this case, the impact of the 
covering cloth is in demolishing the toy’s affordance; hence, the infants are not motivated 
to reach for either the occluding cloth or the hidden toy.  Hence, the infants tend to reach 
more for the cloth when it is presented alone than the cloth as an occluder.  This also 
explains why witnessing the toy being hidden under a cloth does not increase their 
                                                 
17
 In the “cloth-toy” condition, a toy was presented first as an interesting object within a reachable 
distance; then a cloth was introduced as the object that completely covers up the toy.  In the “cloth-no 
toy” condition, the same cloth was presented alone as the only object within a reachable distance.  
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likelihood for reaching.  
  In the “cloth-toy” condition, the infants’ likelihood for reaching for the hidden toy 
also does not increase by hearing the sounds created by the toy underneath.  In order to 
explain why this is the case, let us reflect on the infants’ experience in this situation.  
Why is the auditory input insufficient to invigorate a sense of the toy’s carnal existence 
as a visible and touchable object?   First, the hidden toy’s sound occurs in a visual world 
with multiple objects and rich layouts in the background, unlike in the dark where 
auditory experience clearly stands out.  Research has shown that multiple visual objects 
can compete for the infants’ attention, weakening their focus on a particular object (e.g., 
Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997; Simons, 1996).  Second, as discussed in the section on 
object permanence, the bodily actions of young infants are closely tied to their immediate 
sensory experience.  They are only capable of carrying out “concrete movement,” which 
is a fundamental vestige of the primordial bodily intentionality or “operative 
intentionalities” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).  Reaching for a sound-making object in the dark 
is an example of concrete movement.  In contrast, in order to reach for the hidden toy 
under a cloth, the infants need to perform an “abstract movement” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) 
by moving their arms toward the cloth so as to remove it in order to make the hidden toy 
reappear and be retrievable.  However, the young infants lack the “intentionality of act”18 
to carry out such movement (Simms, 2008, p.91). 
                                                 
18
 The distinction between “operative intentionalities” and the “intentionality of act” is based on Merleau-
Ponty’s (1962) explication of the difference between concrete and abstract movements.  The first describes 
a primordial bodily intentionality that is inherently purposive and directed to objects, and its mission is to 
fulfill the body basic needs and interests.  The latter describes a type of intentionality responsible for more 
willful and determined acts, which is also not independent of the body.  
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  The following is good example of the difference between concrete and abstract 
movements: even though chimpanzees are intelligent enough to use a random branch as a 
tool to gather ants from small holes and are physically capable of breaking off a small 
branch from a tree, they do not immediately perceive a meaningful connection between 
the two.  Thus, in a situation where they have no thin branch and fail to efficiently gather 
ants with fingers, they cannot perceive a nearby tree as a possible solution: the “abstract 
movement” of breaking off a branch from a tree to use it for gathering ants.   
  To sum up, without the capacity for abstract movements, the toy’s affordance for 
reaching is eradicated when covered by a cloth because the infants’ bodily desire to reach 
for it is abruptly extinguished.  Also, the cloth that the infants perceive in the “cloth-no 
toy” condition is not the same as that in the “cloth-toy” condition.  In the no-toy scenario, 
the cloth is the only object of interest available, thus motivating some reaching attempts 
of the infants.  In the toy scenario, the introduction of the cloth eradicates the toy’s 
affordance as a reachable object; thus, the infants are less likely to reach for the cloth in 
this context.  In addition, they could not readily perceive the cloth’s affordance for 
revealing a hidden object, which would require an ability to perform “abstract movement.” 
Differential Reaching in the Dark  
  Returning to the original study, there was a key difference in the way in which the 
infants reached for the large object as opposed to the small object during the initial light 
trials (Clifton et al, 1991).  The infants had both hands forward while reaching for the 
large object, and only one hand forward while reaching for the small object.  These 
reaching patterns were replicated in the pitch dark condition, in which infants were only 
guided by the respective sounds created by the shaking of the large and small objects.  
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This particular finding led the experimenters to make the following interpretation: “such 
anticipatory manual reaches in the dark as meaning the infants used a representation of 
the object to guide their reaching in the dark” (Rochat, 2002, p.98).  
  The rationale of this representational explanation is as follow: the sound presented 
in the dark triggered a “match” inside of the infants’ mind, where a colossal collection of 
mental representations were stored.  An exact visual representation was pulled out and 
projected into the dark room, providing the infants with the visual and spatial guidance 
for a specific manner of reaching.  However, if internal mental representations can 
actually take over and replace the immediate world of darkness, one might wonder why 
we would generally reach in such a cautious and hesitant manner in the dark.   
  From a phenomenological perspective, it is grossly misleading to think of mental 
representations and the world in terms of a copy-and-paste relationship.  The only 
explanation for why people would reach cautiously and hesitantly in the dark, even with a 
clear mental image of the object, is that the body never disengages from the immediate 
world.  When visual access is unavailable, as in darkness, we directly cope with this 
relatively-handicapped situation as intelligent embodied beings.  Dreyfus (2002) offers a 
nonrepresentational account for this kind of intelligent coping, which is based on 
increasingly refined and skillful perceptions and actions.  According to this perspective, 
the infants’ differential reaching in the dark can be understood in terms of embodied 
coping skills.  Because the infants were deeply anchored and engaged in the world, their 
attempt to reach in darkness was guided by the available sensory and spatial cues, which 
was a somewhat risky and difficult motor project.  In the experiment, the infants did not 
need to look for these cues, because their intentional body was fully capable of 
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reconfiguring or reorganizing its functionality in response to a handicapped situation such 
as being in the dark.  
  In addition, the infants in the experiment not only seemed to know something is 
“out there,” but also exactly what was approaching them.  From the perspective of 
embodied coping, we directly perceive affordances through other sensory modalities in 
response to a handicapped situation.  In the same vein, the infants perceived through the 
objects’ sounds the affordance for a particular manner of reaching.  They did not need to 
pull out the matching representation from their mental storage.  Rather, they directly and 
immediately perceived the sounds as being able to “afford” a specific way of reaching for 
it in a more-or-less handicapped situation without a light source, cautiously and hesitantly. 
  In addition, the familiarization process in this research study provided the infants 
with plenty of visual exposure to both the small and large objects making two different 
sounds, beginning from a farther distance and slowly approaching them.  During the 
familiarization trials, they experienced many successful attempts in reaching for these 
objects.  As Dreyfus (1972) suggests, successful coping continually enriches the way 
things in the world show up for us.  Through successful reaching during these initial trials 
in the light, the infants developed what could be considered as skillful perceptions and 
actions.  Precisely because the infants had an intentional body that was capable of 
adapting to a handicapped situation such as being in darkness, they remained somewhat 
competent in perceiving refined discriminations and carrying out skillful, purposive 
actions.  Thus, when hearing the familiar sounds in the dark, they were sprung into a 
specific reaching by the auditory input alone when the room turned into darkness.  To 
sum up, the infants’ differential reaching, as a sign of intelligent behaviors, can be 
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understood from the perspective of embodied coping and based on the notion of 
affordances, without resorting to any representational concepts for an explanation.   
3.4 Intelligent and Learned Behaviors II: Anticipatory  
and “Memorized” Actions 
 
  In this section, we will examine two research experiments that demonstrate 
infants’ intelligent and learned behaviors based on extended memory.  In the first 
research study, a group of three-month-old infants were placed in a crib with a foot tied 
to a mobile by a string (Rovee-Collier et al., 1980).  It was found that the infants quickly 
learned the positive correlation between their kicking frequency and the mobile’s 
movements.   
   Until eight days after the initial experiment, if the infants revisited the same crib 
with the same mobile—in other words, the exact same situation—they would begin to 
kick at a high rate even though there was no string and no movement of the mobile.  
There was a trick that could extend this seemingly learned/memorized behavior well 
beyond eight days: a brief visual exposure of the moving mobile before the experiment 
was repeated.  In the follow-up experiment, the infants showed significantly less or 
virtually no kicking if a different-looking mobile replaced the original, albeit the crib and 
everything else remained the same.  
Reexamining the “Mobile-kicking Experiment” 
  What is the basis of the infants’ understanding of the correlation between their 
kicking and the mobile’s movements—the “knowledge” that more kicking produces more 
movements on the mobile?  The cognitive explanation would suggest that all infants 
possess an overseeing mind, which is capable of identifying patterns and contingencies in 
the external world, and control a physical body in order to maximize the sensory-
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stimulating inputs.  According to this view, the infants in the study gradually recognized 
the fact that the mobile’s movement was contingent on their kicking.  They used this 
knowledge to take control of their bodies as a tool in order to maximize the mobile’s 
movement.  
   From a nondualistic perspective, the body plays an active and intelligent role in 
coping with the world.  The body, according to Merleau-Ponty (1962), is drawn to 
achieve a maximal grip on its environment: “[It] is geared into the world when my 
perception presents me with a spectacle as varied and as clearly articulated as possible, 
and when my motor intentions, as they unfold, receive the responses they expect from the 
world” (p.250).  There are indicators of intentionality in something as basic as eye 
movements; for instance, focal eye movement is an indicator of interest.  To focus is to 
reorient the body in order to achieve an optimal view of the world.  In other words, the 
body is always in the process of reorienting itself so as to get a maximal grip on the 
surrounding environment, and the world feeds back to the body what it desires and needs.   
  How do we then account for the “learning” that took place in the experiment from 
a nondualistic perspective?  Infants’ innate interest in movements is uncontestable, and 
kicking as a predominant behavioral indicator of infants’ excitement is well-documented.  
From a phenomenological view, when the infants were first put on a crib, they saw an 
interesting mobile hovering on top of them and began to kick more frequently out of 
excitement, making the mobile moves even more rigorously.  It is also possible that the 
mobile began to move because of their random kicking, given that alert infants always 
engage in some random kicking motions.  Either way, when the mobile’s movement 
began to increase, the engaging infants became increasingly excited, resulting in even 
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more movements of the mobile.  From an experiential point of view, the “learning” that 
took place here must be understood in the context of this circular feedback loop.  In other 
words, it was inevitable for the infants to increase their kicking based on the fact that 
their legs were connected to the mobile through a ribbon.  This kind of learning was not 
based on the infants’ cognitive abilities to notice patterns and invariants in the external 
world; instead, what they learned in this experiment was inseparable from their bodily 
interests and inclinations. 
 Thus, based on the setup of the study, the infants were not required to act as keen 
observers of the contingencies and patterns in the world.  The mere observation of the 
infants’ increased kicking does not support the occurrence of any cognitive operations.  
The infants did not act as a little “scientist” trying to identify a connection between the 
kicking and mobile’s movements, and use that knowledge by manipulating the body in 
order to receive more visual excitement.  Instead, this can be considered as another 
example of pre-reflective embodied learning, which is fully explainable by infants’ 
bodily tendency to achieve a maximal grip of the environment, without the working of 
any mental activities or conceptual knowledge.    
  The second question to be asked is more explicitly related to extended memory: 
when the infants came back eight days later, why did they immediately engage in high-
rate kicking at the sight of the same mobile, even though its movement this time was not 
contingent on their kicking?  Does this imply that some amount of knowledge about this 
mobile had been learned, stored, and remembered by the infants? What is an alternative 
explanation for this particular observation?  
  In order to address this question, it is essential to revisit the notions of direct 
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perception and embodied skills.  The idea of embodied coping skills renders perception 
as fundamentally anticipatory and always tied to our bodily capacities and interests 
(Dreyfus, 1991).  In order to best explain the immediacy of bodily actions observed in 
many infant research studies, the phenomenon of learning through experience/memory 
must be conceived as operating at the level of perception.  Infants perceive an object in 
the manner of its becoming, through the historicity of their engagement with it, as well as 
their bodily inclinations, capacities, interests, and desires.  In direct, immediate 
perception, the embodied infants perceive an object in terms of what they need to do for 
it to become what best fits their bodily interests and motility.  
  From a cognitive perspective that splits the mind and the body into two areas of 
functioning, the infants would need to first establish a complete visual perception of the 
still mobile, identify it as the same as the image stored inside their mind, and then recall 
and execute the required kicking activity that previously made the mobile move.  In 
contrast, from a phenomenological perspective, when the infants came back after eight 
days of the original experiment, they directly perceived the mobile as that-which-will-
move-vigorously, and this direct perception immediately propelled their bodies to kick 
frequently and excitedly.  Based on experience, the infants seemed to have achieved a 
maximal grip of this situation, which was founded on their body’s innate interest and 
desire for more movements.   
  Furthermore, witnessing the same moving mobile just before repeating the 
experiment was not only itself a familiar and exciting event for the infants, but it also 
reinforced their perception that this thing was the mobile-that-could-move-really-fast. 
They experienced the mobile not as an image that matches an internal representation, but 
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as solicitations for them to response in certain manners.  Thus, this brief exposure was 
able to extend this embodied “skill” well beyond eight days as noted by the researchers.  
  Also, in order for the findings in this experiment to be qualified as an example of 
skillful perception and action, it is also important to examine how perceptually refined 
and discriminatory the infants became after their first visit to the laboratory.   As a matter 
of fact, it was shown that the infants learned to effectively discriminate the original 
mobile from a different-looking mobile, and showed no kicking efforts if the mobile was 
not the original one.  Thus, their perceptual repertoire in this experimental context had 
become rather refined and discriminatory—or, in one word, skilled. 
Reexamining the “Puppet Experiment” 
  The second research study that indicates learning based on relatively long-term 
memory is known as the “happy-puppet” experiment (Stern, 1982).  In this experiment, a 
group of six-month-old infants were introduced to two hand-puppets, a frog and a rabbit.  
The infants did not have an emotional reaction, such as a smile, upon seeing them for the 
first time.  The experimenters then used either puppet to play a game of peek-a-boo with 
the infants.  Most infants, but not all, were smiling during the playful interaction with 
either the rabbit or frog puppet.  
  All the infants were brought back and shown both puppets a week later.  Those 
infants who smiled before smiled again at the now-still frog or rabbit puppet, and looked 
longer at whichever puppet was used during the peek-a-boo game.  In contrast, those who 
did not smile before did not smile upon seeing either puppet again; however, they looked 
longer at the puppet not used in the game (Stern 1982).   
  Lichtenberg (1991) raises a very interesting question about this experiment: 
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“[D]id the infants who smiled during the game smile a week later at the nonmoving 
puppet because they remembered smiling or because they saw a funny puppet”? (p.79)  
He argues that neither is a good explanation, because what the infants remembered was 
neither their own smiling nor a “funny puppet.”  He proposes that memory and 
anticipatory systems work together to form a “perceptual-action-affective sequence” that 
is “remembered” and activated upon seeing a perceptual cue, such as the puppet that 
made the infants smiled in the experiment. This is his version of how perception is tightly 
connected to bodily actions and affective experiences. 
  Nonetheless, the question he posed and attempted to answer is founded on a 
dualistic framework, and it is important to not be misdirected by it.  From a nondualistic 
perspective, the infants did not smile because they remembered smiling a week ago, 
which would imply a reactivation of subjective, internalized memory.  They also did not 
smile because they saw a funny puppet, because that would imply the “funniness” 
became a permanent, objective property of the puppet.  From a phenomenological 
perspective, the immediacy of the infants’ behaviors in the experiment would require an 
alternative characterization that subtends both dualistic explanations.  
  Learning from social interactions is essential to infants’ adaptation in the world.  
Hence, the puppet experiment can be viewed from the perspective of embodied coping as 
well.  For the infants who smiled before, most of them were sprung into smiling as soon 
as their eyes met the same puppet again.  Seeing the puppet and smiling cannot be 
conceived in terms of cause-and-effect in either direction, because visual perception is 
potentially slower than motor actions as discussed before.  If the infants had to first 
visually perceive the puppet, match its present appearance with an internalized image that 
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was encoded or remembered as the beginning of a fun interaction that happened a week 
ago, and then reactivate the same smiling response in their body, this “perceptual-action-
affective sequence” does not seem to do justice to the immediacy of embodied coping.  
  However, the notion that the puppet showed up as a funny puppet is not far off, if 
conceived in terms of the body’s tendency to achieve maximal grip.  From a nondualistic 
standpoint, it is not a question of whether the infants remembered smiling or saw a funny 
puppet, because they are not mutually exclusive interpretations.  For the infant subjects, 
seeing a “funny puppet” a week later was precisely what it means to remember smiling 
the week before.  For them, the puppet showed up immediately as clearly and 
unequivocally “funny,” and their body was immediately sprung into meaningful 
actions—engaging with the puppet through an immediate smiling gesture in anticipation 
of a sequence of joyful interactions.  In other words, smiling at the funny-puppet-which-
is-now-still-and-nonmoving was a revelation of their motor intention to receive the joyful 
responses they expected from it.  
  To sum up, the puppet showed up as a “funny puppet” not because memories had 
permanently altered an object in the external world.  Rather, because the world is 
intertwined with the historicity of the infants’ bodily engagement in it, the still-puppet 
showed up exactly the way they needed to see it—as a funny one, for their bodies to 
immediately engage with it by smiling at it.  Through the fun interaction with a puppet in 
the original experiment, the infants became more perceptually refined and discriminatory, 
bringing about more skillful and meaningful social actions during the subsequent 
experiment.  Their smiling, then, was an indication of intelligent behavior based on 
previous successful, embodied coping experiences in social context. 
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  What about the infants who never smiled?  Why did they look longer at the 
puppet that was not used in the original experiment?  To be considered as successful 
coping, motor intentions should be aiming toward adaptation.  In general, there is very 
little positive gain from boredom, displeasure, or over-stimulation, which seems to be the 
case for the nonsmilers.  Nevertheless, the experiment did lead to more refined and 
discriminated perception for the nonsmilers as well.  In this case, seeing the uninteresting 
puppet again propelled the nonsmilers to engaging in an evasive action of immediately 
turning away from this “unappealing” object.  Thus, when the nonsmilers were brought 
back a week later, they skillfully directed their gaze to a novel puppet that was directly 
perceived as potentially more interesting.  Be it avoidant or novelty-seeking, such 
behavior was clearly a sign of bodily intelligence.   
  Lichtenberg (1991) suggests that perhaps memories are encoded in affective 
forms, “though never in isolation of the perceptual-action mode in which they are 
experienced” (p.80).  Hence, for the baby smilers, the positive affect was remembered 
and reactivated the smiling response; for the nonsmilers, the negative affect was 
remembered and reactivated the looking-away or novelty-seeking response.  
  Nonetheless, we would venture that, in support of the thesis of bodily intelligence 
and skilled perception and actions, being affected motivates and organizes embodied 
coping.  As Tomkins (1981) argues, the major purpose of affects is the amplification of 
experience.  To amplify an experience is to make it an urgent embodied concern, 
reinforcing the body’s natural inclination to cope accordingly.  As demonstrated above, 
the infants in the “puppet experiment” coped with their respective affectively-amplified 
experiences in very meaningful and intelligent manners: whereas the smilers were 
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motivated to initiate what was perceived as the beginning of a pleasant interaction 
through smiling and sustained visual attention; the nonsmilers were motivated to look 
longer at the novel object, partly as a quick termination of what was perceived as the start 
of a boring/unpleasant experience, and partly as an effortful search for something more 
interesting or pleasant.   
  In this chapter, we attempted to provide a series of nonrepresentational 
explanations that would account for the memory-based intelligent and learned behaviors 
as demonstrated in some experimental research studies.  This endeavor was crucial to our 
effort to overcome mind-body dualism in the literature.  In turn, we sought to offer a 
phenomenological reflection of the infants’ experiences in the research experiments cited 
in this chapter, which can account for all the outcomes that the researchers found in their 
studies.   
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Infant’s social world:  
Intersubjectivity/Inter-corporeality 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 Previously, we have established a nondualistic understanding of infants’ 
physical/object knowledge by attempting to overcome the subject-object bifurcation, and 
of intelligent and learning behaviors based on the notion of bodily intentionality which 
deconstructs the mind-body split.  In this chapter, the focus will transition into the social 
dimension of infants’ existence, based on a reflection on some of the major ontological 
themes associated with selected experimental studies in this area.  
  In psychology, the traditional portrayal of infants’ social world has not only been 
clouded by the classical Cartesian separation between self and others, but also 
complicated by remnants of the subject-object and the mind-body bifurcations.   
Although the notion of intersubjectivity has been discussed at length in the introductory 
chapter, it is worthwhile to mention some of its synonymous terms in Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy (i.e., 1962, 1968); each of these notions represents his particular response to a 
different ontological theme or concern.  As discussed before, intersubjectivity highlights 
his refutation against the self-other split that is a direct consequence of the Cartesian 
subject-object dualism—self as subject and the other as object.  Intercorporeality brings 
the lived-body into the equation; an explication of intersubjectivity is insufficient without 
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a deep reflection on the human embodied situation.  The mind-body dualism splits human 
existence into a mind that only performs mental operations, and a body that only acts 
mechanically like a machine.  Consequently, it becomes the mind’s job to constitute and 
store representations of the other.   Lastly, Merleau-Ponty’s articulation of the “flesh” 
accentuates the intertwining and/or reversibility between the self and others in perception. 
 The idea of human sociality corresponds to a conception of the world and 
ontology.  If the world is conceived as an objective reality or an external space of physics 
inhabited by mechanical human bodies with a cognitive structure called the mind, then 
human sociality can only be understood in terms of external, objective interactive 
behaviors experienced internally by separate individuals, within the sphere of subjectivity.  
Accordingly, the self, or similar ontological constructs such as the subject (and 
subjectivity), consciousness, and the mind, becomes the building blocks for scientific and 
philosophical reasoning.  Plenty of such examples can be found in the literature of 
developmental infant psychology.  If, alternatively, a first-order communal world or 
reality is adopted, the study of infants’ social existence might not necessarily start with a 
self or its equivalents.  
  The ontological separation between the self and others suggests a vision of human 
existence as originally individualistic; thus, the world is inhabited by beings existing in 
isolation.  In the following sections, we will approach the tension between the dualistic 
and nondualistic frameworks of human sociality, through a phenomenological-
hermeneutic analysis of a variety of infant research topics including: the perception of 
human faces and neonatal imitation, the perception of social causality or intentionality, 
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more complex forms of facial interaction, the ability to discriminate self from others, and 
internal representations of the self and others. 
4.2 Perceiving the Human Face 
  According to Stern (1985), the perception of other human beings involves both 
constructionist efforts and the more global, amodal processes.  On the one hand, he 
suggests that infants’ perception of the human face is based on “constructionist terms,” 
following a similar developmental progression of human visual scanning tendencies.  
Particularly, he notes that infants in the first two months tend to scan the peripheral, 
external features (contours and edges) of an object.  Then, there is shift toward the 
“internal features” of an object.  Hence, newborns initially experience the face as “no 
different from other objects that move, that are roughly the same size, and that have 
similar contour density.”  It follows that their perception of the human face is considered 
as an aspect of object-perception.  He is very clear about the ontological consequence of 
this interpretation, according to which “the infant is not related in any distinctive or 
unique way to other persons” (p.63).   
  On the other hand, he also points to the evidence suggesting that infants might 
experience human forms in a unique manner from the very beginning.  For instance, he 
makes reference to infants’ appreciation of global aspects of the face, including their 
preference for animation (Sherrod, 1981); their fluid facial-scanning pattern compared to 
geometrical objects (Donee, 1973); and their animated bodily movements and 
vocalizations when looking at live faces (Brazelton et al. 1974).  Judging from Stern’s 
characterizations, it seems to be a difficult task to decide whether the human face is 
perceived as a unique form or “no different from other objects that move” (Stern, 1985, 
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p.63).  Hence, our mission is to approach this question from a phenomenological 
perspective as well as a re-reading of some relevant experimental findings.  
  Although infants, to a certain extent, lack the experience of their own visibility, 
they unequivocally expect and actively seek out human forms in the world.  Whereas 
infants do not have visual access to their own face and are largely unaware of their 
visibility, they are always attuned to the facial features and gestalts in their lived-world.  
For example, research shows that infants prefer circular patterns such as the image of a 
bull’s eye, over a different pattern composed of straight lines with comparable amount of 
contrast such as a checkerboard (Fantz, 1964; Fantz and Fagan, 1975).  In a study on 
visual scanning, it was found that newborns would systematically scan the edges of an 
outlined figure, associated with maximum neuronal activities in their visual cortex (Haith, 
1980).  Furthermore, it seems that infants’ attunement and preference for visual stimulus 
resembling facial features continue to develop over time.  Haith et al. (1977) note that 
between five to seven weeks, infants spend a dramatically increased time looking at an 
adult’s face.  By the second month, infants begin to demonstrate a strong attunement to 
the eyes of an animated face. 
  In addition, infants would imitate an inanimate object performing movements 
resembling facial gestures, such as the protrusion of a pencil.  This phenomenon brings 
up the concept of physiognomic perception, which is the tendency to perceive inanimate 
objects or nonhuman living things in terms of human physiognomies, facial expressions, 
gestures, or more generally, acts of human beings (Werner, 1956).  Infants demonstrate a 
strong preference for and attunement to face-like features in both animate and inanimate 
objects.  Thus, in a way, they seem to perceive the inanimate as the animate.  The world 
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is full of life, as Werner (1957) suggested, because infants’ perception is fused with an 
innate sense of sociality.  For infants and young children, inanimate objects are perceived 
as “directly expressing an inner form of life” (p.69).  
  Nonetheless, infants’ perception of the human face is not indiscriminatory or 
neutral for there is a strong preference for the mother’s face.  In one study (Walton et al, 
1992), infants less than two days old were exposed to the image of their mother’s face 
and that of a female stranger, presented side by side.  The image of the female stranger 
matched the overall features of their mothers such as hair color and skin tone. 
Nevertheless, the infants were found to look significantly more at the image of their 
mother.  In addition, it was shown that newborns would suck more frequently in order to 
watch a video screen showing their mother’s face rather than a stranger’s face.  
  The human face is far more than a simple visual object in the world.  A face is not 
only dynamic with motions, but also represents the emblem of infants’ social existence.  
For instance, infants can detect anything that is “off” about a face.  In one experiment 
(Morton & Johnson, 1991), newborns’ visual tracking patterns were recorded as they 
were watching two-dimensional schematic face-like displays moving on a screen.  The 
researchers found that they looked significantly more at the face-like displays when eyes, 
eyebrows, nose, and mouth were presented in a natural way (i.e. resembling a human 
face), as opposed to a blank or “scrambled” displays.   
  For a face to look “right” in the eyes of infants, it also has to correspond to other 
sensory components that make up the totality of a person.  In particular, Haith (1980) 
notes that babies by six weeks begin to attend more closely to the faces that speak.  
Infants also expect a temporal correspondence between the auditory and visual 
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presentations (i.e., lip movements).  In two collaborative experiments, it was found that 
infants would look longer at the presentation in which the articulatory movements of the 
mouth corresponded to the actual sound they heard (MacKain et al, 1982; Kuhl & 
Meltzoff, 1982).  Hence, infants are evidently attuned to the “right” face.  Nonetheless, 
there seems to be a primacy of the human face as seen over the associated sensory 
qualities of a speaking face.  For example, when articulatory movements are inconsistent 
with the sound produced, people generally experience the sound that is supposed to 
correspond to the lip movements (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976).  As Stern (1985) 
suggests, people hear what they see while looking at a speaking face.   
  Interestingly, infants continue to develop more subtle expectations about the 
human face.  The researchers in one experiment attempted to systematically observe a 
group of three to sixth month old infants interacting with an adult (Hains & Muir, 1996).  
In one condition, the adult fixated her eyes on the infants through a direct gaze; in the 
other condition, she averted her gaze 20 degrees off center.  It was found that the infants 
smiled significantly less in the averted-gaze condition, despite the head position of the 
adult remained the same.  Furthermore, the infants of three-month-old or younger showed 
a significant decrease in smiling when the adult turned the head sideways while 
maintaining eye contact.  Nonetheless, this appears to change by five months of age, as 
infants’ sensitivity to eye contact no longer depends on the head orientation of social 
partners (Caron et al., 1997).  In yet another study, it was shown that infants as young as 
three months old have developed an awareness of the referential gaze, as they would 
orient their gaze and look in the same direction as the adult’s gaze (D’Entremont et al., 
1997).   
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  Our reexamination of the experimental records cited in this section supports the 
general conclusion that infants are born with a global awareness of other co-existing 
human beings.  They demonstrate behaviors that presuppose an awareness of the 
existence of other human beings, perceived as unique forms or gestalts rather than the 
merging of isolated sensory qualities.  Newborns also respond favorably to what might be 
called the “human stimulus”: movements, motion, face, voice, tactile stimulation, social 
behaviors, and so forth.  Furthermore, they evidence a precise precognitive understanding 
of the configurations of the human face, and of the visual-spatial correspondence of an 
articulating face.   
  These findings demand an ontological explication.  Specifically, the nature of 
social consciousness is in question.  If consciousness refers to a state of existing as an 
independent self that goes through a developmental process of social learning, other 
human beings are inevitably reduced to objects within a mind/psyche; the others are “for-
me,” so to speak.  Hence, other human beings will always hold a secondary ontological 
status in the language of self-consciousness: I exist first and foremost as a consciousness 
with a core awareness of my own existence, and other human beings are simply objects 
that I prefer a little more than inanimate objects.  Accordingly, the fact that they also 
possess conscious minds is something that I can only discover later based on some 
cognitive/mental leaps.  
  Alternatively, if consciousness is conceived in terms of “compresence” or co-
existence, the state of being present or coexisting with others, then all of things that I 
know and learn about other human beings can be viewed as already pregnant in such co-
existentiality.  The notion of compresence (Ortega y Gasset, 1957) suggests that the 
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perception of self is coextensive with the perception of others; it also indicates that my 
conscious existence involves my participation in the existence of other human beings, 
suggesting an alternative ontology of intersubjectivity.  As Simms (2001) suggests, "we 
begin life not as separate monads, but as mingling presences, as aspects of significant 
wholes where the newborn's action finds its complement and completion in the actions of 
the other" (p. 27). 
  Thus, the unique human face as seen by infants is not simply a perceived object. 
Whereas infants are not reflectively aware of a separate intentional human being in sight, 
they are nonetheless participating in the expression of human intentionality upon seeing a 
face.  This participation is not based on any innate mental ideas or representations, but 
rather on their embodied engagement in a common world with other embodied beings.  
Hence, their innate awareness of human forms is always coupled with their bodies: what 
they see as human is always coupled with what they feel in their own human bodies.  
This idea of infants’ social existence is fundamental to our investigation in the following 
section, in which we will reexamine the phenomenon of imitation and reflect more deeply 
on infants’ face-to-face encounter with an adult partner. 
4.3 Neonatal Imitation: Facial and Emotional Dimensions 
  Many researchers view infants’ encounter with a social partner from the 
perspective of mental representations and organizations.  From a phenomenological 
perspective, when infants meet the human face in all its variations—facial expressions, 
tones of voice, and so forth—there is something far more fundamental happening.    
  The infant’s embodied awareness of her own face immediately becomes an 
apparatus to produce a variety of facial gestures.  Similarly, the facial gestures on a social 
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partner, as seen from the infant’s point of view, are immediately capable of expressing 
the same intentions; she knows it not by means of a cognitive approximation or an 
analogy, but through what scientists called a cross-modal transfer between vision and 
propriocepton.  According to Merleau-Ponty (1986), when an infant sees the mother 
slowly widening her mouth to display a surprise expression, this facial gesture has 
immediately, for the infant, an intersubjective significance.  This description of neonatal 
imitation has tremendous ontological implications for human existence.  In the following, 
we will attempt to explore some of these implications through a deeper examination of 
the phenomenon of imitation in both facial and emotional/affective dimensions.  
Facial Imitations in Newborns 
  In general, developmental psychologists are primarily concerned with the 
functional role of imitation in an infant’s development.  Nonetheless, it is also important 
to approach neonatal imitation as a phenomenon that might further reveal the primordial 
social nature of an infant’s existence.  Let us consider the following findings from infant 
research.  Meltzoff (1990) found that infants as young as forty-two-minutes-old can 
imitate the facial gestures of an adult model, such as tongue protrusion and lip pursing.   
They can also reproduce head and finger movements modeled by an experimenter 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977).  Furthermore, a different study reported that newborns are 
capable of reproducing well-contrasted facial expressions of happiness, sadness, and 
surprise modeled by adults (Field et al., 1982).  Apparently, these findings contradict 
with the long-believed necessity of visual schemas in facial imitation, mostly from the 
perspective of cognitive psychology.  
  Experimental observations on neonatal imitation have spawned a variety of 
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interpretations.  For some, it is a transient phenomenon that is based on an automatic 
release mechanism of the human body (e.g., Anisfeld, 1991).  Nevertheless, the more 
popular opinion is that it involves an active cross-modal matching between vision and 
proprioception.  Beebe and Lachman (2002) refer this “matching” ability as the 
mechanism that constitutes a fundamental relatedness between self and other.  
  Lichtenberg (1983) conceives imitation in terms of a social responsiveness that 
requires an “innate patterning.” The implication is that both the mother and the newborn 
are primed to engage in social interactions, instead of acting as “two individuals sending 
discrete messages.”  In order for infants to execute imitative facial movements, they must 
“identify the thing they see protruding from the adult’s mouth as the same thing they can 
feel (but not see) in their own mouths,” following by “fairly complex muscular 
movements to complete the imitation” (p.18).  From this perspective, infants are 
“preprogrammed to respond to a visual stimulus in a manner that produces a mirror-
image response—the infant’s face taking on the physiognomic appearance the infant sees” 
(p.105).  Thus, imitation is a primordial kind of “emotional mirroring” understood in 
terms of a “communication system of incredible synchronous immediacy” (p.106).   
  Stern (1985) describes imitation as an example of amodal perception, which is 
prior to the differentiation of distinct sensory modalities.  In their discussion of infantile 
imitation, Maurer and Maurer (1988) argue that synesthesia or the unity of senses should 
also be taken into consideration.  They suggest that imitation is not only a cross-modal 
mechanism, but also reveals an integrated perceptual world of infants.  Accordingly, 
facial movements as seen are no different from facial movements as felt in the infants’ 
own facial muscles.  
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  Our investigation of neonatal imitation will begin with a phenomenological 
reflection on an infant’s embodied situation.  In the newborn’s world, the neonate 
experiences her body in a very different way than she experiences other bodies.  This 
difference does not lie in the bifurcation between two isolated conscious subjects, but in 
the very embodied situation of human beings—that is, we are always on the same side of 
our body.  The infant, being on the same side of her own body, has no access to an 
integrated image of herself as a visible body with a visible face.  Furthermore, there are 
parts of her body that she would never see without a mirror.  To sum up, the embodied 
infant simply does not have the vantage point to visualize her body in the exact way she 
sees other human bodies.  
  Without a visual image of her own, the infant’s imitation cannot be based on a 
point-for-point correspondence between her corporeal schema and the adult’s facial 
configurations.  Otherwise, it would be impossible to conceive why infants would also 
imitate the gesture or motion from a nonhuman stimulus.  Hence, regardless of the kinds 
of visual stimulus that invigorates imitative gestures on the infant’s face, this 
phenomenon reveals a more global notion of social perception during early infancy.   
 The infant engages in the world with her lived-body, which is not merely a 
biological object or a mass of sensations that defines the state of an individual 
consciousness.  One way to think about the lived-body is through the notion of corporeal 
or “postural schema,” which is the awareness of “the body’s position in relation to the 
vertical, horizontal, and certain other axes of important coordinates of its environment” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p.117).  From a phenomenological point of view, it is also 
important to capture the immediacy of embodied, intersubjective encounter between 
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human beings.  Thus, Merleau-Ponty (1964) comes up with the idea of the transfer of 
corporeal schema.   
  The corporeal schema is fundamentally transferable across human beings.  To 
clarify, we do not each possess a corporeal schema that is bounded inside our physical 
body.  Recall that the lived-body is inherently open outward to the world.  The notion of 
a corporeal schema further accentuates this openness; the body (and corporeal schema) is 
open toward a shared world inhabited by other visible bodies (and corporeal schemas).  
In other words, the notion of corporeal schema already presupposes its transferability—to 
possess a corporeal schema is to thrive in its transferability.  For an infant, this transfer is 
understood as an immediate perceptual linkage through which she recognizes other 
human beings as like unto herself.   
  How does the idea of the transfer of corporeal schema apply to a 
phenomenological, nondualistic explanation for neonatal imitation?  When an infant sees 
the facial movements of an adult partner, she feels them in her own face as well.  Seeing 
the gestures on an adult’s face, for the infant, is not merely a visual perception.  Rather, it 
is immediately a “postural impregnation” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p.145), an automatic 
mobilization of her own postural or behavioral capacities that approximate the 
expressions of the seen person with astounding precision.   
  According to Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964, 1968), we do not simply possess a 
body that carries out physiological and biological functions.  The lived-body also grants 
us “postural” functions, one of which is the power of assuming others’ facial and 
behavioral expressions as one’s own—the transfer of corporeal schema.  Thus, neonatal 
imitation reveals the infant’s discovery of the human “flesh” that she and her partners are, 
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and thus, of the commonality they all share.  Through the infant’s own imitative facial 
gestures, their identification as “flesh” is confirmed. 
Is Facial Imitation also Emotional Imitation? 
  Rochat (2001) proposes that infants might not merely be imitating facial gestures, 
but also reproducing the affect and emotion of the person.  This idea is supported by an 
abundance of empirical evidence (e.g., Elkman et al., 1983) that suggest facial gestures 
are not simply an outward expression of inner feelings, but they actually precede and 
“cause” particular feelings.  According to this idea, facial imitation allows infants to 
“experience vicariously the feelings of others” (Rochat, 2001, p.145).  When infants 
reproduce the facial gestures of an adult, they are not only feeling what it is like to 
exercise their facial muscles in a particular pattern, but also experiencing the associated 
emotions.  When infants match an adult’s facial expression through imitation, they are 
creating in their body a “psycho-physiological state similar to that of the partner, thus 
participating in the subjective state of the other” (Beebe & Lachman, 1988a, b). 
  Further supporting evidence of emotional imitation can be found in a study on 
affective resonance.  Note that by the age of ten months, the brain is lateralized for 
positive and negative affects.  Davidson and Fox (1982) conducted an experiment in 
which the infants were shown video records of a happy-laughing actress and a distressed-
crying actress.  As expected, when the infants saw a videotape of a smiling-laughing 
actress, their EEG activation patterns indicates positive affect; when exposed to a 
distressed-crying actress, their EEG activations shows negative affect.  Even without the 
explicit imitation of facial expressions, “the mere perception of emotion in the partner 
creates a resonant state in the perceiver…[and] what an infant perceived on the face of 
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the partner altered his internal state, and the infant could not escape the face of the 
partner” (Beebe & Lachman, 2002, p.37). 
  To expand on the ontological significance of emotional imitation and resonance, 
we should begin with a revised notion of the body in the intersubjective context.  As 
discussed before, Merleau-Ponty (1962) speaks of the body as a sort of generality, 
granted with “the power of adopting certain forms of behavior and a certain world…as a 
certain hold upon the world” (p.412).  The experiment carried out by Davidson and Fox 
(1982) seems to support this idea.   Based on the the EEG activation patterns observed in 
their study, it can be inferred that infants do not actually constitute others as unrelated, 
alien objects.  Rather, infants’ perception of the emotional gestures of other human 
beings immediately generates in their own body an approximation of the same affective 
responses.  
  Furthermore, there is clearly a physiologically-based emotional resonance 
associated with the transfer of corporeal schema, which, in light of the current evidence, 
is not just a behavioral or gestural transfer by means of a visual-proprioceptive 
correspondence.  The phenomenon of emotional imitation and resonance exposes a sort 
of anonymity or generality of the infant’s body, whose innate power is to live in it the 
“conducts” the infant sees on other embodied beings.  According to Merleau-Ponty 
(1962), conduct refers to the manner in which we as human beings deal with the world— 
our ways of grasping the world, so to speak.  One such way is through our facial 
expressions or gesturing.  The research studies cited in this section demonstrate that 
infants can “live” the facial expressions they see on a person, revealing the generality of 
the body that Merleau-Ponty speaks of.  Accordingly, the notion of the body’s anonymity 
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or generality effectively deconstructs the “natural attitude” that the body is either under 
the control of a mind, or equivalent to the self.  
Implications for Infants’ Sociality and Selfhood 
  The current account for neonatal imitation and emotional resonance, based on the 
notion of the transfer of corporeal schema, offers an ontological foundation for infant’s 
development of selfhood and sociality.  Beyond neonatal imitation, it is worthwhile to 
note that witnessing an adult matching his own facial expressions, often with a slight 
exaggeration as many researchers have observed, is also a major part of infant’s 
interactive experience.  
  In this primordial world of social exchanges, we can already find traces of what 
might become core features of an adult’s conscious existence. On the one hand, for 
example, the infant sees a sad facial gesture on the other person, imitates it with her own 
face, and feels the associated sadness in her own body.  This process allows the infant to 
learn not only what a sad person looks like, but also what it feels like to experience the 
sad feelings and facial gestures in her body.   
  On the other hand, when the infant feels sad for some reason and simultaneously 
expresses the sadness on her face, she is often responded to by a proximal caregiver who 
would match her sad facial expression with a slight exaggeration.  This, in turn, is shown 
on the caregiver’s own face and becomes visually accessible for her.  This circular 
process not only allows the infant to experience affect attunement, but also validates and 
refines the ways in which her facial muscles are exercised in such specific and intricate 
patterns while feeling sad.  Thus, it would be logical to infer that these primordial 
interactions based on facial imitation/matching might be the foundation of an ongoing, 
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interaction-based process of facial configurations.  The infant will continue to develop a 
repertoire of facial expressions similar to those of the adults’ in her surrounding, thus 
beginning to demonstrate a social presence increasingly similar to that of an adult.  This 
also seems to explain why blind infants would lose their “social smile” by the middle of 
their first year without compensatory tactile stimulations provided by caregivers 
(Fraiberg, 1977).  Fraiberg’s research shows that emotional gestures such as smiling are 
not just facial features, but a complete bodily event situated in a social world.  
  In addition, the tight connection between the infant’s proprioception of her own 
facial movements and her visual perception of others’ facial movements (and their 
associated emotions) is deeply sedimented in her social experience.  This can be viewed 
as the developmental foundation of the infant’s increasingly reflective and thematic 
existence.  The sedimentation of vision-proprioception-emotion explains why most 
infants do not seem to be frightened when they first discover their own specular/mirror 
image (Lichtenberg, 1983).  The infant’s own mirror image, in a sense, is already implicit 
in her earliest social reality, which involves primarily with imitative facial exchanges and 
matching.  Thus, these primordial social exchanges can be considered as the building 
blocks of the integration between her specular/mirror image and bodily intentionality, 
which would forever transform the infant’s conscious existence into an awareness of 
herself as a visible body among others.   
 Lichtenberg (1983) also suggests that neonatal imitation is fundamental to why 
the mirror conveys information about the toddler’s self: “The infant seems to be 
preprogrammed to respond to a visual stimulus in a manner that produces a mirror-image 
response—the infant’s face taking on the physiognomic appearance the infant sees” 
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(p.105).  As evidenced in infants’ imitative behaviors, we can see that for them “the other 
body has ceased to be mere fragment of the world, and become the theater of a certain 
process of elaboration, and, as it were, a certain ‘view’ of the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962, p.412). 
  Experiments on neonatal imitation and emotional resonance attest to the infant’s 
primordial intersubjective world, which is founded upon the transfer of corporeal schema 
or intercorporeality.  Accordingly, this intersubjective ontology effectively deconstructs 
the body as a unified identity of the self; the infant’s body is no longer conceived as the 
physical agent carrying out actions commanded by an overseeing mental entity.  Also, the 
infant’s perception of others is no longer understood as a pure perceptual or cognitive 
event.   Merleau-Ponty (1962) argues that “if another’s body is not an object for me, nor 
mine an object for him, if both are manifestations of behavior, the positing of the other 
does not reduce me to the status of an object in his field, nor does my perception of other 
reduce him to the status of an object in mine” (p.411).  This means that as embodied 
beings our intentions play across each other’s body (the transfer of corporeal schema), 
and this fundamental “co-existence” transcends the self-other and the subject-object 
thematizations.  
  Through our reflection on the phenomenon of neonatal imitation, we believe that 
the so-called self and others are given in the infant’s perception as an integrated system; 
the newborn “perceives its intentions in its body, and my body with its own, and thereby 
my intentions in its own body” (p.410).  In a sense, the infant lives both her intentions 
and my intentions in her visible body, as demonstrated in both facial and emotional 
imitations.  Thus, the infant also participates as the “other” in the system of her social 
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partner, for her body pre-reflectively adopts and expresses the intentions of others as 
Merleau-Ponty suggested.  Thus, the body itself cannot be identified as the equivalent of 
a self or the subject. 
4.4 Perceiving Intentionality19  
   In this section, we will look at a couple of experiments and use their 
findings to reflect on infants’ perception of intentionality in an intersubjective world.  In 
particular, there are two specific issues to be addressed.  First, how do infants experience 
intentionality in their social existence, without a reflective and articulated understanding 
of other “minds”?  Second, how do infants perceive the subject-object role distinctions 
that are often considered as the basis of social intentionality or causality?   
  These questions are rooted in an intriguing issue in the history of developmental 
psychology, often posed under the heading of “theories of mind”: when and how do 
infants begin to perceive other persons as intentional beings?  The general consensus is 
that children do not develop the ability to “construe others as having states of mind, 
beliefs, desires, and complex reasons for behaving one way or another” until at least 
between the age of three to four (Rochat, 2001, p.163).  However, not everyone believes 
in such a clear-cut developmental trajectory, as some psychologists argue that “prior to 
the well-documented emergence of theories of mind in the verbal child, infants develop 
sophisticated, although implicit (not yet verbalized) understanding of others as 
intentional—having desires, feelings, and fluctuating affects” (p.164).  
  From a phenomenological perspective, our access to others’ minds is only a 
                                                 
19
 Here, “intentionality” is being discussed as a topic of study within infant research (e.g., Rochat, 2001). 
More specifically, this section is dedicated to investigate the question of how infants can access and 
experience other “intentional” minds.  
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problem under the dualistic framework, in which we all are construed as self-contained 
consciousness subjects, isolated core entities, or demarcated experiential territories.  In 
our research on this subject matter, we have found that there is a major confusion in the 
literature between the absence of cognitive abilities to represent, reason, reflect, and infer 
the intentional or mental features of other people; and the absence of intentional beings in 
infant’s social existence.   
  Let us take a step backward and entertain the following questions.  If infants do 
not perceive others as intentional beings, what do they perceive other human beings as? 
Prior to the achievement of some “theories of mind,” explicit or implicit, do infants 
simply perceive other human beings as “mindless” objects with bodies that move?  The 
transfer of corporeal schema, as the foundation of intersubjectivity, renders such a 
hypothesis impossible because it suggests that infant’s social awareness is founded on a 
state of coexistence with other similar embodied beings in a shared world.  Accordingly, 
the problem of “how” to access other minds is no longer the same problem under the 
ontology of intersubjectivity or intercorporeality.  
 From an experimental point of view, it is a challenging task for researchers to 
directly study infant’s perception of social intentionality in experimental settings.  Thus, 
many experiments are actually designed to provide some indirect empirical observations 
through which researchers can make grounded inferences about infants’ perception of the 
basic aspects of intentionality, such as social causality and the subject-object roles.  
Perceiving Intentions/Social Causality 
 In a research experiment on infants’ perception of social intentionality (Rochat 
et.al., 1997), three groups of subjects (i.e., three-month-olds, six-month-olds, and 
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“control” adults) were exposed to two dynamic displays on two computer screens placed 
side by side.  Each display showed a pair of colored displays either independently 
(independent display) or in systematic interaction with on another (chase display).  In the 
chase display, the “chaser” disc systematically approached the “chasee” disc at a constant 
velocity; the latter automatically accelerated away from it whenever they came close.  In 
the independent display, the movements of both discs were random.  The findings of this 
experiment were threefold: first, three month olds looked significantly more at the chase 
display; second, adults and sixth month olds looked significantly longer at the 
independent display; third, post-test interviews of the adults indicated they were 
attempting to pick up “invariant dynamic patterns” by looking longer at the independent 
display, which was very obvious in the chase display. 
  This study has been interpreted as the early traces of adults’ inclination to 
attribute physical and social causality to dynamic displays of geometrical figures: one 
object is “causing” the other object by dragging along with it or launching at it; or, one 
object is chasing after the other object with the intention of “catching” it.  The researchers 
suggested that infants from as young as three months of age already show “a sensitivity 
to movement information that specifies sociality causality for adults” and “this sensitivity 
is expressed differently and appears to develop between three to sixth months of age” 
(Rochat, 2002, p.154).   
  The first finding shows that the three-month-olds were looking longer at the 
“chase display.”  What made the infants pay more attention to the “chase display” than 
the “independent display”?  What was the basis of this “preferential looking”?  Based on 
this finding alone, it can only be concluded that young infants are more sensitive to 
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relational movements between two inanimate objects.  However, if we follow the logic of 
physiognomic perception—the tendency to “perceive the inanimate as the animate,” it is 
a legitimate assumption that the infants perceived the relational, patterned movements 
between two inanimate discs as an expression of social intentionality—that is, an 
intentional bond between them.   
  The second finding suggests that there was a change in the sixth-month-old 
infants’ approach in the same experimental situation.  Whereas the younger infants 
seemed to immediately identify with the “chase display” that provokes a sense of an 
intentional bond between two objects, the older infants paid more attention to the 
“independent display” for some reasons.  At the most fundamental level, this could be 
attributed to an epistemological change in which infants progressively become more 
interested in “figuring out” an event that does not immediately offer a meaning.  This 
change is consistent with other empirical evidence suggesting a similar developmental 
trajectory—for instance, from being more people-oriented (i.e. an immediate engagement 
in social interactions) to object-oriented (i.e. an increasingly exploratory stance toward 
the world of objects).   
 In the post-test interviews, the adult participants claimed that they were looking 
longer at the independent display in attempt to “figure out” these movements.  Hence, it 
can be logically inferred that the sixth-month-old infants were expecting the random 
movements of the discs in the “independent display” to be somehow “in-relation” to one 
another.  Like the adults, they might have been looking longer at the independent display 
in attempt to figuring out a visual display that did not immediately offer an intentional 
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bond or relationship between the two discs.20 
  Putting all the findings together, the three-month-old infants looked longer at the 
“chase display” because the movement patterns immediately offered a sense of social 
intentionality, and the sixth-month-old infants looked longer at the “independent display” 
because the random movements did not provide the intentional bond that they expected to 
perceive.  Whereas the experimental outcomes in this study allow us to conclude that 
infants seem to perceive movements between two inanimate objects in terms of their 
sociality (either through an immediate identification or a sense-making effort), it does not 
provide enough clues about the nature of their sense of social intentionality.  Thus, the 
tension between the dualistic and nondualistic perspectives on the infant’s sociality 
cannot be resolved based on this study alone. 
  From a dualistic point of view, the infant’s sense of social intentionality is defined 
by two isolated objects imposing their intentions on one another, and causing one another 
to behave in certain ways; hence, the sixth-month-olds seemed to be trying to “figure out” 
these “causal” relationships from the independent display.  According to this standpoint, 
the infants “embellish their interpretations of how one entity moves in relation to the 
other with physical or social causality, and even to attribute intentions and dispositional 
qualities to these figures” (Rochat, 2001, p.153).   
  From a nondualistic perspective, in contrast, the experimental outcomes can be 
just as easily be interpreted as indicating a more global sense of social intentionality, 
which would suggest that it was the relational movements between the two discs that 
                                                 
20
 Accordingly, the effect of novelty can no longer be treated as the evidence of infant’s ability to 
discriminate one thing from another, or mentally represent these entities in their heads.  The so-called 
preference for novelty might simply refer to infants’ epistemological approach to figure out or make sense 
of the unfamiliar.  
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provoked in the infants a sense of the intentional bound between the two discs.  After all, 
we do not know if the infants perceived that one object was actively pursuing the other 
object and causing it to move further away, or the stillness of one object was inducing the 
other object to approach it.21  Given the cause-and-effect relationship and the subject-
object role assignment were unclear in this case, it cannot be said that the infants were 
simply “interpreting” these movements by means of physical and social causalities, or 
“attributing” them to intentional and dispositional qualities that characterize adults’ social 
interactions.  In order to further substantiate this claim, we will look at a different but 
related research study. 
                     Perceiving Subject-Object Roles 
  If the young infants do perceive a more global sense of social intentionality, 
which precedes and grounds the clear distinctions between the subject-object roles in 
social interaction, it is expected that infants would not notice the events when these roles 
are reversed.  Rochat et al. (2004) carried out another experiment that seems to support 
this idea.  In this research study, the infants from different age groups were habituated to 
two identical discs, different only by color (blue & red), chasing one another on a 
computer display.  Then, they were either exposed to the same event or a role-reversal 
event in which the chaser became the chasee by a color switch of the discs.  The 
researchers were particularly interested in the infants’ response to the role-reversal event.  
It was found that infants younger than seven months old showed no signs of 
dishabituation during the role-reversal trial, indicating that they did not notice the fact 
that the roles of the discs were reversed.  They found that, however, dishabituation 
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 As shown in the “still-face” experiment discussed before, “stillness” can certainly be the call that induces 
actions in the social dimension.  
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became evident for seven-month-olds and increased dramatically by nine months.  
  The outcomes of this study provide empirical clues for how social intentionality 
might be expressed in infant’s lived-world.  In the experiment, the blue disc chasing the 
red disc and the red disc chasing the blue disc were two distinct events (from an adult’s 
point of view) that represent two different subject-object relationships; each event had a 
clear assignment of the subject-object roles.  Because the young infants did not notice a 
“role-reversal” event, as shown in this experiment, it would be logical to infer that what 
is construed as two different events for adults are essentially identical in the world of 
infants; at least, not until at a later age as suggested by the researchers.  It seems that they 
did perceive a more global sense of social intentionality, based on the dynamic, 
supposedly-relational movements of the two discs.  The ontological implication is that 
young infants experience a world in which objects are not marked with fixed subject-
object roles, and it is only in the full relational or intersubjective contexts that social 
intentionality is perceived and experienced.  
  From a phenomenological perspective, relational movements between two objects 
are already pregnant with an intersubjective significance, a global social intentionality.  
In other words, infants immediately perceive object movements as capable of carrying 
out the same social intentionality they experience with other human beings.  Borrowing 
Merleau-Ponty’s characterization (1968), the subject-object relation in the infant’s world 
is reversible in perception, and this reversibility seems to be a fundamental aspect of 
infant’s social existence.  
  How do we explain that the older infants seemed to notice the role-reversal event 
then?  The timeline of this change is strikingly similar to the epistemological change that 
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took place in the previous research study.  Infants’ developing tendency to seek meanings 
in novel events might be related to their increasing attunement to the nuances of social 
exchanges.  For instance, Rochat (2001) discusses a number of research studies 
suggesting that infants between two to six months “develop an ability to consider the 
behavior of people beyond the here and now by relating current behavior to past 
interaction” (p.151).  Whereas two or three-month-old infants seem to be completely 
involved in a world of reciprocal social exchanges, older infants begin to develop some 
kinds of expectations specific to their interaction with a certain partner.  This capacity 
allows the relationship-seeking infants to perceive social transactions in an increasingly 
(not completely) thematized manner.  Thus, the older infants in this experiment could 
notice when the object that was chasing another object suddenly became the one being 
chased.  Their increased attunement to the transactions of social interaction might explain 
why their strategies in eliciting and coping with certain social responses seem to become 
more patterned and partner-specific over time (e.g., Tronick et al., 1978).  
  The two experiments cited in this section show that infants directly perceive a 
more global social intentionality, which precedes and grounds their developing awareness 
of individual intentionality and subject-object role distinctions.   Hence, it seems that 
infants do perceive other human beings as intentional in a pre-reflective and embodied 
manner, prior to the achievement of explicit “theories of mind” much later in their 
development.  The young infants’ identification with the display that indicates an 
intentional relationship, as well as their indifference to the role-reversal event that 
specifies a particular intentional bond between two objects, suggest that they do perceive 
a more global sense of social intentionality.  The reversibility between subject-object 
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roles is founded on the infants’ intersubjective world, in which these roles are not fixed, 
determinate, and thematized.  Nevertheless, they gradually transition from being 
completely involved in these immediate social exchanges, to becoming increasingly 
sensitive to the social nuances that specify the subject-object roles of an intentional bond 
between two moving objects.   
4.5 Infants’ ability to distinguish between the self and others 
  In this section, a research study (Martin & Clark, 1982) will be thoroughly 
analyzed from a phenomenological perspective guided by a very specific ontological 
question—that is, whether or not the self and others are originally separated in infant’s 
social existence.  In psychology, this issue traditionally takes on a dichotomous theme: an 
undifferentiated self-other confusion versus an absolute demarcation between two 
isolated subjects.  The tension between these perspectives is easily observable in infant 
psychology.  For instance, it has been noted that the developmentalist D. Stern also 
struggled to find a “middle ground between psychoanalytic concept of the symbiotic, 
undifferentiated relationship of self and other, and the cognitive concept of two distant 
unrelated observers” (Simms, 1993, p.38).   
  In our review of the literature, the cognitive perspective tends to generalize the 
opposing views into an extreme version of “symbiotic oneness,” a classic term made 
known by Margaret Mahler in psychoanalysis.22  Accordingly, it is a rather simple task 
for the researchers to overturn these “undifferentiated” views, insofar as it is shown that 
infants are not confused between their bodies and other human bodies.  In fact, there is 
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 Many “undifferentiated” views are automatically discounted because they are considered as remnants 
of the notion of “symbiotic oneness” by mainstream psychologists  
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plenty of empirical evidence suggesting that infants are not confused.  However, does 
such evidence support an ontological separation and distinction between the self and 
others?  Most infant researchers seem to believe that, and their underlying rationale is not 
difficult to articulate: if research shows that infants are not “confused” and do “react 
differentially” to what belongs to them and what belongs to others (such as voice, touch, 
or movement), it would support a dichotomous self-other perspective of the infant’s 
social existence.   
  This ontological inference is a huge leap of faith.  In general, there is often an 
unspoken tension between ontology and theory in the work of infant researchers who 
attempt to take on the self-other problem in their writings.  Dichotomous terms such as 
differentiation and undifferentiation, fusion and separation, distinction and confusion, are 
frequently used by infant scholars.  However, their ontological implications associated 
with these terms do not always get enough attention.  An adequate ontological approach 
to the self-other problem requires a clear conception of these two terms, “self” and 
“others,” as well as a cogent articulation of their relatedness or separateness.  There are 
numerous ways in which these two terms have been implicitly taken up by psychologists, 
often determined by how an individual is defined or characterized: isolated conscious 
subjects, biological entities, or experiential domains (e.g., D. Stern’s senses of self).   
  At this point, we have already established an ontological description of 
intersubjectivity that subtends both the self and others, as well as the notion of corporeal 
schema that describes their transferability or relatedness.  Now, the challenge is to 
reexamine whether or not the infant’s so-called “ability to distinguish” indicates a self-
other ontological dichotomy, and necessarily precludes a more-or-less undifferentiated or 
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syncretic view of intersubjective ontology.  In addition, we need to show that the 
intersubjective ontology, often associated with descriptions such as “undifferentiation” 
and “fusion,” can survive the empirical evidence suggesting that infants can “distinguish” 
and “discriminate” between the self and others.  
  Evidently, infants do not respond to every living thing in the world in the exact 
same way, and there is no exception to their social and interactive behaviors.  Newborns 
are born with preferences that are highly adaptive from a biological/evolutionary 
perspective.  They can distinguish their mother’s voice, which they prefer to a stranger’s 
voice (DeCasper & Fifer , 1980).  They also prefer their mother’s smell and face to those 
of a stranger (MacFarlane, 1975; Field et al, 1982).  Do these early “preferences” suggest 
a distinct sense of other that is essentially separated from a sense of self?  Apparently, 
they have been interpreted as such (e.g., Stern, 1986; Rochat, 2001; Beebe & Lachman, 
2002).  These preferences have been considered as supporting a dichotomous self-other 
ontology: a distinctly differentiated sense of self acting discriminately toward the features 
of other isolated human beings out there.  Nevertheless, such an “ontological leap” is 
prone to be challenged by critical thoughts because the same rationale can be easily 
applied to an intersubjective ontology: these preferences can be viewed as the 
experiential quality of togetherness with a specific other, or a distinct state of 
togetherness and coexistence, which does not necessarily presuppose a self-consciousness 
or a distinct identity of the self.   
  What about the research that demonstrates infant’s ability to discriminate other 
people from herself?  Is this kind of research evidence of the shatterproof indication of an 
ontological distinction between the self and others?  There is in fact a sound logic to this 
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line of thinking, which permeates the infant literature.  For the sole purpose of the current 
investigation, we have identified it as the thesis of a “discriminatory consciousness.”  
According to this thesis, if an infant behaves differentially to her own voice than to her 
mother’s voice, she is thus able to know and discriminate between what is the self and 
what are the others.  As a result, it would presuppose an ontological demarcation between 
the self and others.  This thesis offers a view of consciousness or the mind that is 
preoccupied with a mental project of discriminating and distinguishing between a sense 
of self and a sense of others.  This perspective has led a handful of researchers to envision 
infants as cognitive agents who are actively grouping the “self-invariants” and “others-
invariants” into separate mental categories or schemas (Stern, 1996).  
  Without a doubt, the thesis of discriminatory consciousness requires a serious 
investigation.  In the following, we will reexamine a major supporting experiment that 
has led many researchers to conclude that infants possess an “auditory self” (Butterworth, 
1990).  This study has been widely cited as the evidence of a distinct sense of self that is 
already operative in early infancy.  We will explore alternative interpretations that might 
contradict the dualistic ontology of self-other differentiation.   
  Martin and Clark (1982) show that neonates are able to distinguish their own 
vocalizations from those of other neonates.  In their experiment, there are two groups of 
infant subjects, each exposed to two experimental conditions: a calm baby listening to its 
own crying voice on a tape and that of another infant, and a crying baby listening to its 
own crying voice on a tape and that of another infant.  The results indicate that a calm 
baby vocalizes less when hearing its own crying, and vocalizes more when hearing the 
cry of another infant; and the crying baby cries less when it hears its own cry, and more 
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when it hears the cry of another.  
  From a dualistic perspective following the line of reasoning as discussed before, 
these findings are broadly taken to indicate the literal existence of an “auditory self.”  The 
rationale of this interpretation is based on the simple fact that the baby responds 
differently to the auditory presentation of her own crying and that of another infant, 
which is attributed to her ability to “discriminate” between what belongs to her and what 
belongs to others.  The infant has a core sense of self with a rigid boundary, existing as an 
isolated subject among other human beings.  And this fundamental sense of an “auditory 
self” is what guides the infant to discriminate between her own crying and another 
infant’s crying.  
A Nondualistic Reinterpretation of Experimental Outcomes 
  Before attempting to reinterpret the observations in this research study, it is 
important to ponder the meanings of vocalization (and its frequency) for an infant in a 
relatively calm and alert state, and of crying (and its intensity) for an infant in a relatively 
distressed and dissatisfied state.  To this end, we believe that frequent vocalization 
indicates interest, pleasure, and excitement, and frequent crying suggests displeasure, 
unattended needs, and more distress.  From a phenomenological perspective, vocalizing 
with interest and excitement is no different than living in a calm and interesting world, 
and crying in distress is also no different than living in a distressed world.   
  According to Merleau-Ponty (1964), infants live in a syncretic social reality in 
which there is a relative lack of self-other differentiation: “there is not one individual 
over against another but rather an anonymous collectivity, an undifferentiated group life" 
(p. 119).  The phenomenal world of infants is experienced as one global perspective; 
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when they interact with a social partner, they are not aware of the back-and-forth 
transactions between two individual perspectives.  Rather, infants only experience the 
affective flow of the social exchanges.  For instance, when a distressed infant is crying 
intensely, she might be aware of the sensations from the touch and the voice of her 
mother, but not the mother’s intention to calm her down as a different perspective, so to 
speak.  If the mother’s comforting attempt fails, the infant’s world remains to be a 
distressed world.  If it succeeds, the infant’s world gradually becomes a calmer world.   
  This idea is not the same as the psychoanalytic notion of symbiotic oneness which 
is envisioned by mainstream psychologists as a sort of merged entity, like “some huge 
animal whose organs our bodies would be, as for each of our bodies, our hands, our eyes 
are the organs” (1968, p.142).  The lack of differentiation is not to be taken literally.  
Instead, it refers to a lack of reflective differentiation between the self and others as 
isolated and separate intentional being.  The point taken is that infants do not experience 
themselves as isolated selves with a distinct identity.  The infant’s body is not the 
equivalent of an individualistic self because it does not entirely coincide with her own 
intentions.  Neonatal imitation and crying contagion are great examples of how the 
infant’s body might act on the intentions of others.   
  This is because infants experience the world holistically: how they feel and how 
the world shows up correspond to each other.  During interactions, infants do not have 
the awareness of two distinct identities or isolated conscious subjects.  In the case of 
emotional contagion, the infant does not first reflectively identify that it is the cry of 
another infant, interpret it as a signal of distress, and then begin to shed tears as an 
empathic response.  Instead, if the infant begins to cry when listening to the cry of 
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another baby, it means that the associated distressed signals have become the global 
perspective of her lived-world.  The infant starts to cry in what is immediately perceived 
as a distressed world; she does not perceive the distressed infant who makes her cry, so to 
speak.   
  To sum up, if we do not begin our interpretation with the self and others as two 
separate terms, then what might be considered as the infant’s “ability to distinguish” is no 
longer the uncontestable evidence of a core self and a core others.  Instead, the 
nondualistic descriptions of the “auditory self” research study (Martin & Clark, 1982) can 
be reinterpreted in the following manner.  
Reflecting on the Experience of the Calm and Engaging Infants 
  In half of the experimental conditions, the infants began in a calm and alert state 
in which they were attentive and interested in their surroundings.  For one group of these 
infants, it was a calming and somewhat interesting world as evidenced by their 
vocalizations until the cry of another infant was introduced.   This new crying voice was 
somewhat realistic, because hearing the cry of another infant is not uncommon in a 
typical infant’s life.  The primary observation noted here is very simple: more 
vocalizations.  Why did they vocalize more when hearing another infant’s crying?  
Because there was no indication that their increased vocalizations were associated with 
distress, it was unlikely to be a result of emotional contagion or empathic response.  In 
fact, with no indication of an affective shift, there is a strong reason to believe that the 
previously engaging and alert infants might have simply become “more” interested and 
curious about the sudden introduction of another infant’s crying. 
  For the other group of calm and alert infants, they heard a somewhat “familiar” 
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and unrealistic presentation of their own crying.  Why did this strange exposure to their 
own crying make them vocalize less?  Butterworth (1990) would say that it is because the 
infants could identify their own crying, suggesting that they possess a core auditory sense 
of self.  From a phenomenological perspective, there is no need to attribute this 
observation to a cognitive operation of “identifying” or “distinguishing.”  From the 
viewpoint of the engaging and alert infants, decreased vocalizations could simply point to 
a lowered level of overall interest due to a disruption of alertness or even a state of 
confusion.  The global world became rather confusing when they simultaneously 
experience two contradictory affective expressions—one indicates interested engagement 
and the other signals distress.  As a result, their overall level of engagement decreased as 
shown by their less vocalization.  
  Thus, the reason why infants responded differently in these two experimental 
conditions is explainable without postulating a core identity of self or the other, or a 
discriminatory consciousness.  From the standpoint of an intersubjective ontology, the 
embodied infants directly perceived the cry of another infant as an invitation to become 
more engaged and curious about this unfamiliar expression of distress. This is a leaner 
explanation that attributes the infants’ increased vocalizations to their attunement to the 
crying of another infant.  In the same vein, the infants of another group perceived their 
own recorded crying as contradictory to their current affective state—the world showed 
up as somewhat confusing with an apparent conflict between two affective expressions of 
their own.  There was a blatant tension between the calm, alert and vocalizing infant, and 
the distressed, crying infant from the recorder (decreased vocalization is an inevitable 
outcome).  Infants might not have been completely lost in this tension, but hearing their 
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own crying sound from an external source was enough of a distraction or confusion that 
decreased their level of engagement in the world.  
Reflecting on the Experience of the Crying and Distressed Infants 
  In the other half of experimental scenarios, the infants began in a somewhat 
distressed state for whatever reason, as they were already crying prior to the introduction 
of the auditory presentations.  For them, it was an unsatisfying or distressed world.  They 
cried less when hearing their own crying from a recorder, and they cried more when 
hearing the cry of a different baby.  These findings have been interpreted as their ability 
to identify their own voices as uniquely distinct from other voices, which would suggest a 
core sense of self and a core sense of others. 
  However, these observations are also explainable without the idea of a mind that 
actively discriminates between what is self and what is others.  One group of distressed 
infants perceived their own crying voices from the recorder as a familiar auditory 
expression of an affective state, which might have cancelled out some of their own crying 
effort and produced a sense of confusion in them.  This explanation reveals a relatively 
loosened boundary between inner and outer regions of infants’ existence—an “external 
source” of their own crying was felt as “real” to some extent.  The other group of 
distressed infants perceived a different infant’s crying as an unfamiliar auditory 
interference to their own crying endeavor, which might also have caused more distress in 
these infants resulting in more crying. 
  In retrospect, there were two experimental conditions in the whole experiment 
that hold a strong ecological relevance: the infants in two affective states (calm and alert; 
distressed) hearing the crying of another baby.  In contrast, there were two relatively 
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“unrealistic” conditions, in which the infants in two different affective states heard their 
own crying from a recorder.  Not surprisingly, these infants all showed decreased level of 
activity—less vocalization and less crying.  For them, hearing their own crying voice, 
consistent with their current affect or not, lowered their activity level.  Neither case 
necessarily indicates an ontological demarcation between the self and others.  In 
conclusion, an intersubjective or intercorporeal ontology suggests that the self and others 
are intertwined at the level of experience in the infant’s world, without a reflective 
differentiation between the two ontological terms.  As demonstrated in this section, this 
nondualistic ontology is fully capable of explaining the experimental findings without 
resorting to the notion of a mind that actively discriminate between the self and others.  
The Question of Emotional Contagion 
   If the infant’s world is syncretic in nature and there is a lack of thematic 
differentiation between herself and others, why is there no conclusive evidence of 
emotional contagion in this study?  This is a complex theoretical question requiring more 
empirical evidence to provide an answer because the key is to determine the conditions in 
which emotional contagion would occur.  Does it require the infant’s own emotional state 
to be somewhat “closer,” or at least not contradictory, to the emotional stimulus for 
contagion to happen?  Does it depend on the kind and intensity of the emotional stimulus? 
For example, there might be many different “cries” and only some are potentially 
contagious.  Does the image of a crying infant increase the likelihood for contagion to 
happen?  These are very important questions that cannot be thoroughly addressed based 
on one study.  However, our phenomenological reflections on the various scenarios in 
this study suggest that it is important to take into account the infant’s affective states at 
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the beginning of the experiment.  
  First of all, the infant’s own crying presented in a recorder does not trigger a 
contagious response regardless if she is already in distress or a relatively calm state, 
because this “unrealistic” voice was confusing the calm infants and canceling out some of 
the crying efforts of the distressed infants, as discussed before.  When difference in 
affective states are ruled out, it has been shown that newborns who are presented with 
other infants’ versus their own crying sounds demonstrate more and longer-lasting 
distressed facial expressions (Dondi et al., 1999).  Second, we need to examine why there 
seems to be a “contagion effect” in the distressed infants hearing the cry of a different 
infant, but not in the calm infants in the same situation.  It seems that at least one of our 
hypotheses is correct; emotional contagion seems to require the infants’ own emotional 
state to be “closer” to the emotional stimulus (i.e. crying in distress).  Accordingly, the 
calm and engaging infants become more curious and interested in the cry of another 
infant, whereas the already-distressed infants seem to become more distressed in the 
same situation.  It may be that the cry of another adds to the distress and makes the 
reason for crying more urgent and real.  Hence, the contagion of cries is a fundamentally 
social response to a threatening world.    
4.6 Research on Representations of Self and Others  
  In order to further examine the nature of infant’s sociality, it is necessary to look 
at the research studies involving more complex forms of interactions.  These interactions 
are founded on intricate facial movements such as “mouth openings, eyebrow raises, 
shifts of head orientation, shifts in direction of gaze, smiles, frowns, grimaces, sobering, 
and so forth” (Beebe & Lachman, 2002, p.90).  The ontological issues associated with 
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infant-adult interactions in the research literature can be divided into two themes. 
  The first theme is the portrayal of the infant-adult dyad as discrete conscious 
subjects reacting to each other’s actions.  Nevertheless, the rapidity of facial interactions 
demonstrated in empirical research does not support the stimulus-response model of 
interaction, because the high-speed exchange of facial gestures is actually faster than 
visual reaction time.  In particular, Cohn and Beebe (1990) found on infant-mother 
partners these facial contingencies at 1/12-second interval; in other words, before one 
partner’s gesturing is completed, the other partner has already begun gesturing.  Some 
researchers used video technology to analyze infant-adult facial interactions frame by 
frame in slow motion, revealing the subtleties in these interactive exchanges (Beebe & 
Gerstman, 1980).  For example, whereas infant-adult interactions are primarily 
characterized by imitative and matching gestures, it was found that an exact facial match 
rarely took place.  Hence, a better characterization of facial interaction is that the infant 
and the adult partner are “moving in the same affective direction” (Beebe & Lachman, 
2002, p.95).  
  Furthermore, a closer look at these studies reveals a second ontological issue.  In 
the former chapter, it is suggested that the concept of representation has often been 
viewed as the only explanation for infant’s intelligent and learning behaviors—the 
missing link that connects the past and the present, although there is no direct evidence 
that affirms the existence of internal representation.  Nevertheless, its ontological 
consequence is nothing but a full-blown Cartesian dualism: the internal mind that makes 
and stores mental copies of the external world.  Nonetheless, representational concepts 
continue to influence the psychological explanations for social behaviors and interactive 
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patterns observed in infant research.  In this section, we will reexamine some of the major 
empirical findings that have been interpreted as the evidence of social-based 
representations.  Our exploration is guided by the following ontological question: Is the 
concept of representations necessary to explain infant’s social behaviors that indicate the 
influence of memorization and learning?   
  Previously, we attempted to deconstruct the thesis of a “discriminatory 
consciousness” by showing that infant’s conscious existence is not preoccupied with a 
mental project in actively differentiating between the self and others.  However, there is 
another layer to the problem of this thesis.  According the Stern (1998), the infant’s mind 
actively divides her experiences into “self-invariants” and “other-invariants,” which 
become the foundation of internal representations of the self, others, and their interactions.   
  The classic concept of representation has undergone a transformation in 
contemporary infant literature.  Let us consider the following issue: if “symbolic” 
representations or schemas (dynamic or static) are considered as the prerequisite of 
intelligent or meaningful social behaviors as the basic units of learning and memory, it 
would render such behaviors incomprehensible in the infant’s “presymbolic” world.  As a 
result, a conceptual revision of representation is needed.  For Beebe and Lachman (2002), 
this revised concept is called presymbolic representation.  Well-aware of the historical 
critiques concerning representationalism, they make a deliberate effort to redefine 
representations as an ongoing process of “the mind that updates its map”:  
  Representations are formed by the active process of constructing and      
  reconstructing incoming information.  They can be reorganized and transformed   
  as incoming information is reinterpreted and reordered on the basis of past  
  experience and current expectations (p.148). 
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Nevertheless, such an effort has succeeded only in deconstructing the static quality of 
mental representations.  Symbolic or pre-symbolic representations are conceived as 
something real that have been “formed” or “created” and stored as the basis of which 
ongoing experience is being organized or influenced.  This continuing endeavor to revise 
representational concepts demonstrates a deeply-entrenched commitment to the 
representational model of mind, widely shared by contemporary psychologists and 
scholars.  
  For instance, Stern (1996) also adopts a representational model for conceiving 
infant’s social experience, which is known as RIGs, or representations-of-interaction-
generalized.  He considers these entities as the basic units of memory, but there is no 
direct evidence for their existence as well.  The concept of RIGs is a theoretical construct 
based on empirical evidence that demonstrate the infant’s capacity to memorize, 
recognize, and generalize/abstract interactive experiences.  Not surprisingly, Stern’s 
reconstruction of the infant’s world has been subjected to criticisms for its commitment 
to the language of “natural scientific” psychology—subject-object, mental representation-
reality, internal-external, and other dualistic ontological convictions (Simms, 1993, p.33).  
In particular, he distinguishes between external objective events and internal subjective 
experience in the social domain of infant’s existence.  Accordingly, creating a bridging 
process between the two becomes theoretically inevitable. Stern (1996) refers to this 
process as one in which the objective social events are transformed into subjective 
experiences.  
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Presymbolic Representations 
  Based on an abundance of existing research experiments and naturalistic evidence, 
Beebe and Lachman (2002) suggest that infants possess presymbolic representational 
capacities that actively organize social interactions.  They argue that representations are 
being formed to render the social world predictable and expectable. They outline three 
principles of “salience,” according to which these representations are organized and 
“internalized.”  These principles provide a bridge between observations from infant 
research and psychoanalytic theories, which is the major purpose of their work.   
  First, regularity and repetition in social interactions create expectancies and 
predictabilities, which are captured by the “principle of ongoing regulations.”  Second, 
there is the “principle of disruption and repair,” which refers to social experiences that 
“disrupt his interactions or violates his expectancies, along with subsequent effort to 
repair disruptions” (p.145).  Then, finally, the “principle of heightened affective 
moments,” both positive and negative, suggests that intense affective experiences are a 
powerful force in organizing infant’s social perception.   
 The supporting evidence for presymbolic representations can be divided into four 
categories: temporal consistency of organized behavioral patterns, generalization of 
aberrant patterns of interaction, differently organized brain activities based on interactive 
experience, and the enduring effect of violated social expectancies.  First, there is 
evidence that organized patterns of interactive behaviors of a mother-infant dyad, such as 
facial affects, looking patterns and gestures, are consistent over time (e.g., Weinberg, 
1991).  Second, research shows that infants who demonstrated aberrant interactive 
behavior with “depressed” mothers, such as protest and disengagement, behaved 
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similarly with a new nondepressed, well-attuned female adult.  Third, in one research 
study (Dawson, 1992a, b), two groups of infants were exposed to the same event—their 
mothers initiating peek-a-boo play with them.  Whereas the group with “normal mothers” 
showed positive-affect behavior and EEG pattern, the group with “depressed mothers” 
evidenced negative-affect behavior and EEG pattern of activation.   
  Finally, the enduring effect of violated expectancies is also considered as the 
evidence of presymbolic representation.  This is best demonstrated by the still-face 
paradigm (Tronick et al., 1978).  The mothers in this experiment were first instructed to 
play with their infants normally, and then with a “still-face” (no facial movements and 
vocalizations) for the same amount of time.  The infants smiled and cooed repeatedly to 
elicit a response from their mothers, showed surprised reactions upon their failure to 
respond, and continued cycling through disengagement and repeated attempts to elicit a 
response.  In another “violation of contingency” study (Murray, 1991; Murray & 
Trevarthen, 1985), infants looked at a videotape of their mothers responding to them in 
an interaction that was recorded a few minutes ago, and they showed a similar pattern of 
attempts to elicit a maternal response and distressed engagement. In addition, coping 
strategies of infants in the “still-face” experiment actually predict attachment styles 
(Cohn, Campbell, & Ross, 1991).  In particular, infants who used positive soliciting 
strategies—smiling and cooing—are more likely to develop secure attachment.  In 
contrast, the relative absence of positive solicitation appears to predict anxious 
attachment.  
  These are the empirical evidence that led to a variety of representational 
interpretations.  Among other infant researchers, Beebe and Lachman (2002) articulate 
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extensively on the concept of presymbolic representation: Interactive experiences are 
“encoded in a nonverbal, implicit mode of information, which may be motoric 
(procedural), imagistic, acoustic, or visceral” (p.149).  In order to make sense of the 
experimental outcomes in the aforementioned studies, they attribute to a “remarkable set 
of presymbolic representational capacities” already present in the first year of life: 
  The infant perceives features, can translate cross-modally, can detect whether or  
  not the partner is acting contingently, and can tell whether behavior patterns are  
  similar or different. The infant develops expectancies of these patterns,      
  remembers them, and categorizes them. These expectations are organized through  
  time, space, affect, and arousal. This is the equipment the baby use to develop 
  presymbolic representations (p.78). 
 
According to this point of view, what is basic to representations is the capacity to order 
and recognize patterns, to expect what is predictable and invariant, and to create 
categories for these invariants.  Hence, in order to account for the temporal consistency, 
generalization, and enduring effects of the infant’s interactive experiences, the 
representational explanation is in fact quite appealing: “Representations are more or less 
persistent, organized classifications of information about an expected interactive 
sequence” (Beebe & Lachman, 2002, p.148). 
Nonrepresentational Interpretations 
  Dreyfus (2002) discusses a major issue associated with literally all of the 
representational concepts: among the millions of represented facts, how does the mind 
figure out which ones are relevant to the current situation, which ones stay the same, and 
which ones need to be updated?  This is known as the “relevance/frame” problem.  
Merleau-Ponty (1962) argues that such “relevance” is already implicated in our 
primordial engagement in the world, whereas psychologists under the influence of 
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cognitivism and representationalism continue to utilize internally stored representations 
as the middle term between an inner mind and an outer world. 
  Without representational explanations, how do we make sense of the temporal 
consistency in infant’s interactive behaviors, negative or positive? How do we explain 
that the infant’s brain structures appear to be organized over time in terms of the quality 
of interactions?  How does the infant’s derailed interactive experiences with one adult 
become generalized and affect her approach with other adults, and how do we understand 
their enduring effects over time?  What are some alternative explanations that are 
consistent with the intersubjective ontology established in this chapter, without recourse 
to the hypothetical representational entities of which there is no direct evidence?    
  The place to start is an alternative phenomenological concept of learning as 
discussed in the previous chapter, which is termed “nonconceptual embodied coping 
skills” (Dreyfus, 2002).  According to this idea, bodily intentionality not only implies that 
immediate bodily actions are meaningful and purposeful, but they are also indicative of 
intelligence and learning.  The embodied infant is pre-reflectively drawn to refine her 
perceptual skills and actions in order to cope with the world as an intelligent being.   
  Dreyfus (2002) borrows two notions from Merleau-Ponty—the intentional arc and 
the tendency to achieve maximal grip—in order to supplement a nonrepresentational 
account of what he called skillful perceptions and actions.  The intentional arc refers to a 
tightly “coupled” relationship between the body and the world.  The embodied infant 
acquires skills from her participation in the world, which become dispositions to respond 
to the solicitations of situations in the world: “[T]he way our successful coping 
continually enriches the way things in the world show up” (Dreyfus, 2005, p.6).  The 
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tendency for the embodied infant to achieve maximal grip means that her body is 
dedicated to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal 
gestalt.  Through experiences of “successful” coping, the infant develops refined 
perceptions and skillful actions that gradually become habitual, as sediments of their 
behavioral repertoire.  Hence, it has been observed that infants gradually develop habitual 
patterns of facial affects, looking patterns, and behavioral gestures, demonstrating a 
stronger social presence in the eyes of adults (Weinberg, 1991).   
  This phenomenological concept of embodied learning can explain why the 
infant’s interactive behaviors are relatively consistent over time, regardless if they are 
considered positive or negative.  As embodied agents coping in their social world, infants 
continually develop refined perceptions and behavioral responses based on their everyday 
interactive experiences with proximal caregivers.  These experiences are not recorded 
frame-by-frame inside the mind and stored as internal representations.  From a 
phenomenological perspective, when infants encounter the same social partners, they 
directly perceive the physiognomies on their faces as an invitation to respond in 
particular ways.  In other words, their interactive patterns gradually become more 
habitual in both perceptual and behavioral dimensions.  Unlike the representational 
explanations, infants respond directly to the solicitations rather than the sources of the 
invitation (Taylor, 2005), which can be considered as an example of “affordances” in the 
social dimension.  
    This phenomenological explanation based on direct perception of social 
affordances can effectively account for the immediacy of interactive behaviors that are 
indicative of embodied coping.  For instance, Beebe and Stern (1977) found that maternal 
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over-stimulation and infant withdrawal are quite common in normal infant-mother 
interactions, and one of these examples is captured by the “Chase-and-Dodge” game:  
  As the mother ‘looms’ into the baby’s face, the baby’s head moves back and  
  away.  The mother then ‘chases’ by moving her head and body toward the baby.  
  As she chases, the baby simultaneously moves his head still farther away.  These  
   sequences occur with split-second response so that, the baby, he has already  
  begun to move away (Beebe & Lachman, 2002, p.111). 
 
In this example, the baby directly perceives the mother’s “looming” face as a solicitation 
for evasive actions.  Hence, the baby keeps moving her head farther and farther away, not 
simply as a response to her mother’s chasing, but actually as a preemptive strategy to 
avoid the anticipated overstimulation and minimized the associated anxiety.  Thus, these 
seemingly “negative” interactive behaviors are also indicative of successful coping.  
From this perspective, the infant’s protest and disengagement can be considered as 
adaptive (defensive) behaviors—the enduring interactive patterns in coping with a 
depressed mother who might be inconsistent, unavailable, unresponsive, or intrusive.   
  As intelligent embodied agents, infants not only develop consistent habitual 
patterns across time, but also generalize their approach across similar situations.  Hence, 
research shows that the infants’ aberrant interactive patterns with depressed mothers were 
replicated when encountering a different female.  In addition, affective experience 
provides a strong organizing force in infant’s world, as discussed before.  Thus, the 
negative affects associated with the infant’s aberrant interactive experiences with a 
depressed mother—such as overstimulation, anxiety, and so forth—directly shape the 
process of embodied coping.  For instance, the “still-face” experiment (Tronick et al., 
1978) demonstrates the powerful organizing force of negative affects in the infant’s 
world, because an immediate impact on the infants’ interactive behaviors was already 
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evident after a few trials, regardless if their mothers were considered depressed or healthy.  
This is described by the principle of “disruption and repair” as mentioned before (Beebe 
& Lachman, 2002).   
  For these infants, their aberrant interactive behaviors are not only specific to their 
own mothers, but also become generalized into habitual patterns across different social 
situations involving different social partners.  From a phenomenological perspective, 
when these infants encounter a different female, for instance, they perceive in her not an 
external image that matches or resembles their mothers, which would then summon an 
internal representation of interactive sequences or expectations.  Based on the idea of 
direct perception, they are plunged into actions upon seeing the face of another female, 
because it directly solicits in them a certain pattern of responses.   
  The “still-face” experiment (Tronick et al., 1978) adds that the infants’ strategies 
for coping with “violated-expectancy” not only reflect habitual interactive patterns with 
mother, but also imply potentially enduring outcomes such as attachment styles or even 
personality traits.  According to the researchers, the presence of positive strategies to 
elicit a response from the mothers seems to reflect the foundation of secure attachment; 
and the relative absence of such positive coping appears to predict anxious attachment.   
  In addition, even though all the infants were exposed to the same stimulus (a 
“still-face”), so to speak, they did not directly perceive the same social affordances that 
would call for the same coping behaviors.  The “still-faces” of the normally-responsive 
but nonintrusive mothers directly summoned the infants to respond with positive 
behaviors, such as smiling and cooing, so as to solicit the positive maternal responses that 
they expected and desired.  In contrast, the “still-faces” of the more unresponsive or 
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intrusive mothers directly called for a pattern of more avoidant and passive behaviors, 
because successful solicitations of maternal response would have brought about 
overstimulation or more anxiety.  
  Finally, the study by Dawson (1992a, b) basically provides an inside view of the 
brain that shows what might have been the neurological counterpart of the infant’s 
embodied coping experiences.  Because affects are intertwined with perception from the 
perspective of embodied coping, the infant’s neuro-affective systems seem to develop 
according to the quality of interactive experiences with her mothers.  In their experiment, 
even though all the infants were playing the same peek-a-boo game with their own 
mothers, their neuro-affective responses corresponded to the specific interactive patterns 
associated with either the “normal” or “depressed” mothers. 
  In conclusion, the phenomenological notions of direct perception and embodied 
coping skills could effectively account for all of the empirical evidence that has been 
taken as the proof of presymbolic representations.  The literal existence of representations 
is always inferential, and their ontological implications are often very problematic, as 
discussed here.  Hence, Gallagher (2008) argues that it would be more economical and 
parsimonious to explain social phenomena without representational concepts.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Dissertation Conclusions and Discussion 
 
5.1 Infant Research and the Phenomenological-Hermeneutic Method 
  There is no doubt that recent developments in infant research deserve tremendous 
appreciation.  From a methodological standpoint, many of these studies are carefully and 
brilliantly designed to address some specific theoretical questions in infant psychology. 
Our current project respectfully treats the entire field of infant experimental research as 
an invaluable pool of data for further phenomenological exploration.  
  Nevertheless, from a phenomenological-hermeneutic perspective, we attempted to 
take on several “gray” areas in infant research in order to enrich our understanding of the 
deeper implications of empirical findings.  First, our critical reexamination of a number 
of selected research experiments revealed the circular relationship between brute 
observational data, theoretical explanations, and ontological underpinnings.  For example, 
we showed that the age-old theoretical debates about the “drawbridge phenomenon” can 
be attributed to an underlying dualistic framework that renders two competing 
explanations mutually exclusive.  Also, we challenged and deconstructed the rationale of 
some of the “ontological leaps” that infant researchers often make based on observational 
data in their studies.  
  Second, our critical reflection on the experimental procedures and setups, such as 
the habituation-dishabituation, preferential-looking, and violation-of-expectancy 
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paradigms, highlighted the importance of examining the ecological validity of these 
artificial experimental situations.  We argued that this is especially important when 
drawing ontological relevance from the infant’s behaviors observed in experimental 
settings.  
  Finally, we approached these research studies from a phenomenological 
perspective by establishing their “lived-contexts” and offering a more integrated 
phenomenological account for their findings.  Unlike most infant researchers, we 
attempted to pay extra attention to the minor details and nuances of the infant’s 
experience in experimental situations, viewing each experiment in terms of the unique 
spatio-temporal unfolding of events as experienced by the infant participants. 
  Our phenomenological-hermeneutic interpretive method was built on an 
understanding of the ontologies of developmental research.  Throughout this project, we 
followed through this emphasis by systematically explicating a variety of dualistic 
assumptions in infant literature.  Again, this kind of scholarly effort is beyond the 
capacity of experimental methods and statistical analysis, and is more philosophically-
grounded and comprehensive. 
  We provided an extensive overview of the dualistic issues associated with each 
topic areas in infant research, as well as an explicit, alternative nondualistic framework 
upon which further analyses of the research studies were done.  We distinguished 
between the descriptive, behavioral descriptions from the researchers’ theoretical or 
conceptual interpretations in the research literature.  In turn, our method allowed us to 
systematically deconstruct the dualistic explanations and establish a phenomenological 
account for the experimental outcomes; these efforts provided an empirical ground for 
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our nondualistic framework.  Furthermore, our method guided us to reveal the 
simplifications and generalizations underlying these dualistic assumptions (e.g., the 
comparison between visual occlusion and darkness).  Conversely, we fully spelled out 
our circular, hermeneutic re-reading of the written infant research records, allowing the 
progression of our reasoning or thinking to be reexamined and reflected upon by other 
readers.  
5.2 The “Story” about the Infants in this Project 23 
  In retrospect, this project follows two trajectories.  On the one hand, it seeks to 
show the relevance of a nondualistic ontology by reinterpreting empirical infant studies 
as its supporting evidence; this is an example of how an ontological inquiry can be based 
on empirical research evidence, which is a contribution to all scholars who are interested 
in addressing ontological issues in science.  On the other hand, our analysis also attempts 
to demonstrate the legitimacy of phenomenological and nonconceptual concepts, which 
are rooted in this nondualistic ontology, in explaining the experimental outcomes and 
observations in these research studies.  This dissertation is an example of how an 
alternative ontological framework can serve as the starting point of psychological 
interpretations and also thereby is a direct contribution to infant psychological research.   
  To sum up, we believe that the primary contribution of this investigation lies in 
our demonstration of the legitimacy of the phenomenological, nonconceptual, and 
nonrepresentational explanations for accounting for experimental findings in infant 
research.  Without these “grounded” explorations, our effort to validate a nondualistic 
ontology would be much more difficult and unconvincing.  The “story” about the infants 
                                                 
23
 This characterization of a “story” is in reference to Rochat’s (2001) discussion of validity.  
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that has emerged through our investigation is precisely founded on such a nondualistic 
ontology.  Let us take a closer look at this vision of the infants in a nondualistic world.  
  As discussed before, the lived-world is a philosophical notion that transcends the 
Cartesian subject-object and inner-outer distinctions.  When these dualistic conceptions 
are replaced by the idea of the lived-world, the infants’ actions toward the objects in the 
world become understandable without the hypothetical cognitive operations.  This vision 
of the infants’ lived-world points to the fact that their bodily capacities are inextricably 
connected to their interest and grasp of the objects.  As demonstrated in our analysis of 
the object-permanence research, when the former becomes increasingly advanced, the 
latter is correspondingly transformed.  This idea is expressed in Merleau-Ponty’s 
articulation of the “intentional arc” which ties the subject and the objects (and the world) 
in a tightly-webbed system.  In other words, it is not necessary to rely on the model of a 
mind or consciousness and the hypothetical internal entities (i.e., internal cognitive 
schemas or representations) in order to explain the changing nature of the relationship 
between infants and the objects.  For the idea of internal knowledge or understanding is 
inevitably associated with some forms of mental representations, the notion of 
physical/object knowledge might not be the best characterization for the infant behaviors 
described by the researchers.   
  Based on an integrated subject-object view of object perception, the phenomenal 
world is envisioned as always in the process of becoming, never determinate; it is always 
partial but fully meaningful.  For infants, a perceived object is neither a factual entity in 
the physical world nor a subjective, mental construction—rather, it is in-itself-for-us.  
The objects in the phenomenal world do not appear to infants as fully-determinate objects, 
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and are never given to them completely and totally in perception.  As Merleau-Ponty 
(1962) suggest, “the presence and absence of external objects are only variations within a 
field of primordial presence” (p.106).  Thus, partiality is always an integrated aspect of a 
perceived object; thus, it is not the concept of object-permanence that drives the infants to 
retrieve a partially-hidden object as discussed in our analysis of the object-permanence 
research.  
  From a phenomenological standpoint, infants’ visual perception of an object 
immediately brings about a simultaneous perception of its touchability.  Thus, the “out of 
sight, out of mind” metaphor is not quite accurate.  Touchable objects are permanent 
entities in the world; thus, the so-called permanence of objects is in a way already 
implicated in infants’ embodied situation.  In addition, because infants’ actions are 
concretely tied to the specific objects in the world, all the sensory components associated 
with a perceived object are integral to its identity.  Thus, when one component (e.g., the 
sound) is removed, it is no longer the same phenomenal object for them.  Accordingly, 
instead of thinking about object-permanence as a concept that infants gradually acquire, it 
is more appropriate to conceive the infants’ actions toward the objects during the first 
year in terms of how their grip of the visible and touchable objects might change over 
time.  According to Merleau-Ponty (1962), this progression can be captured by the 
transition from concrete movement to abstract movement.  Our explication of this 
transition can be summarized as follows:  
  At the beginning, the newborns’ bodily interest and actions are tied to their 
immediate visual grip of the objects.  The attention flow of newborns is characterized by 
a continuous flow in which their visual focus is repeatedly being redirected toward the 
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next interesting thing or event that remains visually accessible and potentially touchable.  
The visual absence of an object means termination of interest for them.  Gradually over 
the next six or seven months, as the infants’ motor capacities and visual tracking abilities 
become increasingly advanced, their relationship to the objects continue to expand in 
both spatial and temporal dimensions.  Correspondingly, some embodied, nonconceptual 
expectations about the visual-and-touchable objects become to develop.  Thus, infants 
between one to four months of age seem to be somewhat “shocked” by the sudden 
disappearance of an interesting object.  Beginning at around the eighth month, their 
bodily capacities allow them to track and anticipate the movement of an object, and to 
perceive the “affordance” of a partially-occluded object as a possible motor project in 
retrieving it.  According to Merleau-Ponty (1962), however, these achievements are still 
only indicators of “concrete movement.”  Soon after that, nonetheless, infants begin to 
demonstrate the ability to carry out “abstract movements” based on a pre-reflective, 
embodied understanding of how their actions toward one object can open up the “future 
space” or further potential motor actions.  Perceiving an obstacle as an object that, if 
removed, can reveal the visibility and touchability of an interesting object, is an example 
of this achievement.  
  The image of an infant that emerges in this project is also much more holistic than 
the separate theoretical camps within infant research.  For example, our extensive 
analysis of the drawbridge phenomenon provides a portrayal of the infants who have both 
natural perceptual inclinations and preferences, as well as some embodied understandings 
of the objects-in-motion.  This idea has contributed to our understanding of the age-old 
debate between the perceptual-processing and the conceptual explanations about the 
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drawbridge study, and provided a clarifying account for the variable outcomes in other 
versions of the drawbridge study. 
  Infants do not live in a world inhabited by an array of still objects.  From a 
phenomenological perspective, their phenomenal world also includes constant motions 
and pure movements (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).  Hence, movement is not a secondary 
property of the objects in the perceptual world; rather, it is central to the identity of the 
objects-in-motion.   Based on Merleau-Ponty’s description of movement perception, it is 
shown that infants perceive or decipher the “behavior” of the moving object, or the 
manner of its passing, so to speak.  According to this idea, the perception of something in 
“transit” must be understood as fundamentally anticipatory or “hypothesis-generating.”  
This notion of movement perception requires neither “mental tracking” nor conceptual 
knowledge of the permanence and continuity of objects in motion.   
  Lastly, infants’ phenomenal world is not fundamentally a categorical world—in 
other words, they do not perceive discrete categories in their natural habitat.  
Nevertheless, the ways in which multiple objects show up in the infants’ lived-world 
(which speaks to a process of perceptual organization) are intertwined with their bodily 
interest and inclinations ( or “motivation”).  When an experience is introduced to alter 
their bodily interest and inclinations, such as the habituation experimental process, 
infants can be “motivated” to reorganize or reconfigure their perceptions.  For example, 
our phenomenological reflection on the infants’ experience in a particular experimental 
situation shows that their perceptual organization was “motivated” by the displeasure 
associated with the habituation process.  This process propelled them to pull together 
some of the “generalizable” features of these objects.  This idea should inspire further 
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inquiries about whether or not the development of more advanced object categories is a 
purely natural process, or whether “motivations” from our interpersonal and 
social/cultural existence play a role in shaping the process of object categorization as well.  
  Our portrayal of the infants’ lived-body is a deliberate effort to overcome the 
mind-body dualism in infant literature.  From our point of view, the dualistic conceptions 
about how the mind controls and directs the body to act intelligently do not fit with the 
immediacy of infant behaviors as observed empirically.  Our explication of Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of the lived-body not only reveals the infant’s motor intentionality which 
is the foundation of a primordial sense of “I can,” but also articulates an idea of bodily 
intentionality that is fully capable of accounting for learned and intelligent actions.   
  These ideas about embodied infants are in sharp contrast to the classical view of 
the body as a mechanical and physical entity in infant literature.  Our nondualistic 
framework shows that the lived-body is coupled with the world, actively structures the 
practical space, responds directly to any spatial changes, and is fully aware of itself in 
both proprioceptive and affective domains.  These ideas provide a vision of the infants as 
pre-reflective embodied copers.  Rather than acting as little scientists observing the world 
from a neutral and removed perspective, the embodied infants directly and pre-
reflectively cope with the world through refining their perceptions and actions.  
  As embodied copers, infants are motivated by an innate tendency to achieve a 
“maximal grip” of the world, which is the basis of a revolutionary model of skilled 
perceptions and actions (Dreyfus, 2002, 2007).  Thus, they directly perceive the 
“affordances” of worldly objects as solicitations of situations in the world, which propel 
them to respond in a certain manner—in other words, affordances are both perceptual and 
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action-oriented.  As Merleau-Ponty (1962) suggests, “any mechanistic theory runs up 
against the fact that the learning process is systematic; the subject does not weld together 
individual movements and individual stimuli but acquires the power to respond with a 
certain type of solution to situations of a certain general form” (p.164). 
  This vision of intelligent and learned behaviors suggests that the infants’ lived-
body automatically reconfigures itself in response to some handicapped situations.  
Merleau-Ponty (1964) also highlights this compensatory capacity of the lived-body in his 
discussion of a patient with brain injuries.  As our analysis has shown, when the light is 
turned off, the darkness immediately reconfigures the embodied infants’ relationship with 
the objects that were previously reachable and visible.  In this relatively handicapped 
situation, the auditory sense of space is immediately accentuated.   
  In addition, because infants are intelligent embodied beings always in the process 
of coping with the world, successful experiences bring about perceptual refinement for 
them.  As they become increasingly refined in perceiving solicitations of situations in the 
world, their actions correspondingly become more skilled.  This process is evident in our 
exploration of what the infants might have acquired during the familiarization process in 
several memory-and-learning-related experiments.  These “situations” are not fixed and 
determinate features of the environment, nor are they rigid mental schemas that neglect 
the surrounding world. 
  The perception of “affordances” or solicitations is fundamentally anticipatory and 
always tied to our bodily capacities and interest.  Our skillful perception and actions form 
a web of intelligence that continues to feed on more relevant experiences.  Thus, in 
embodied coping, memory works at the level of direct perception and immediate actions.   
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For instance, through successful reaching toward the different sound-making objects 
during the familiarization trials of an experiment, the infants became perceptually refined 
to such an extent that the sounds presented in the dark immediately propelled them to 
engage in a particular manner of reaching. 
  However, the embodied infants are dedicated not only to mastering skillful 
perception and actions in the physical aspect of the world (e.g., reaching with hands), but 
also to refining their social behaviors based on affective experiences.  In this sense, 
infants are coping with both the physical and socio-affective aspects of the world.  
Affects played a major role in determining the ways in which the infants coped in the 
puppet experiment. For example, on the one hand, the “smilers” were motivated to 
initiate what was perceived as the beginning of a pleasant interaction through smiling and 
sustained visual attention.  On the other hand, in contrast, the nonsmilers were motivated 
to look longer at the novel puppet—partly as a quick termination of what was perceived 
as the start of a boring/unpleasant experience, and partly as an attempt to search for 
something more interesting or pleasant. 
  The sum up, the notion of the lived-body supports an idea of bodily intentionality 
that is not trapped within immediacy, and thus, allows for an account of intelligent and 
learning behaviors without representations.  In embodied coping, infants’ perception and 
actions are not only tied to each other, but they are also immediate, anticipatory and 
“memory-based. 
  From the perspective of an intersubjective ontology, the infants’ social world is 
fundamentally a communal world.  This concept provides an alternative ontological 
ground for infant researchers to situate their interpretive inquiries.  In particular, the 
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starting point for such investigation no longer has to begin and end with the notion of a 
self.  Unlike some researchers who insist that the human face is no different from other 
objects that move and speak, our phenomenological analysis of the empirical findings 
suggests that infants have an inherent awareness of human forms.  Furthermore, their 
conscious social existence is characterized by a state of being present with others 
(“compresence”) or coexisting with others (co-existentiality).  As Merleau-Ponty (1962) 
also suggests, “we must therefore rediscover…the social world, not as an object or sum 
of objects, but as a permanent field or dimension of existence” (p.420). 
  From a dualistic point of view, the infants’ sociality is conceived in terms of an 
isolated conscious subject against other separate individuals.  Infants are so deeply 
entrenched in their sociality that they demonstrate a tendency to perceive the inanimate as 
the animate.   Not only do they imitate the movements of an inanimate object, but they 
also tend to perceive a sense of social intentionality from dynamic displays of movement 
involving two objects.   
  In addition, the body is often conceived as under complete control of an 
overseeing mind; hence, the boundary of the physical body is considered as the boundary 
of the self.  However, our reflection on infants’ facial and emotional imitations provides a 
testimony to the “anonymity” or generality of their body, effectively deconstructing the 
idea that the physical body marks the territory of an individual selfhood.  As Merleau-
Ponty (1962) also suggests, “I experience my body as the power of adopting certain 
forms of behavior and a certain world…now, it is precisely my body which perceives the 
body of another, and discovers in that other body a miraculous prolongation of my own 
intentions, a familiar way of dealing with the world” (p.142). 
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  Hence, the infants’ earliest sociality is syncretic by nature because there is no 
reflective thematization of the self and others.  This lack of thematization is not the same 
as a complete undifferentiation or confusion.  Through the transfer of corporeal schemas, 
infants’ perception of others is immediately an invitation to adopt their gestures and 
emotions in their own body.  The phenomenon of infantile imitation in both facial and 
emotional dimensions is based on a primordial identification between embodied beings in 
a common world, without a reflective awareness of the identities of self and the other.  
This characterization again speaks to a kind of co-existence or an “anonymous 
collectivity.”  In our point of view, these primordial imitative exchanges are foundational 
to the infants’ social development, including the ongoing, interaction-based process of 
facial configurations and the integration between her proprioceptive body and her mirror-
image.   
  In the intersubjective world, the infants’ sociality is not based on interacting 
minds but the fundamental transferability of intertwining bodies.  The intentions of 
embodied beings (infants and adults) always play across each other through the transfer 
of corporeal schemas, and thus, the problem of how to access other minds is no longer the 
same issue under the ontology of intersubjectivity.  Prior to the development of any 
“theories of mind,” it seems that infants do perceive other human beings as intentional in 
a pre-reflective and embodied manner.  The infants’ social existence, so to speak, is 
characterized by the interplays of intentional embodied beings. 
  Infants are not confused in a syncretic social world.  An intersubjective ontology 
does not support the hypothesis that infants would be constantly living in confusion in 
this world, and thus, it is different from the psychoanalytic portrayal of a completely 
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undifferentiated, symbiotic relationship.  Our vision of infants’ intersubjective existence 
is capable of accounting for the evidence suggesting that they can “distinguish” and 
“discriminate” between what belongs to themselves and what belongs to others. 
  As embodied agents coping with an intersubjective world, infants’ social 
existence is not preoccupied with a mental project of discriminating and grouping from 
experiences what belongs to self and what belongs to others.  Accordingly, the idea of 
self-and/or-other-representations, which is the logical consequence of the hypothesis of a 
“discriminatory consciousness,” is also problematic under this intersubjective ontology.  
In contrast, our nondualistic framework provides a vision of the embodied infants who 
can also directly cope with the vicissitudes of their social experience without mental 
representations.  Unlike the representational explanation, this integrated view of social 
perception and action captures the immediacy of meaningful, adaptive, and learned 
interactive behaviors of infants.  From this perspective, infants only “memorize” their 
interactive experience insofar as it refines their direct and immediate perceptual 
repertoire in social situations, and automatically propels them to act in certain 
anticipatory manners as a mean to cope intelligently.  Given that the literal existence of 
representations is always inferential, Dreyfus (2008) is correct that it is also more 
economical and parsimonious to explain social phenomenon without representational 
concepts. 
5.3 Concluding Thoughts  
  The discussion of the limitations of this entire project can be divided into two 
levels: ontological and theoretical/developmental. In our point of view, it is impossible to 
fully validate an ontological framework based on experimental studies because there is a 
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limitation of the data collected in these artificial settings, which might not speak to the 
ontological structures of human beings in their natural habitat.  
  Ontology is an incredibly complex field of philosophical inquiry.  Our 
investigation endeavors to ground ontological exploration on written records of 
experimental research in infant psychology.  Nonetheless, our conclusions do not do 
justice to the diversity of ontological thoughts.  On the one hand, for the purpose of this 
project, we are fully aware of the generalizations and simplifications being made 
concerning the dualistic remnants in contemporary infant literature.  For the most part, 
we had no intention to single out individual scholars as the culprits of Cartesian dualism 
in infant psychology.  Many quotations were chosen for the sole purpose of highlighting 
the most common misconceptions rooted in dualism.  In fact, we noticed through our 
extensive review of the literature an interesting tendency of infant research scholars and 
theorists: an occasional shift between dualistic and “anti-dualistic”24 propositions in the 
progression of their writings.   
  Our phenomenological-hermeneutic method brings about a conscious effort to 
limit any “ungrounded” philosophical explorations that might be too removed from the 
experimental outcomes and observations.  Thus, it is correct to say that our chain of 
thoughts and arguments presented here do not fully represent the nondualistic ontology 
proposed by Merleau-Ponty through many years of writings.  As a matter of fact, there is 
already a diversity of ontological thought in philosophy that can be considered as 
nondualistic, and their potential application to experimental research awaits further 
                                                 
24
 At times, most of these infant researchers and scholars would make a statement explicitly stating their 
refutation of dualism, even though a lot of their conceptions and explanations are based on a dualistic 
framework, of which they seem to be unaware.  
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exploration.   
  This project is also limited in its scope of theoretical-developmental exploration 
as well.  In fact, we do not consider this project as a well worked-out, alternative 
developmental theory of infancy.  Our emphasis is on demonstrating the legitimacy of 
nondualistic, phenomenological explanations in accounting for empirical findings, with 
the hope of inspiring further explications of human development based on scientific 
psychological research.  Nevertheless, we do not suggest that the term “nondualistic 
ontology” is the font of truth: it does not automatically bring about an integrated theory 
of development.  Furthermore, we believe that there should be theoretical debates even 
though two competing arguments might both be grounded on a nondualistic ontology.  
  Based on our commitment to phenomenology, we were not particularly interested 
in making absolute predictive conclusions and cause-and-effect propositions.  
Accordingly, our analysis did not provide a theoretical-developmental account that 
perfectly lays out the unfolding of developmental sequences and accurately predicts the 
occurrence of developmental achievements.  Instead, we focused on showing how the 
structures of the infant’s relationship to her body, objects, and others, evolve over time 
during the first year, in a meaningful way.  For example, whereas our lengthy discussion 
of the ontological implications of neonatal facial and emotional imitation highlights their 
relevance to the infants’ social development, we have no intention to integrate the 
imitative mechanism into a learning theory or a developmental theory of selfhood (e.g., 
Stern, 1986; Merleau-Ponty, 1964) because it is not a major purpose of this project.  
  From our point of view, the invention of an integrated theoretical account of 
development, regardless of its founding ontology, would inevitably sacrifice the 
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complexity and vicissitude of human existence—from the dimensions of culture, 
language, symbols, and social structures, to the relevance of neurological maturation, 
interpersonal experience, and existential concerns.  Hence, we have purposefully limited 
my participation in developmental theorizing.  When theorizing takes place in this project, 
we seek to stay in close contact with the empirical observations.  
   In conclusion, beyond the direct findings and conclusions of the current 
investigation, this project also aims to making some broader contributions in two 
dimensions: methodological and ontological.  From a methodological standpoint, this 
project is an extensive demonstration of how to approach experimental research records 
from a phenomenological-hermeneutic perspective that highlights the circular relation 
between ontology, epistemology, and theory.   
  This approach can enrich our understanding of experimental studies in several 
ways.  First, it guides us to look at research experiments in fully-contextualized terms as 
a unique spatio-temporal unfolding of events.  Second, it shows that experimental setups 
and procedures could not be understood without recognition of infant’s innate interests, 
inclinations, motility, affective experience, and manners of embodied coping.  Lastly, it 
also calls for our critical attention to the details (minor variations) of the experimental 
paradigms, designs, and procedures in accounting for the research outcomes.  
 Particularly, our phenomenological reflection on the “violation-of-expectancy” 
and “habituation/ dishabituation” paradigms has provided two valuable methodological 
implications.  First, it offers an empirical ground for making sense of the variable 
outcomes across similar studies due to minor alterations in experimental conditions, 
setups, and procedures.  Second, it illustrates the importance of being critical and 
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somewhat suspicious about the ecological relevance of the experimental situations—
whether or not they are representative of human natural habitat.  In our opinion, these 
demonstrations can serve as an inspiration for future scholars who aspire to explore the 
fullness and complexity of experimental research in any areas of psychology.   
   From an ontological point of view, this project reveals the importance of 
ontological dialogues in infant psychology.  Our rigorous phenomenological-hermeneutic 
analysis has shown that all theoretical interpretations and conceptual accounts presuppose 
some ontological assumptions, exposing their potential problems at the logical, inferential, 
and philosophical levels.  Even though our investigation is clearly founded upon a very 
specific version of nondualistic ontology (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 1964, 1968), we would 
contend that one of the broader contributions of this project is the promotion of a 
reflective, intellectually-stimulating dialogue about ontological thoughts within 
psychology, dualistic or nondualistic, Cartesian or post-Cartesian.  Such dialogue 
certainly exists in the field of philosophy, but we are inspired to keep pushing it into the 
territory of psychology and grounding it on an empirical pool of experimental findings.  
  Furthermore, given the indwelling presence of Cartesian dualism in psychological 
literatures, we believe that any nondualistic explications of psychological research can 
benefit from further revision and refinement through an ongoing dialogue.  Finally, for 
the scholars who might find wisdom in the nondualistic ontology proposed by Merleau-
Ponty, we hope that our investigation would further push forward an ongoing effort to 
justify its validity on empirical and scientific grounds.  Future investigations like this 
should involve continuing efforts to reexamine up-to-date cutting-edge experimental 
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research, and to monitor the increasingly-complex evolution of dualistic thoughts that 
prevail in the literature. 
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